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OZLEM TÜR KAVLI 
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS - THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF THE 
MIDDLE EAST? A CASE STUDY OF TURKEY PHD, 2003 
This thesis attempts to provide an explanation for the emergence of Islamist 
movements in the Middle East. The main argument is that Islamist movements are a 
response to an imposed version of modernity and join the New Social Movements of 
the West in their critique of modernisation and homogenous national culture defined 
by elites. 
The thesis rejects mutually exclusive, single causal arguments in 
understanding Islamist movements. It proposes that studying elite-imposed 
modernisation processes in the Middle East, including their economic, political and 
cultural aspects, can provide a better understanding of the phenomenon. The thesis 
draws on theories of New Social Movements and post-modernity, as well as 
alternative understandings of the public space, in order to understand the nature of 
collective action in response to modernisation processes in the Middle East. These 
processes have been characterised by state-led capitalist industrialisation, imposed 
conceptions of homogenous national cultures and the consolidation of the nation- 
state. This thesis identifies Islamist movements as being responses to these alien and 
imposed experiences of modernisation. 
The thesis uses Islamist political parties in Turkey as a case study. It argues 
that the nature of the political system and public space in Turkey have been such that 
Islamist political parties have been one, and arguably the most important 
manifestation of the Islamist movement in that country. The thesis demonstrates that 
Islamist political parties have evolved in Turkey as a response to the republican 
modernisation project. Their credentials as Islamist movements have nonetheless at 
times been compromised by their function as parties competing for political power. 
While the thesis focuses on the Turkish case, its central argument has a clear 
relevance for the general understanding of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The main argument of this thesis is that Islamist movements are a response to an 
imposed version of modernity and join the New Social Movements of the West in 
their critique of modernity and homogenous national culture as defined by elites. 
The thesis examines the rise of Islamist political parties in Turkey as a case study. 
The term "Islamist" is defined here as the organisational ideologisation of 
Islamic revivalism, with an explicit or implicit political agenda. This agenda may be 
either the pursuit of power or the desire to influence the political arena in such a way 
as to promote Islamic norms and values, sometimes but not necessarily including the 
desire to implement Shari'a law. 
Islamist movements represent the main opposition to the authoritarian 
establishments of the Middle Eastern state and gather support from a large group of 
citizens who are alienated from their regimes on economic, political and cultural 
grounds. Studying Islamist movements is important in understanding what 
constitutes the major political debate in this part of the world. As well as their 
dimensions within the individual nation-states and against the nation-states, Islamist 
movements have trans-national characteristics that go beyond the scope of the state. 
Some analysts see them not only as a threat to the future of the Middle Eastern 
regimes but also to Western society and modernity, increasing the urge to understand 
what the Islamist movements really are. 
This thesis understands such movements as political expressions of the r 
phenomenon of Islamic revivalism, or the revival or reassertion of the Islamic 
identity in the public space. Islamic revivalism itself has so far generally been 
I 
explained by mutually exclusive single causal arguments focusing on responses to 
either socio-economic conditions or political factors or an elite-imposed culture. 
This thesis understands Islamic revivalism as a response to the combined economic, 
political and cultural impacts of an elite-imposed modernity. In doing so, the thesis 
draws on New Social Movements theories, which locate the emergence of new social 
movements in `the West' in a response to the "crises of modernity". New Social 
Movements introduce a strong critical approach to the prevailing politics and 
political cultures in the countries where they develop. 
The basic features of the New Social Movements (NSMs), are that they 
advocate a new social paradigm, which contrasts with the dominant goal structure of 
Western industrial societies. They generally question the emphasis on economic 
growth and materialism prevalent in industrial societies. Instead, they advocate 
greater attention to the cultural and `quality of life' issues that have received less 
attention in the post-War rush to affluence. They strongly challenge the nature of the 
corporatist-bureaucratic state, and are highly suspicious about the established elite 
and the state apparatus. The legitimacy of this elite is challenged by the claim that it 
does not represent the population as a whole. They further reject its claim of 
integrity, morality and ability to address the critical issues that the societies are 
facing. They advocate universalistic moral concerns, away from using 
institutionalised politics for instrumentalist concerns. They are able to refrain from 
formal political structures and organise and mobilise in other forms in liberal, 
democratic countries of the West, where political activities are only constrained by 
democratic legal processes and procedures. 
In the Middle East there has also been a comparable "crisis of modernity", 
which I argue, accounts for Islamic revivalism. However, responses to these crises of 
modernity take divergent forms from those of the West. The Islamist movements are 
1) 
different from the NSMs due to differences in the prevailing political structures in 
the two regions. As in the Middle East there is a greater or lesser degree of absence 
of a legal environment outside of formal political structures within which movements 
responding to this crisis of modernity can operate, the ideologisation and 
organisation of these movements are different. The ways in which they develop their 
ideology and seek to organise are constrained by the non-liberal, non-democratic 
political environments within which they operate. This must be taken into account 
when studying the Islamist movements in any given country. Despite such a 
difference in the political environments, the thesis underlines that New Social 
Movements theories can be used to understand how Islamist movements as social 
movements arise as a response to modernity. 
This thesis refers to this alternative political environment in terms of the 
concept of "public space". Habermas defines `public space' as "a realm of our social 
life within which something approaching to public opinion could be formed. "' Thus, 
"a portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which 
private individuals assemble to form a public body. "2 Citizens are noted to behave as 
a "public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion - that is with the 
guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and 
publish their opinions - about matters of general interest. "3 The restrictions on the 
citizens' rights to assemble and express themselves mark the differences between the 
Middle Eastern and the Western public spaces. 
However, for this work, such a distinction does not decrease the importance 
of the recent discussion about the changing nature of the public space. The bourgeois 
nature of the public space, as it was formed by the end of the 18`h century in the 
West, discussed in the-works of Habermas, has in the last decades bee h subject to 
serious challenges from a new group of elites with their own concerns, thanks to the 
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media and the mass education. This concept of a new elite, or a counter-elite, that 
challenges the definitions of the public space by the traditional elites becomes an 
important debate in the Middle East. In the Turkish case, the counter-elite challenges 
and questions the military-bureaucratic elite and the imposed modernisation project 
that laid down the rules and laws within the public space. 
This is closely related with a second challenge to the nature of the public 
space: The erosion of the distinction between the public and the private space. What 
was considered as belonging to the private space like the religious and moral 
conscience and intimate matters has for the last decades become issues of public 
concern. In the Middle East, like in the Western countries, religious and ethnic 
identities, which were regarded as belonging to the private space, are emerging and 
challenging the distinction of public-private separation. This makes the public space 
a field for the competition of private interests. In Turkey, religion was confined to 
the private space with the Republican reforms in early 1920s. The rise of the Islamist 
political parties in Turkey, can be understood as one of the primary identities, 
religious (Islamic) identity, that was a matter of private space, emerging in a "crisis 
of modernity" and becoming a common concern in the public space. 
As the Turkish case shows, efforts to advance a political agenda by Islamist 
movements have largely, but not exclusively, taken place within the sphere of 
electoral competition. Unlike many Middle Eastern countries, electoral competition 
plays a significant role in the political scene of the country, although the military- 
bureaucratic elite, from time to time, intervened in party politics. Apart from political 
parties, other forms of Islamist movements (e. g. religious orders like Nur Tarikati, 
Nakgibendi Tarikati, Iskenderpaýa Cemaati, etc. ) also exist, but the most important 
manifestation of Islamist movements is by this thesis considered to be the political' 
parties. The opportunity for politics to take place through a genuine electoral 
4 
competition is the main reason for this emphasis of political parties. Habermasian 
public space conditions the kind of activities that Islamist movements would take and 
the form that they would assume, depending on the political culture of a given 
country. Thus, in the Turkish case the public space is characterised by electoral 
politics. Given the limitations set upon civil society activity, by constraints on rights 
of expression and association, political parties play the dominant role in the political 
scene. Even religious orders advance their political agendas through links with the 
political parties in the country. 
Since its transition to multiparty politics in 1946, competitive elections and 
peaceful transfer of power following national electoral contests have been the 
principal characteristic of Turkish politics. Unlike their counterparts in many other 
developing countries, including those of the Middle East, political parties in Turkey 
have displayed a relatively high degree of organisational strength, complexity and 
continuity. 4 
Identifying Turkish politics as party politics is widespread in scholarly 
literature. 5 Frey commented as early as 1965, "Within the power structure of Turkish 
society, the political party is the main unofficial link between the government and the 
larger extra-governmental groups of people [... ]. "6 Özbudun recently wrote that 
"Turkish politics are still by and large party politics. Most people realise that there is 
no alternative to political parties [... ]. "7 Thus, this thesis will study Turkish Islamist 
political parties as a manifestation of an Islamic revival, and try to locate them within 
a discourse on responses to modernity. 
It is necessary to acknowledge, however, that despite being the main 
mechanism through which interest articulation is materialised and being the main 
actors in the political scene of the country, political parties, remained largely 
autonomous from the social groups that they represent, both because of being elite 
5 
centred and constrained by the function of power-seeking itself. This enhanced their 
instrumentalist nature, different from the social movements of the West. Most 
scholars of Turkish politics would agree that the origins of the party system in the 
country rest on a centre-periphery cleavage: a nationalist and secularist state elite 
(military-bureaucracy) pitted against the "culturally heterogeneous, complex and 
even hostile periphery with religious and anti-statist overtones. "8 As Kalaycioglu 
writes, the choice of voters among parties had in part reflected their identification 
with the belief system and interests of the centre or of the periphery. 
9 In order to gain 
the electoral support of the periphery, that constituted a greater segment of the 
population and held the key for gaining electoral victory, most political parties used 
discourses that would appeal to this "religious and anti-statist" periphery. 
At the same time, these political parties, in most cases, retained their 
autonomy from these social groups by shifting from one electoral base to another and 
abandoning the interests of their supporters once elected to office. 
10 This is closely 
related with the political party formations in the country. Most political parties of 
Republican Turkey were formed by the elite, and the multi-party politics came into 
existence rather "abruptly and in the absence of organised movements actively 
seeking to procure political citizenship rights for the masses. "11 Unlike Western 
Europe, where the extension of suffrage to lower classes came about gradually and at 
times involved resorting to violence, the transition to multiparty politics was a 
political decision made at the top, more or less independently of the demands of the 
social groups. New parties were generally founded not through new channels and 
demands from the society but rather by factional splits from the already existing 
parties. This led Turkish political parties to retain their autonomy from the society at 
, large and adopt clientalistic structures and patronage distribution in return for 
political support for their elite formations. The nature of the political parties, being 
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autonomous if not detached from the social groups that they represent, led to an 
instrumentalisation of policy. To use Heper's analysis, the "extreme 
instrumentalism" of political parties became an important characteristic of party 
politics, which is attributed to "the absence [... ] of a civil society with political 
influence. " Islamist political parties have, so far, been no exception to the general 
characteristics of Turkish political parties with their instrumentalism and autonomy 
from the society. 
This thesis will demonstrate that Islamist political parties in Turkey have 
made a clear instrumentalist use of Islamist objectives to advance the parties' 
opportunities for winning power. Thereby, the Islamist political parties are also 
themselves constrained by the function of power seeking. Similarly, their links with 
other forms of Islamist movements bear marks of instrumentalism. Therefore, the 
thesis argues that Islamist political parties are not simply manifestations of Islamic 
revivalism but have an additional and at times contradictory dimension that must also 
be acknowledged. 
In its analysis of Islamist political parties in Turkey, this thesis will follow 
a chronological narrative. The modernisation process, with its economic, political 
and cultural components is studied in this narrative. The Islamist political parties as 
responses to this modernisation, which is fundamentally elite-imposed, are located in 
this framework. 
Up until 1980, the modernisation project of Turkey was composed of a 
combination of state-led capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and homogenous 
national culture. Turkey is an interesting case in studying Islamist movements in the 
sense that the modernisation project has been based on excessive emphasis of 
Westernisation and secularisation, and an attempted re-definition of the role of 
religion in society - regulating and confining its role in the public sphere. In the 
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newly formed Republic, the homogenous national culture was formed around the 
themes of Turkishness and secularism and there was no room for independent 
Islamist groups in the political sphere. 
Opposition to the modernisation project of the military-bureaucratic elite 
emerged as early as the 1920s. This was a natural reaction to the secularist reforms 
by traditionalist circles. Such reactions were suppressed during the consolidation of 
the Republic and single party rule. Populism and corporatism were also incorporated 
into state discourse at this time' and thus left little room for the development of 
independent collective action in general, collective action being defined here as 
individuals acting collectively, gathering with purposeful orientations and organising 
a common behaviour. 12 Various parties, some of which demonstrated Islamist 
dimensions, were founded as multi-party politics was introduced in 1946. However, 
they remained as minor actors in the political scene. The major centre right parties, 
the Democrat Party during the 1950s and the Justice Party during the 1960s, 
successfully used Islamist discourse in an attempt to gather the support of the 
periphery. 
The 1970s are important in the country for Islamist political parties. The 
most significant Islamist parties during this period were the `National Opinion 
parties' founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970, which has played an important role 
in representing the majority of the Islamist groups until 2002. Erbakan's parties, 
repeatedly closed for being against the Constitution and subsequently re-opened 
under different names, increasingly challenged the components of the modernisation 
project. 
By the late 1970s, the modernisation project had become highly fragile due 
r 
to the failure of the state to deliver economic prosperity to the citizens as well as 
decreasing legitimacy of the hegemonic ideology. As a remedy to such failure, the 
S 
country opened up its economy by implementing liberalisation measures and 
decreasing the economic role of the state. Economic liberalisation brought with it a 
more liberal political environment in the 1980s. This in turn resulted in drastic 
changes in politics and collective action, most significant of which was the 
proliferation of identities that challenged the modernisation project in general. 
Islamic identity posed one of the main challenges to the Kemalist modernisation 
project, generating support for the Islamist political party of the time. 
Support for the Islamist movements, which had previously been generated 
from the lower-middle classes and the petit-bourgeoisie during the 1970s, was 
increasingly coming from the university students, businessmen, journalists and 
intellectuals. These were themselves the products of modernity and the modernising 
reforms like mass education and equal rights of citizenship. Now, however, they 
were advocating an alternative interpretation of modernity and created an `Islamic' 
version of the key elements in the national identity. Concepts such as Islamic dress, 
Islamist businesses, an Islamist bourgeoisie, Islamist intellectuals, Islamist feminists 
challenged the definition of modernity and the role and power of the traditional elite 
- the military bureaucracy - in defining the public sphere and what modernity meant. 
The Turkish case is significant in the sense that the Islamist movement's `symbolic 
revolution', to use Bourdieu's words, against the centre, has taken place openly in 
the public space from the 1980s onwards. An increase in the votes for the political 
parties that proposed such a `revolution' as a political project became a significant 
source of debate during the 1990s. The 1995 elections carried the (Islamist) Welfare 
Party of Erbakan to power in a coalition government with the centre-right True Path 
Party. Upon coming to power, Erbakan began to give speeches referring to an 
approaching `transformation' to an Islamist order that would take place with or 
without blood' in Turkey. Despite such a discourse, the party did not make any 
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policy moves-towards this direction in government. This contradiction is a sign of the 
instrumentalist features mentioned earlier. Such speeches were nonetheless enough 
to increase the tension between the secular circles - notably the military-bureaucratic 
elite - and the Islamist groups. This tension peaked in a soft coup in 1997. 
This thesis is composed of six chapters. The first chapter draws the 
theoretical framework of the NSMs. It analyses the main arguments regarding the 
New Social Movements within the changing patterns of collective action in the West 
from class to cross-class, cultural, issue-based movements within post-industrialism 
and post-modernity. It underlines how the NSMs are a response to modernity. 
Further, the chapter explains how modernity came to the Middle East with the elite 
imposed modernisation projects and the differences in the theme of collective action 
in the region from that of the Western world. The chapter also points to the 
assumptions within NSM theory concerning the nature of the public space, which 
may not be relevant in other (non-democratic) contexts. 
The second chapter examines the main approaches to the Islamist 
movements. It explains the socio-economic, political and cultural approaches to the 
growth of Islamist movements in the Middle East and underlines the necessity of an 
approach bringing all these three perspectives together. It proposes analysing the 
Islamist movements within a modernisation process that brings economic, political 
and collective action themes together by drawing at the themes raised by the 
discussion of New Social Movements while acknowledging the varying nature of the 
public space in Middle Eastern countries. It proposes as an alternative a non- 
reductionist approach to the study of Islamist movements. 
The third, fourth and fifth chapters focus on the case study of Turkey and 
r 
the examination of the Islamist movement in the country emerging within and as a 
response to the modernisation process. The chapters focus on the Islamist political 
10 
parties as the case study. The third chapter analyses the modernisation project 
between 1908-1946. It discusses the process of reforms that started as early as mid- 
19th century and resulted in the efforts of the military-bureaucratic elite, led by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, to engage in a Western-inspired nation-building process 
after the formation of the Republic in 1923. It also studies how the modernisation 
project-was formulated and which reforms were implemented to accomplish the 
project. The chapter examines the emergence of an Islamist reaction against the 
reforms that was manifested within the two short-lived multi-party periods. Further, 
it analyses the impact of single party rule, populism and corporatism preventing any 
expression of an explicit Islamist opposition. 
The fourth chapter focuses on the period of multi-party politics and the 
emerging class structure and class identities between 1946-1980. The collective 
action during this period revolved both around the newly developing class identities 
and the continuing duality, between the military-bureaucratic elite and the political 
periphery. The chapter analyses the representation of the Islamist groups in the 
centre right parties until 1970, and later within Necmettin Erbakan's Islamist 
political parties. It also notes the collective action shaping around class as well as 
ideological lines, similar to that of the old social movements. 
The fifth chapter analyses the post-1980 political developments. It focuses 
on the redefinition of the modernisation project with liberal, free market policies and 
the increasing emphasis on a Turkish-Islamic synthesis taking over the 
Westernisation framework. Further, it studies the proliferation of different identities 
in the society, one of which is Islamic. The chapter analyses the rise of Islamist 
political parties in relation to this re-defined version of modernisation. 
Throughout these three chapters, the thesis will point to the developing 
nature of the public space, the character of collective action, (in order to illustrate the 
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- political environment and constraints on Islamist movements), as well as examining 
the nature of the Islamist political parties themselves, assessing how they represented 
Islamist projects on the one hand, but compromised themselves with instrumentalist 
approaches to attaining power on the other. 
The sixth chapter analyses the discourse of the Islamist political parties 
from 1970s onwards and locates the evolution of the discourse in relation to the 
changes in the modernisation process. The chapter reflects how the Islamists saw 
themselves as responding to modernity as well as how they used Islamic discourse in 
order to appeal to the periphery. Again, this serves to emphasise the tension between 
their function as Islamist movements and their utilitarian approach towards seeking 
power. 
The thesis concludes that a process comparable to the emergence of New 
Social Movements can be identified in Turkey with the Islamist political parties as 
the most significant elements of the Islamist movements, articulating a response to 
modernity. This response has been compromised, however, by the prevailing 
political structures which determine that Islamist movements should most effectively 
take the form of political parties but which are then themselves compromised by their 
power-seeking function. 
This case study offers a useful framework within which comparable Islamist 
movements in other Middle Eastern countries may be studied. However, this 
response will take different forms as a result of the processes by which modernity is 
pursued as well as the differences in the political structures. Political parties may not 
always be the most relevant form of Islamist movement to be studied, but the notion 
of Islamism as an organisational and ideologised response to elite-imposed versions 
r 
of modernity remains valid. Equally, the choice of Islamist movements to be studied 
12 
in any given case should be made with due reference to the nature of the public space 
in that country, or the prevailing political structures. 
The most common forms of transliteration are used in the text. Turkish 
names are written in their original form. They are written in italic letters and are put 
into parenthesis when they had been translated in the text. I have made all the 
translations of the texts when necessary. Thus, it is my responsibility should there be 
any ambiguities in the translation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
MODERMSATION, GLOBALISATION AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept and theory of New Social 
Movements. This provides us with a framework for understanding the political 
responses to modernity that have been experienced in the West. The chapter will 
explain how the processes and problems of modernity generated a new form of 
collective action - New Social Movements. The chapter then examines the 
comparable process of modernisation in the Middle East, although it will be argued 
that modernity in that context has been an elite-imposed phenomenon (unlike the 
experience in the West). While this form of modernisation initially took the form of 
nation-state-led capitalist development and corporatism - undermining the 
opportunities for social classes to develop as they had in the West - more recent 
experiments with economic liberalisation have unleashed new problems and social 
forces that challenge this elite-imposed version of modernity. 
NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
The main feature of the New Social Movements lies in their challenge to the 
Enlightenment process and the underlying components of Western modernity. They 
challenge the nation-state and the official state ideology and bring culture and 
identity issues into the heart of politics. The evolution of the literature on New 
Social Movements coincides with the debate on globalisation, post-industrialism, the 
information/network society and the widely accepted view that Western societies 
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have left modernity behind and entered a new phase of history generally referred to 
as post-modernity. 
It is a widely held view that the term "movement" is closely related with 
modernity: "either social movements constitute modernity, or at least make a very 
large contribution to its appearance". ' Ron Eyerman supports this idea by saying 
that "modernity connotes movement"2 in line with the writings of Alain Touraine, 
stating that "modern society is the first type of society to reproduce itself and the 
social movements are the decisive force in this process". 3 
During the "modern" period, the capitalist industrialisation process was the 
underlying mechanism determining the dynamics of society and class struggle was 
seen as the main collective action. With the transition from the industrial to post- 
industrial society and from modernity to post-modernity, independent of the class 
struggle, New Social Movements are the main collective action in the West today. 
As told in the beginning of the chapter, while the Western societies are 
occupied with demands for change being voiced through the New Social 
Movements, societies of the Middle East are experiencing strong Islamist movements 
demanding social change along the lines of Quran and the Shari' a law. The question 
to be asked in this chapter is "can the study of the New Social Movements, with their 
understanding of collective social responses to modernity, provide a useful 
framework for understanding the Islamist movements in the Middle East? " 
In an attempt to find an answer to this question, I will in this chapter firstly 
be looking at the debate on modernity, social change and social movements. I will 
then discuss what some people term as the `old' social movements that are based on 
class identity. Further, I will talk about the debate on the process named 
r 
alternatively `new modernity', `the second-modernity', or `post-modernity' and the 
development of the New Social Movements (NSM). Then I will discuss the 
is 
relevance of this framework in the Middle Eastern case, and look at how social 
movements of the region were shaped in comparison with, and contrast to Western 
social movements. 4 
THEORIES OF MODERNITY, SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
According to Jürgen Habermas, modernity is the name for a partial but nonetheless 
quite significant historical realisation of key proposals from the progressive, 
humanist agenda of the European Enlightenment - the project of modernity - 
developed by the "horizon of Reason". 5 With the onset of modernity, all subsequent 
developments - of the self, society and nature - would be under the aegis of reason. 
6 
There is a general agreement in literature that modernity involves a rapid 
and all-encompassing change despite disagreement over where to place the turning 
point and the beginning of this modernity. Dahrendorf sees its beginnings between 
the "autumn of the Middle Ages and the first traces of the protestant ethic and the 
spirit of capitalism, that is, the turning point of the 15th and 16th centuries, the key 
period of the modern world"7 in line with the views of Parsons who sees Renaissance 
and Reformation as the beginning Of modernity, adding the importance of industrial 
and democratic revolutions and the education revolution that followed. There is 
another group of scholars that locate the beginnings of modernity in the social 
change that came with the impact of industrialisation, urbanisation and political 
democracy much later in the 19`h century. Whichever approach is taken, modernity 
carries with it connotations of a new experience of the world, a world that is re- 
invented "through the active and conscious intervention of actors and the new sense 
of self that such active intervention and responsibility entailed, '. 8 
Within modernity, capitalism played a vital role as the basic component of- 
the new system. As Weber says, capitalism became the "most fateful power of 
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modem life". Not subscribing to the reductionist claim that capitalism played the 
central role in the transformation to modernity, the idea here is that modernity of the 
economy (capitalism) represented a prototype for the. modernisation of other 
institutional spheres like law and governance. While the control of the means of 
production constitutes the core of the capitalist economy, seeing this as the decisive 
factor in the structure of modernity might be misleading. Rather it could be seen as 
one of the central forces in an overall change paving the way for modernisation. The 
separation of economic action from politics is a basic characteristic of the capitalist 
system, and it was accompanied by the separation of state, law and science from 
politics. 9 However, the role played by capitalism should be analysed carefully in this 
process as it contributed greatly to the passage from the traditional to modern 
societies. 
Polanyi notes that in traditional societies, "the economic system was 
submerged in general social relations... the self-regulating market was unknown; 
indeed the emergence of the idea of self-regulation was a complete reversal of the 
trend of development". 10 With the advent of capitalist industrialisation, industrial 
plants were established, heavy industry was given special emphasis making the steel 
industries and single industry localities central to the system. Manufacturing the 
basic commodities for the modem society became the primary goal of the capitalist 
production. The society that came with capitalism was "free" in the sense that 
economic activities were not dominated by the political motives and concerns; 
t production decisions were based "on the norms of economic rationality". " 
With the advent of capitalism, the move of the individual from rural 
communities and farm labour to centralised urban work places resulted in a physical 
r 
and mental break with the traditional community life. The individual was set free 
from the communal ties, while at the same time the community itself was changing 
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with the forces of modernisation. There was no longer a social bond in the modern 
community that kept the parts together; it was not an all-embracing process that left 
little room for individuality. Rather the restrictive role of tradition decreased while 
room for individual liberation increased. As a result of these developments, the 
traditional social networks that formed the basis of social identity no longer had 
direct control over the individual, making him subject to new influences, making 
possible the formation of new social networks and political identities. The idea that 
the individual was freed from the "established identity-giving mechanism"12 and was 
now free to reconstruct his world is a widely held view, but this is not really the case. 
It would be wrong to assume that the individual was set free to choose his world with 
the advent of modernity. The process of modernisation gave the individual his new 
role in the society, defined by his place in the industrial capitalist production. He 
would be "the consumer" of the system rather than its producer. Thus, the `liberating 
nature' of modernity is questionable and this issue came to constitute the main 
arguments of post-modern discourse. One might think that the individual is "free" as 
a consumer after all, as he has the freedom to choose in the market among various 
goods that are produced for his choice. Freedom in the sense of contribution to the 
consumer culture is not what is meant here by freedom. Khuri defines freedom as 
"how fully a human being is able to flourish as a whole. The larger the `circle' 
within a human being is covered by freedom, the more truly free one is. s13 With the 
capitalist economy, the occupational status of the individual, his class position, was 
seen as determining almost all aspects of his life: how and where the person lives, 
what kind of consumption habits he will have, what kind of political opinions could 
be expected from him. Thus, the individual was now `depending' on his class 
position determining his "life-world", far away from being "free". In addition to 
18 
these-constraints drawn by the class, the nation-state ideology and how it impedes 
difference and thus freedom will be discussed below. 
THE ADVENT OF THE NATION-STATE 
Ian Roxborough writes that to each form of economic development, a particular form 
of politics and form of state apparatus would correspond. 14 Following his argument, 
we can say that for the capitalist industrialization and mode of production, nation- 
state became the political apparatus. 
Although the beginnings of the international system based on nation-states 
go back to the 1648 Westphalia Treaty, the modem contemporary nation-state carne 
much later. Habermas notes that the nation-state came as a response to the necessity 
firstly for new legitimacy for the political authority that is "stripped of its religious 
grounding in `divine right"' and secondly for social integration of the geographically 
mobilised and isolated citizens. 15 With a quest to solve these challenges of industrial 
capitalism/modernity, a new form of community - the nation - was introduced. 
Habermas proposes that 
only a national consciousness crystallised around the notion of a common ancestry, 
language and history, only the consciousness of belonging to "the same" people, makes 
subjects into citizens of a single political community - into members who can feel 
responsible for one another . 
The nation - the first truly modern form of collective 
identity - provided the cultural basis for the constitutional state. As drawn out by 
historians, this thoroughly artificial fusion of older loyalties into a new national 
consciousness which was also steered by bureaucratic imperatives is a long, drawn-out 
process. 16 
This "artificial fusion of old loyalties into national consciousness" is of 
significant importance here as the nation-state rested on the assumption of a 
culturally homogenous population. Within this assumed cultural homogeneity - the 
nation - all the differences regarding the individuals and groups of culture, ethnicity, 
religion and sometimes language were overlooked and were replaced by the 
"national culture", that is generally the hegemonic majority culture implemented by 
the elite. In many cases, this majority culture became the dominant political culture 
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of the country that claimed to be recognised by all citizens regardless of their cultural 
background. '7 The role of the state and the intellectuals were seen as decreasing any 
impediments for the advent of reason and creating the environment where its utmost 
realisation could be attained. While doing this, the modern nation-state propagated 
some patterns and was set to eliminate others, promoting similarity and uniformity. 
- By applying a uniform law for all the people residing in the territories of the nation- 
state and giving the status of citizenship to the members, all the members of the 
nation-state were proclaimed to' be indistinguishable from each other. Whatever 
distinctive qualities they might have had, were seen as illegitimate. Bauman names 
this quest of the state to form uniformity as "cultural crusades" aimed at "destruction 
of autonomous, communal mechanisms of reproduction of cultural unity". 18 In time, 
citizenship and cultural conformity seemed to merge, where the latter was seen as a 
condition for the former. Politics in general is identified with the functioning of the 
capitalist system. Rather than focusing on the management of change or reforms, the 
political system of the nation-state was concentrated on `order', in which modernity 
and capitalist-industrial production could flourish. 
`CLASS' AS THE CENTRAL THEME IN COLLECTIVE ACTION 
As presented above, following Roxborough's claim that to each form of economic 
development, a particular form of politics and form of state apparatus would 
correspond; for capitalist industrialization, the nation-state became the political 
apparatus. We can extend the argument of Roxborough here by saying that to every 
political system a form of collective action and social movement corresponds. Thus, 
the social movements, in the period under consideration here, revolved around class 
r 
structure and class antagonism. During the- period of "modernity", capitalist 
industrialization and the nation-state were accompanied by class and class based 
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social movements as the main mechanism for collective action in society. 
Workplace and employment were seen as the key to the position of the individual in 
the society and the production process was the main focus of attention; therefore 
social antagonism and demand for social change revolved around the class struggle. 
Demands for better working conditions, better payment and social benefits 
constituted the main source of mobilization for these movements. 
The homogenous culture of the nation-state was not questioned at this 
time. However, this did not mean that the national culture remained unchanged or 
static. It was renewed as it became subject to class struggle. Originally, upper 
middle class establishment had defined the contents of this national culture. As 
labour movements came to power, they adjusted the national culture to bring it in 
line with labour identity. This did not mean challenging the national culture or the 
unity of the society but rather reproducing it with labour values. 
The beginnings of the modem age, its impact on society and the absorption 
of the individual into the new, modern structures received widespread scholarly 
attention. The works of Karl Marx constitute an important place in this literature. 
The development of the modem capitalist order, the formation of a class society and 
basically the route to social change through class action are central in the works of 
Marx. According to the Marxist analysis, the capitalist mode of production resulted 
in a group of individuals owning and controlling the means of production (the 
bourgeoisie) and another group that used their labour for survival (the proletariat). 
Thus, this was the beginning of a new form of oppression, oppression based on 
economic power, for the masses. As Perry Anderson notes, 
Capitalism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby the 
surplus which is pumped out of the direct producer is purely `economic' in form - the 
wage contract: the equal exchange between free agents reproducers, hourly, and daily, 
inequality and oppression. All the previous modes of exploitation operate through extra 
economic sanctions - kin, customary, religious, legal and political. 19 
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The dynamics of the society were- seen as revolving around this 
antagonistic relationship of class struggle, the struggle between the bourgeoisie and 
the proletariat. This was also seen as the main mechanism for social change - the 
driving force of the social movements. Social movements can be viewed as 
collective enterprises to establish a new order of life. 20 Marxist thought has foreseen 
this "new order of life" to be formed by the collective action of the workers against 
the exploitation of the bourgeoisie capital. Mapping history as the history of class 
struggle, Marx emphasises the' struggle between the two major classes - the 
bourgeois, which owns the means of production as well as the political power, and 
the proletariat, who have only their labour force to serve the capital. 
One of the main points in Marx's work is the idea that the "mode of 
production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life... It is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their being but on the contrary, their social 
being that determines their consciousness". 21 The point made above regarding the 
linkage between an individual's place in the production system and his life-world is 
directly linked to this point in Marxist analysis. 
The Marxist approach to collective action was shaped by a three-step 
approach: structure - consciousness - action. According to this approach, the 
consciousness of the individual that was shaped by his place in the structure has not 
only determined his interests, but also his action in the society. The main class that 
would take the revolutionary role in changing the system was the proletariat. The 
capitalist order would be changed with the collective action of the proletariat, against 
the oppression of the bourgeoisie, and a socialist order would be formed as a 
consequence, which is a higher stage of evolution. 
r 
Up until the world economic crisis of 1929 the predominant economic 
structure of Western Europe was undoubtedly one of industrial capitalism. The 
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political agent was the nation-state, playing a minimal role in the economy. During the 
post- World War II period, the Keynesian economic system was adopted by the 
European states. Consequently, the state took on a major role in the economy, and the 
conditions of the workers improved considerably. The Keynesian economic model 
rested on state regulation of the economy where a policy of full employment was 
adopted and maintained basically by controlling demand through taxation and other 
fiscal policies. Increased levels of state provision in education, health and welfare 
became the characteristics of the period. This was the establishment of the European 
welfare state. 
In the production scene, Fordism became a common practice: the large scale 
mass production of cheap, uniform commodities, the detailed division of labour and 
extensive hierarchical organisation of productive activity. Mass production was 
associated with mass consumption, maintained by the state's support of the economy 
during this period. The capacity to plan and regulate national economies rationally 
seemed to be achieved in the West during the period after the Second World War as 
economic expansion was witnessed in this part of the world. Up until the 1970s, the 
components of "modernity", industrial capitalism, nation-state and class identity 
continued to dominate the Western societies. 
CHANGES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY AND DECLINE IN CLASS IDENTITY 
The system induced by "modernity" began to show signs of change as the 1970s 
arrived. During the post-war period of economic expansion, manufacturing 
industries increased their production significantly to meet the demand for consumer 
goods, until the competition and the saturation of the domestic market led to a 
dccline in these industries. The post-war economic booth was already declining 
when the oil price crisis of early 1970s hit the Western economies, leading to a 
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further collapse of the manufacturing industries. This gave way for a new "post- 
industrialisation" period. 
The Fordist production pattern of mass industries of the post-war period 
began to be replaced by the `flexible production patterns' on smaller, dispersed sites 
in contrast to the huge industrial plants, with production being designed according to 
consumer demand, in small quantities. The neo-liberal policies that proposed 
liberalisation of economy and primacy of market forces was gradually adopted by 
Western governments. State monopolies were passed into private hands and the state 
withdrew to a regulating role of the economic sector. The decline in the 
manufacturing industries led to periodical increases in the number of unemployed in 
the Western countries. These newly unemployed individuals were mainly absorbed 
by the growing service sector. Thus, the concept of working class became less 
relevant as a result of these developments. 
The decreasing importance of industrial production led to the loosening of 
class positions and identity defined by employment and class. This is closely related 
with the welfare state system in the post-Second World War period and the success of 
the working class in managing to influence the state towards implementing a system of 
equality. The social change to overcome this inequality was not coming through 
revolution led by the proletariat but rather via the incorporation of the working classes 
into the corporatist and distributional networks of the welfare state. According to 
Schmitter corporatism can be defined 
as a system of interest representation in which the constituent units are organised into a 
limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognised or licensed (if not created) by the state 
and granted a deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in 
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supporters. 12 
Organising in corporatist groups, the working class in time became a client 
of the state occupied in distributional competition with others. Workers parties, in 
their bids to the state, were successful in providing their members with better 
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working conditions, better payment and decent salaries for decent life standards. 
Thus, under `organised capitalism', with an active state role in economy, the 
significant relationship of the individual to the means of production seemed to be 
overridden, if not replaced, by his relationship to the means of distribution, to the 
state. 23 This was one of the main factors that led to the loosening of class structure. 
It was not the failure, but rather the success of the labour movements in getting their 
demands and changing their positions in society that was now opening new avenues 
for identity and collective action. 
GLOBALISATION 
Globalisation is a widely used, fashionable concept regarding the changes of our 
time. There are different definitions of this concept. Although Wallerstein says that 
the world has been going through a social compression since the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, with the advent of the international capitalist market, the theorists 
of globalisation contend that since the 1970s we have been living in an entirely new 
era: 
It is widely asserted that we live in an era in which the greater part of social life is 
determined by global processes, in which national cultures, national economies and 
national borders are dissolving. Central to this perception is the notion of a rapid and 
recent process of economic globalisation... The world economy has been 
internationalised in its basic dynamics, it is dominated by uncontrollable market forces ... the principal economic actors and major agents of change are truly transnational 
corporations, that owe allegiance to no nation state and locate wherever in the globe 
market advantage dictates. 24 
The global economy is often contrasted with the post-War Keynesian 
economics. In the post-War economic system, the main actors were the nation states 
that were linked by trade, but which nonetheless produced primarily for domestic 
consumption. Production process took place in national territories and the states 
often controlled,, protected and supported these industries. This process was 
underlined with the policies of Import Substitution Industrialisation in most of the 
Third World, making the state not only the main employer but also the main 
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producer. The changes in the post-War economic order came with many different 
processes, the most important of which was the technology and information 
revolution. This led to drastic changes in the production processes, altering the 
logistics, structures and relationships of the previous structure and facilitating the 
internationalisation of capital markets. Trade started to be replaced by foreign direct 
investment as the connection between states made the trans-national companies the 
main actors in the international market. In the face of these developments, the 
appropriateness of the nation-state as a unit of analysis in international relations 
started to be questioned, as well as the term's definition regarding the institution 
where important governing decisions are made. Rather than the nation-states, the 
supra-national and sub-national became the focus of contemporary concern. 
Hirst and Thompson underline four characteristics of globalisation: The 
first one is a truly globalised economy where national economic actors, governments 
and firms find themselves "confronting an international economic system which has 
become autonomised and socially disembedded". 2' The second element is that the 
trans-national corporations became the major players in the world economy, willing to 
locate anywhere for the most secure or the highest returns. The third element is the 
decline in the political influence and economic bargaining power of organised labour. 
This also includes the erosion of class struggle and consequently the decreasing 
validity of social analysis based on class. The fourth characteristic is the growth of 
multipolarity in the international political system. 26 The nation-states lose their 
centrality in world politics as non-political actors, like transnational firms and 
multinational corporations gain power, at the expense of political actors. 
Another important aspect of globalisation is the way that it links local 
events with those at the global level. When defining globalisation, Giddens notes 
that, 
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Globalisation can be defined as an intensification of world wide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
events occurring many miles away and vice versa. This is a dialectical process 
because such local happenings may move in an obverse direction from the very 
distanciated relations that shape them. Local transformation is as much a part of 
globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space. 7 
The localization and relativization of culture against the Western `norms' 
and `value system' is a continuing debate in the non-Western parts of the world. 
Rather than the homogenous culture of each nation-state, there is debate going on 
regarding the global culture that shapes the individuals all around the world. 
However, this concept of a global culture is regarded with suspicion by many, as it is 
seen as a justification for further spread of Western ideas, values and culture. Giddens 
notes that globalisation is a consequence of the spread of Western culture throughout 
the world by "settlement, colonization and cultural replication". 28 
Even if globalisation is a consequence of centuries long process, it does not 
mean that the culture it brings will be accepted in every corner of the world. Rather, 
globalisation activates localisation; the residents of a local community would want to 
make conscious decisions about which values and facilities they would like to 
implement in their communities. In fact, globalisation is complementary with 
fragmentation. This is a factor distinguishing modernity from globalisation. 
Modernisation theory suggested that the world was moving from particularism to 
universalism and that it was converging on a consensus. In contrast, globalisation is a 
"complex interaction between globalizing and localising tendencies - so-called 
`glocalisation'; a synthesis of particularistic and universalistic values". 29 
As pointed out above, there are different aspects of globalisation; it 
encompasses a totality of different processes and change taking place in different 
spheres all at the same time. The main difficulty in dealing with the concept of 
globalisation is that it is a process that we are still going through and we don't know 
at what stage of this process we really are and how far we can/if we can proceed 
further down this line. Despite differences in the level of "global ising", the countries 
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of the West are considered to have entered a post-industrialist, post-modem period 
with the advent of the globalisation process. The research of Englehart shows that 
the entire world is far from entering the post-modern period. 30 While some parts of 
the world are still struggling to enter the modernisation period, most of the countries 
of the West are cited as being well into post-modernisation, with the Nordic 
countries and the Netherlands being considered as the most post-modem countries in 
the world at the present time. 31 
Despite differences in the present level of passage to the post-modem 
condition among states, one thing must be made clear: that once the transition starts, 
the forces are unleashed that challenge the old order - the modernity in its nation- 
state and homogenous culture components. The transition to a new form of 
economic production will be accompanied by changes in the political apparatus and 
the nature of collective action. Economic liberalisation and the impact of 
globalisation open new venues for political establishments, for the shaping of 
individual needs and identities and the organisation of collective action. As the role 
of the state declines and the state ceases to be the sole power in the political arena, it 
is met by multinational, supranational and subnational forces and class ceases to 
represent the demands of the society for social change. 
To summarize, we can say that the old, organised capitalist system 
characterised by the heavy industrial core of the motor, chemicals, electronic and 
steel industries is being challenged and significantly undermined by the growth of 
finance, property, service, knowledge and Research and Development functions. 
Thus, a new core is replacing the old industrial core, which gathers around 
information, communications and other services like telecommunications, tourism 
and leisure. Daniel Bell characterises the post-industrial society as `knowledge and' 
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innovation serving as the strategic and trarisforming resources of the society, just as 
capital and labour had been in earlier industrial society". 32 
POST-MODERN CULTURE AND IDENTITY 
In the post-modem stage, the unifying ideology of the nation-state with its focus on 
economic growth and prosperity is being questioned. This questioning involves 
dissolution of the hegemonic culture of the modem period, leading to the proliferation 
of culture and identity issues. 
The post-modem environment locates the individual at its centre while in 
modernity, individuals were seen as members of an entity, of a whole. As a result of 
the achievements of modernity itself, such as mass culture, increasing educational 
levels and generalisation of citizens' rights, individuals in post-modernity are the 
main components or subjects of society. Inglehart links the spread of post-modern 
culture and values emphasising individual self-expression and quality of life 
concerns to the economic development achieved in the modern period. 33 The main 
concern of the industrial era - that of existential security and survival - is attained in 
the contemporary Western societies and people take their survival for granted. This 
leads to the post-modern shift from emphasis on coping with survival to maximizing 
subjective well-being. 34 
One of the main characteristics of the post-industrial society is not only the 
change in production pattern, but also the change about what is actually produced. 
Some writers go as far as to suggest that what is now produced is not material 
products anymore but rather signs - either those of informational goods like know- 
how or post-modern goods like music, cinema, leisure, magazines, and videos. 35 
This seems like an exaggerated and rather a utopic idea as industrial production still 
continues and material goods are still produced. However, there is some truth in this 
29 
approach in the sense that non-industrial goods are widely produced and consumed 
and they are produced to fit more specifically into individual development and 
personal needs. Melucci names the basic antagonism of the post-modern context, as 
concerning "the way development is conceived and identities and needs are defined... 
Production is no longer making goods, instead it has come to mean controlling 
complex systems of information, symbols and social relations". 36 
The rise of identity politics, the increasing discourse in culture and 
identity, is one of the main features of this developing new global order. Castells 
characterises this closely with technological development: 
In a world of global flows of wealth, power and images the search for identity, collective 
or individual ascribed or constructed becomes the fundamental source of social meaning. 
This is not a new trend, since identity has been at the roots of meaning since the dawn of 
human society. Yet, identity is becoming the main and sometimes the only source of 
meaning in a historical period characterised by destructuring of organisations, 
delegitimation of institutions, fading away of major social movements and ephemeral 
cultural expressions. People increasingly organise their meaning not around what they do 
but on the basis of what they are or believe they are. Meanwhile, on the other hand, 
global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, 
groups, regions and even countries according to their relevance in fulfilling the goals 
processed in the network, in a relentless flow of strategic decisions. It follows a 
fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism and historically rooted 
particularistic identities. " 
A definition of identity and what is meant by identity politics should be 
provided here. Calhoun writes that: 
We know of no people without names, no languages or cultures in which some manner of 
distinctions between self and other, we and they are not made... Self-knowledge - always 
a construction no matter how much it feels like a discovery - is never altogether separable 
from claims to be known in specific ways by others. 39 
As identity is formed in a continuous interaction with others; many factors 
in the society have an impact on how we and others define ourselves/us. With the 
advent of post-modernity how we categorize ourselves and others is no longer 
focused on employment and work, but rather on the production of symbols and 
meanings of social interaction. The main antagonism has therefore shifted to how 
, this meaning and social codes are produced and by whom. Thus, the social 
movements of the contemporary period, the New Social Movements, strive to 
transform the dominant political cultures, the meanings and norms that are developed 
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outside their control and challenge the dominant groups that determine these codes in 
the society. 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DEBATE 
If class movements are associated with modernity, the New Social Movements 
(NSMs) are associated with post-modernity. 39 This is a widely held but also widely 
contested issue. The popular movements that are taken into the scope of the NSMs, 
like the peace, environmentalist and women's movements, have generally rather long 
histories, with the possible exception of the ecology movements, and they all carry a 
strong continuity with earlier civilization-critical movements. 40 However, the 
`newness' of these movements can be seen in their focus on new individualities and 
cultural proliferation as well as in their cross-class membership profile. In the sense 
that they are addressing the post-materialist themes, like the "new risks" such as 
environmental pollution and the threat of nuclear war41 as well as the rights of 
women and homosexuals, these movements introduce a "new" aspect to the social 
movement context. But going beyond that, the NSMs introduce a strong critical 
approach to the politics and the political culture of the countries in which they 
operate. Koopmans has argued that the essence of NSMs "does not lie so much in 
the new way of conducting politics but rather in the fact that they reflect the rise of 
new themes and new actors on the political stage". 42 In addition to bringing new 
themes (based on a critique of modernity) and new actors (the new middle classes 
and the counter elite) the challenge NSMs pose to the political culture and the 
political system in which they operate also signify elements where their main novelty 
resides. It is true that NSMs raise new themes with the incorporation of the new 
work force into the economy with mass education policies, mass employment 
opportunities and the high levels of social mobilisation this brought in the post- 
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World War II period. In addition to this, they are significant because they bring the 
"conduct of politics" into question. They challenge the modernity that constitutes the 
basis of the present political order and the role of the elite in defining the 
homogenous culture and modernity. In this sense they are generally considered as 
the products of "post-modernity". 
To summarize the basic features of the NSMs, we can say that they 
advocate a new social paradigm, which contrasts with the dominant goal structure of 
Western industrial societies. ' They generally question the emphasis on economic 
growth and materialism that is prevalent in industrial societies. Instead they 
advocate greater attention to the cultural and `quality of life' issues that have 
received less attention in the post-War rush to affluence. They are advocating 
universalistic moral concerns, away from using institutionalised politics for 
instrumentalist concerns. They strongly challenge the nature of the corporatist- 
bureaucratic state, and are highly suspicious about the established elite and state 
apparatus. The legitimacy of this elite is challenged by the claim that it does not 
represent the population as a whole. They further reject its claim of integrity, 
morality and ability to address the critical issues the societies are facing. NSMs 
generally use alternative methods in their campaigns, rather than the conventional 
forms of party politics and they usually combine their activities with leisure activities 
and present a real `counter-cultural context' to that of the established politics. 
Until the 1970s social movements were simply seen to be the side effects 
of modernity. They were either rejected as not having a valid claim on governance 
or they were perceived as anomalies and simple rejections of a modem life. 43 
Commonly, a socio-psychological line of reasoning was applied: uprooted and 
lonely, economically vulnerable individuals, were seen as the members and main 
supporters of these movements. 
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- The changing nature of the social movements from being based on 
production and employment to culture and identity has been reflected in the changing 
approach to discourse. In the recent literature, NSMs attract popular attention. The 
recent and the now widespread approach to the study of the NSMs is the `identity- 
formation' argument. 44 Although the argument varies from author to author, the 
basic premise of this approach is that we never view events directly as they are but 
through our intellectual prisms (our lenses) composed of our presumptions about our 
society and ourselves. The prisms give our observations meaning, shape our 
emotions and determine our political approaches to events. However tolerant and 
open minded we might think ourselves, we can never escape our cultural prisms 
when reviewing social happenings. Thus, cultural assumptions are constantly 
influencing our understanding of things and our exercise of power. The ability of the 
non-elites to redefine their identities and free themselves from the limitations of an 
elite designed homogenous nation-state culture and identity is the starting point in 
the study of the NSMs. People coming together in the movement structures 
contribute to the movement with their different opinions and reshape its structure in a 
continuous fashion in cases where intra-movement democracy exists. Most of these 
movements create extensive `communication networks' 45 like bookstores, radio 
programmes, workshops, and magazines. Through the media, movements often 
successfully radiate their ideas throughout the society and encourage new ideas, 
different from those of the elite. Thus, social movements not only reflect popular 
culture but also produce and shape it. 
The NSMs focus on the inevitability of inequalities in every society and 
the attempt of elites to legitimise these inequalities by talking about the advantages 
of the status quo and the dangers of the alternatives. According to the identity- 
formation theorists, despite an elite's efforts to shape the thinking of the society - the 
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non-elite - through the educational curricula and government's influence, repeatedly 
questions the elite's definition of reality in both daily expressions of popular culture, 
in cafes and teahouses, as well as in the organised social movement. This is what 
Terry Eagleton terms the "culture wars", going on in contemporary societies that are 
"no longer simply a battle of definitions but a global conflict. "46 
To summarize the developments since 1970s, what we see in the economic 
sphere has been the breaking down of the industrial capitalist production based on 
Fordist production scheme with the globalisation of markets and the spread of 
transnational capital. Politically this has mainly resulted in the increasing 
questioning of the role of the nation-state, and its decreasing role in the economic 
sphere, despite its persistence as the main political actor in the arena. Class identity 
has ceased to be the main hegemonic identity. Particularly with the decreasing 
hegemonic identity, proliferation of different identities has been an important factor. 
New Social Movements have replaced class movements as a new type of collective 
action in this post-modem period. 
THE MIDDLE EASTERN EXPERIENCE 
In the above section, the developments in the West regarding the collective action in 
the light of the modernity - post-modernity debate have been discussed. The basic 
economic and political structures as well as the basic identity and collective action 
features have been drawn for both the modern and the post-modern periods. The aim 
of this section is to look at this debate in relation to the Middle Eas t47 and try to find 
out how, if at all, this theoretical framework that has grown out of the Western socio- 
political experience works within the Middle East. This is a non-Western region that 
r 
has economic, politic .1 and cultural 
dynamics distinct froth those of the West. At the - 
same time it also embarked upon the modernisation process and policies of state-led 
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capitalist industrialisation and later economic liberalisation. Rather than the NSMs, 
it witnessed the growth of Islamist movements as the main representative of 
collective action in the region since the 1970s. 
Modernity arrived in the Middle East as an `imported project' and was 
often applied by the elite of the country in a top-down fashion in a drive to catch up 
with the growing power of the Western countries. "Social engineering" became the 
main task of the new regimes - the modernising elite of the countries - that saw the 
state as composed of different agencies that would help to build the societies that 
they had designed. 48 This intended "modernization project" has often taken a form 
where the basic institutions mimicking the Western experience were established 
without having the historical, economic and social roots. With the advent of these 
modern Western type institutions, the elites of the Middle Eastern countries thought 
that traditional ties would weaken, the role of religion would decrease and the 
countries of the region would embrace modernity despite the late incorporation to the 
modern world. 49 The ethnic and cultural issues were generally neglected and seen as 
a part of the traditional society that would `pass away', with the modernization of 
society. 
For the Middle Eastern countries, like others that implemented 
modernisation from above, the modernization meant the combination of the three 
important processes of capitalist industrialisation, consolidation of the nation-state 
structure and the homogenisation of cultural identities. How modernity has been 
`implemented', rather than `imposed', on the societies of the region and what 
political identity and collective action results it conveyed will be the main subject of 
the next section. 
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THE BUILDING UP OF STATE-LED CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALISATION 
The Middle East entered the world capitalist economic system quite late, mainly as 
an exporter of raw materials. By the beginning of the 19th century most of the 
Middle Eastern territory was under Ottoman control, at least nominally. As the 
power of the Ottoman Empire began to decline during the 19`h century, the French 
and the British intensified their competition for influence and colonies in the region. 
It was also mainly by the 19th century that most of the Middle Eastern markets were 
penetrated by European industrial goods, especially textiles and iron goods. Soon, 
producing raw materials for the factories of Europe, especially cotton, became the 
main economic activity in the region, which served to sustain the flow of these new 
imports. Transformation of the agriculturally dominated economy from subsistence 
to export-oriented cash crops integrated the Middle Eastern economies in a 
peripheral status to the world economic system. This led to the emergence of a new 
class of commercial mediators, as well as political groups acting as agents of colonial 
powers in these territories. Thus, during the period of 1920-1948, European 
colonialism reigned in the whole of the Arab world, generally through protectorates 
and the mandate system, while Turkey had become an independent Republic from 
1923 onwards. 
As the territories of the Middle East gained independence as nation- 
states, 50 the nation-building process kept the rulers of these countries preoccupied. 
The colonial powers left behind political structures that were based on the European 
models controlled by monarchical and traditional elites. The main concern of these 
elites was to maintain their positions and current relations with the former colonial 
powers. The anti-colonialist/nationalist movements challenged the power of this 
r 
elita by using the existing structures. However, when this failed to dislodge the elite, 
impatient young officers in various Arab armies seized power, 51 and thus "ending the 
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brief existence of semi-liberal parliamentary institutions in some countries and 
destroying traditional despotic monarchies in others". 52 
Most of these new regimes embarked upon ambitious modernization 
projects that aimed at gaining economic independence and catching up with the 
European powers. One of the main points of reference of these new populist regimes 
was that the state was economically backward. If was predominantly producing 
agricultural commodities, and its integration into the world markets as an agrarian 
economy was the main factor in keeping it underdeveloped. 53 The private sector, or 
what was left out of it after the foreign connection declined, was seen as financially 
weak and unable to take on the role as a motor in the economic development 
necessary for the modernization project to succeed. This sector was involved in 
commerce rather than industrial investment and tended to seek short-term profits 
rather than the long-term commitments needed for the overall development effort. 
The domestic commercial and the business bourgeoisie were closely linked to the 
landowning class and were seen to lack the independent, entrepreneurial perspective. 
They were caught in two pre-capitalist relations; one was "the paternalistic relations 
associated with nomadism, pastoralism, subsistence agriculture and semi-feudal 
relations [... ] the other one was the dependence of the Arab bourgeoisie on the 
protection of the foreign bourgeoisie". 54 
Lack of entrepreneurship as well as the lack of middle classes is 
commonly cited as one of the main peculiarities of the region. However, these are 
characteristics that come with late development. In cases where the bourgeoisie was 
weak and the need for rapid accumulation of capital and subsequent development 
was high, it was the state that took on the tasks of industrialising the country, raising 
productivity, and redistributing wealth. The aim of the economic sector in these 
countries was not merely the making of profits. Rather it was concerned with job 
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creation, production of cheap goods for immediate needs, development of poor and 
rural areas and achievement of self-sufficiency in production of goods. 55 The Middle 
Eastern policies of this period seem to follow the basic premises of the Keynesian 
economy and the Fordist production pattern in line with the Western practice of the 
time. 
Ayubi writes with reference to Gerschenkron that the later a country is in 
its economic development, the larger the role of the state is likely to be in trying to 
promote development. 56 The differences between the countries that gained their 
independence before the Second World War and the ones that gained it after the War 
supports this argument. While the former countries seem to have developed a 
national bourgeoisie and to some extent have accumulated capital, the latter put the 
state apparatus more directly into the centre of the production and accumulation 
process as well as the dependence of the national bourgeoisie and the work force on 
the state. 
Within the capitalist industrialisation effort, the main strategy used for the 
development of the national economies of the Middle East was import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI). The main aim behind this policy was to substitute the 
formerly imported goods with goods manufactured domestically. By this way the 
countries that had previously been dependent on single cash crops could break away 
the dependence on the international markets and the unfair terms of trade. In time, 
they could develop domestic industries to a level of international competitiveness. 
Diversification of the economies could be attained and profits could be re-invested to 
sustain economic development. During the first phase or the "easy" stage of ISI, the 
state starts with the domestic manufacture of non-durable consumer goods such as 
clothing, shoes and household goods and of their inputs, such as textile fabrics, 
leather and wood. These products are believed to suit the conditions existing in 
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developing countries at the initial stage of the industrialisation process, since they are 
intensive in unskilled labour, and costs do not rise substantially at lower output 
levels. Production does not involve the use of sophisticated technology and a 
network of suppliers of parts, components and accessories are not required for 
efficient operations. 57 By setting up new factories and mass production of goods, the 
state was- providing employment for the population and building long-term 
employment patterns for the newly rising workforce. The reason for this phase of ISI 
being called as the "easy phase" is because of the relative advantages of the 
developing countries in the production of these commodities and the availability of 
resources to produce these goods. 58 It is thought that as production of these goods 
increases, the initially infant industries will develop and in time will help to create 
the backward linkages that will lead to the creation of new enterprises and production 
diversification. However, before the economies of scale and competitiveness are 
attained, those industries had to be protected from international competition. 
Therefore, high tariff walls and quotas were set up around the national economies to 
protect the national industry. 
Economically, the capitalist industrialisation component of modernity was 
being formed through the ISI policies. The difference of the Middle Eastern case from 
that of the West is that capitalist industrialisation here came as a project initiated by the 
state from above, without having indigenous roots in the political economy of the 
societies. Thus, indigenous capitalism began in the region with the state ownership of 
the means of production and the workers being state employees. 
THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE NATION-STATE 
In the West, the advent of capitalism and modernity was accompanied by the nation- 
state as its political institution while in the Middle East; nation-states were formed as 
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these territories gained independence. As seen above regarding capitalism, the 
Middle Eastern nation-state did not evolve as a natural outcome of socio-economic 
and political developments or cultural and intellectual debate in the society as it did 
in the West; again it was imported, if not directly installed by the colonial powers of 
the West. The borders of most of these countries were drawn by the colonial powers, 
which made the nation-state a further contested and artificial phenomenon in the 
region. 
In most Middle Eastern examples, being an imported project, the nation- 
state generally lacked both the infrastructural power that would help it to penetrate 
into the society effectively, for example through taxation, and the ideological 
hegemony that would help it form a strong bloc of alliances that legitimised its rule 59 
Its lack of infrastructural power and ideological hegemony led some to name it as the 
`quasi-state' 
'60 or the `hybrid creature'. 
61 The availability of excessive rent in the 
region contributed to the `lack of infrastructural power', as the state did not need any 
taxation revenues from its citizens. For example, the rent from oil, tourism and the 
Suez Canal in the case of Egypt accrued directly to the state budget, and generally to 
the hands of the rulers, and most of the time enabled the regime to distribute some of 
this rent as subsidies to its citizens, helping to legitimise the role of the nation-state 
in the society. The economic benefits provided by the state became one of the most 
important tools in `gaining' legitimacy for the regime. In addition to the lack of 
taxation and the provision of subsidies, state employment also played an important 
role in the building up of support for the regime, as well as creating a new group of 
supporters upon which the state itself rested. 
One of the most important impacts of the modernisation process on the 
r 
state mechanism has been the growth of the bureaucracy and the creation of a 
"bureaucratic-bourgeois" state. 62 Bureaucratisation has been a tendency of all 
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modernizing countries and the Middle East proved to be no exception here. Ayubi 
identifies two dimensions to this bureaucratisation: first he refers to bureaucratic 
growth; the increase in the numbers of administrative units and personnel, and the 
increase in public spending especially on wages and salaries. The second aspect is 
"the orientation whereby the technical and the administrative dominate over the 
- social. [... ] It is a tendency that goes very much in the direction of centralisation, 
hierarchy and control". 63 The public sector became the main source of employment 
in the region as large numbers of people were employed by the state as labourers, 
civil servants and managers of public industrial plants and firms. In Egypt the 
number of people employed by the state constituted almost half of the non- 
agricultural workforce by the 1980s. 64 This second aspect can be seen as 
contributing to the authoritarian character of the state, which will be discussed 
below. While the state on the one hand was trying to prevent any struggle of classes, 
by incorporating a populist discourse and corporatist policies, it was on the other 
hand "creating" a bureaucracy that would not only be "fulfilling the conventional law 
and order functions but also to be involved in industry, trade, education, culture and 
so on". 65 In time the bureaucracy developed vested interests and became a class in 
itself, accumulating wealth through the "control" of the means of production and the 
power that it had in the state apparatus. It soon became the leading socio-economic 
force in these countries. 
Despite the nationalisation policies and the related replacement of the pre- 
populist period wealthy groups like land-owners and trading elite, the private sector 
was never abolished in the region. It rather adapted to the new situation, made use of 
new opportunities for cooperation with the state and grew under its protection. The 
r 
link between the state and the bourgeois sections- of the society worked for the 
betterment of both parts. While the industrial projects were encouraged and 
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supported with state credits and favourable terms for tax evasions, the state elite was 
getting the support of these sectors, building a constituency for itself. The 
industrialists became a support base for the state, especially in times when the state 
was not able to fulfil its distributive and welfare functions. Despite the efforts to 
build up a strong constituency in support of the regime, the role and the power of the 
leader of the state is enormous in the Middle East. Generally, the leaders of the 
countries enjoy long terms in office, if not life-time tenure and the relationship 
between the leader and the people forms the "backbone of the political system in a 
situation where political organisations are no more than tools for the mobilisation 
and recruitment for the sake of [... ] populist democracy". 66 Asked about the nature 
of the political system in his country, Bourguiba of Tunisia answered, "What 
system? I am the system". 67 
The nation-state in the Middle East was an imposed one, creating a 
homogenous identity around the themes of economic development and progress. 
This economic development via ISI constituted the basic source of legitimacy of the 
state. Despite its imposed and artificial nature, it managed to keep the elements of 
the society together, towards the target of reaching the level of Western 
development. 
To summarise, the political structure that took form under this economic 
system of state-led capitalist industrialisation was the nation-state, despite its 
artificial and imposed nature and the clientalist and paternalistic structure that 
became dominant. 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND CLASS 
r 
`Modernity' in the Middle East followed the capitalist industrialisation and the 
nation-state components of Western experience. The collective action model within 
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this context could be expected to revolve around class. However, this was not in fact 
how identity and collective action developed in the Middle East. The main reason 
for this lies in the imposed version of modernity and the late-developer characteristic 
of the region. 
In understanding why class is not the main determinant of collective action 
during the period of modernization in the Middle East, we can turn firstly to the 
articulation of modes of production. Although state-led capitalist industrialisation 
was the main economic pattern in the region, most of the former production patterns 
were retained as well. This made the horizontal class structure unclear as vertical 
stratification patterns persisted with it side by side. As discussed above, one of the 
characteristics of modernity was to bring the individual to the urban labour market, 
decreasing the importance of rural networks and of the loyalties in the countryside. 
Suffering from its location within a late-modernizing region, individuals were still 
embedded in different traditional networks in the Middle East, as well as becoming 
part of the modem ones. 
As Bill and Leiden write: 
Middle Eastern societies contain a kaleidoscopic array of overlapping and interlocking 
groups of constant flux. Individuals maintain membership in a large number of groups. 
In doing so, they build webs of personal connections that constitute the basic sinews of 
the social system... The social and political system resembles mosaics composed of a 
limitless criss-cross of groups. 8 
In the Middle East the formal groups - associational and institutional 
groups - have not played the significant role that they played in the European system. 
One exception to this could be the Turkish case, where political parties played a 
dominant role and electoral politics became the centre of political activity, especially 
since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1946. However, even in the Turkish 
case formal groups other than political parties remained rather weak in the political 
structure. Informal groups dominate the main group structure of the region. 
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Personal ties based upon kinship, friendship, religious and regional affiliations have 
been among the best means of insuring effective individual effort. 69 
Structure after structure - family, village, clan, class, sect, army, party, elite, state - turns 
out when narrowly looked at to be an ad hoc constellation of miniature systems of power, 
a cloud of unstable micro-politics, which compete, ally, gather strength and very soon 
overextended, fragmented again. 70 
These informal ties are further reinforced by the incorporation of vertical 
corporatist structures. Corporatism was the main channel through which individuals 
were incorporated into the system. Populism and corporatism were the two 
significant features of the Middle Eastern state. Whereas the corporatist structure 
was more related to the politics of production and the interest representation related 
with production, populism was more related to politics of consumption, and the 
distributive character of the state. This combined function of the state, both as a 
producer and distributor at the same time, led some to name the Middle Eastern state 
as the "patron state"71 that managed to gather two distinct features during the post- 
independence period. As mentioned earlier corporatism rests on the assumption that 
society is not composed of individuals or groups that operate independently and in 
relation with each other according to a social contract but rather of a society 
composed of bodies of people that share distinct tasks and an internal solidarity. 
Vertical and functional are two key words regarding the corporatist system. The 
populist regimes in the Middle East were not content with mobilising a social base 
for their support but they also wanted to control this base and structure the 
relationship of support of different groups to the state. As the populist regimes were 
providing material and symbolic benefits for their citizens they also wanted to 
fashion centrally controlled organisational structures to link their support groups directly 
into the state structures. The bulk of these organisations were formed on a sectoral and 
functional criteria, thereby fragmenting support groups into 2arallel primary 
organisational structures joined at the top by interlocking sectoral elites. ' 
The modernisers of the countries generally worked tö assimilate politics 
into economics and "call on the energies of the workers and the expertise of 
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technocrats while keeping the potential-political demands of such classes and groups 
in check". 73 As O'Donnell writes, the aim of this corporatism was not the creation of 
a new society but rather `organising' the popular sector by "means of its subordinate 
association with the populist state". 74 
The experience of many European countries with corporatism in their post- 
War political systems was mentioned above. The main difference between the 
European and Middle Eastern exercise of corporatism is that horizontal stratifications 
were already present in Europe and the corporatist structures were incorporated by the 
elites that were accountable to their populations through a democratic system. It was 
mainly used as a tool for working classes to affect the policy-making in these countries 
and this was often resented by the counter forces - notably the business organisations 
and the centre-right parties. In the Middle East, the horizontal structures were 
overridden by vertical ones, if they were not missing altogether, and the rulers' 
accountability was highly questionable. In the drive to industrialise and modernise, the 
elite in the Middle East was aware of the importance of incorporating different 
segments of the society vertically, subordinating them to the state. Corporatism 
became an important tool for the control of different groups and interests in the society. 
In such a corporative system, "class" as the means for collective action could not 
develop. 
In the corporatist Middle East order, the Party of the state, either a single or 
the dominant party, was acting as an intermediary between the state and the people 
organised around `functional lines', like the civil servants, agricultural producers, 
industrial producers, women. In this corporatist system, people with different socio- 
economic backgrounds were gathered under these functional organisations, thus 
making, the class struggle more impracticable. In a system where the poor rural tenant 
and the big land owner were incorporated on an equal basis in their relationship to the 
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state, talking about a class struggle as in the European sense seems more impossible. It 
was the main party that mediated between these functional groups and the state. The 
functional groups had representatives in the party that worked for the interests of their 
group. Thus, in this system any opposition to this mechanism of the mediation of the 
Party and the working of the system was perceived as an opposition against the state 
that had based its legitimacy on nationalist motifs. Opposition was considered as 
harmful for the fulfilling of the interests of the state and as something that should not be 
tolerated. The national struggle had provided a temporary respite from class 
antagonisms and provided the state with the opportunity to delegitimize class identity. 
Also, because the population knew that they were trying to develop from behind, 
lacking the advantages that the Europeans had had in the matter, national unity became 
more important for them. 
Under the populist discourse, class struggle was made rather irrelevant as the 
state was claiming that it was representing all the socio-economic groups in the 
country. Class struggle was seen as harmful and the necessity of a unified nation, with 
no internal struggle, was emphasized for the effort to increase the wealth of the nation. 
Historical elements that underlined unity were included in the rhetoric of the rulers and 
unifying myths around patriotism were "created". As the state was representing all the 
citizens of the country, around the collective interest of progress and development, 
there was no need for other parties or political associations. Political mobilisation was 
limited to the state party mechanisms and all other ways were sacrificed for the 
common good of the people. 
State capitalism and in some cases, state socialism made the individual 
dependent on the state, which offered him security and guaranteed his basic welfare 
needs. Employment in the industrial sector did not, severe the working conditions of 
the individual against the accumulated wealth of the capitalist class. The antagonism 
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in the society was not clearly defined as between the bourgeoisie and proletariat in 
this case where both groups were dependent on the state mechanism, and where the 
bourgeoisie group was the state itself in most of the cases. 
To summarise, we can say that until the 1970s, when the period of economic 
liberalisation started in the region, the modernisation process continued uninterrupted 
revolving around the goal of development and progress and the principles of state-led 
capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and vertical corporatist organisation revolving 
around the national unity theme were emphasized. The state played the main role in the 
economy, and collective action took place along corporatist lines. 
ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION AND THE CALL FOR REFORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Most of the Middle Eastern countries began facing difficulties in the capitalist 
industrialisation project as the `easy phase' of the ISI gave way to the `second stage' 
of producing consumer durables from late 1960s onwards. Economic growth 
declined coupled with high inflation and huge budget deficits. Unemployment 
became an important problem as the technologies employed in industry were 
increasingly capital intensive and could not answer the employment needs of the 
society. As Ayubi writes, facing the increasing inefficiency in their economies, the 
developing countries were faced with the dilemma of choosing between development 
and welfare. However, the rent in the region from hydrocarbon industries, especially 
after the oil price increase in the 1970s led to availability of funds, and eased the 
urgency of this dilemma. Most of the governments have had the opportunity to 
pursue both development and welfare, with varying degrees of credibility, up until 
the present. As the legitimacy of the regimes depended to a great extent on the 
economic power and the distributional capabilities of the states, cutting down on the 
welfare would have threatened the survival of the regime. The economic crisis 
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stemming from the inability of the state to successfully industrialise the country, 
brought a need to open the economy for an increased commercial activity that could 
make up for losses in the state-dominated industrial sector. As the state had ceased 
to be an engine of growth, and the state elite were looking for a solution to broaden 
their base of support, early attempts of selective liberalisations in the region started 
to take shape. 75 Thus; the calls for changing the system came as a remedy to the 
failures of the economic development as well as the desire of the elite to broaden 
their support base in the face of an economic decline. Rather than a response to the 
technological revolution and the new stage of economic production that this had 
necessitated, as in the European case, reforms were made in the Middle East mainly 
to make up for the losses that the economies faced. From mid-1970s onwards, 
selective liberalisation began in the economies of the region, despite the differences 
in the timing and the extent of these reforms. 
The attempt to change the economy as a remedy to the losses coincided 
with an emerging consensus on liberal economic principles in the Western world. 
Re-establishing the free market mechanisms became the prescribed remedy for 
getting the state-dominated economies back on track. According to this new 
approach, the so-called Washington consensus, the government intervention in the 
economy should be gradually reduced in order to make the productive private sector 
the main actor in the economy. 76 The aim was to transform the protected and 
increasingly inefficient economies into Western style market economy, incorporated 
into the global market. The statement: "in settling matters of resource allocation, 
imperfect markets are better than the imperfect states", 77 sums up the fundamental 
message of economic liberalism. Programmes either under IMF supervision or 
independent of but nonetheless inspired by it were implemented in the economies of 
the region to get them in balance. 
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As the countries of the region -started to embark on liberalisation policies, 
economic forces of globalisation had been penetrating into the region. Trans- 
national companies, foreign direct investment, as well as information and 
technological developments were arriving in the Middle East, despite at a slower 
pace than in the rest of the world. The 1980s witnessed not only liberalisation 
measures in the Middle Eastern economies, but also the globalisation process 
penetrating the region. 
With the impact of the selective liberalisation policies, the already contested 
nation-state was becoming less relevant as a political organisation and losing its 
legitimacy. This is because it was denying the responsibility of providing benefits and 
welfare for its citizens, the two themes that it had built its legitimacy on during the 
1950s and 60s. Faced with the inability of the state to provide, the citizens were now 
looking for new reassurances and new institutions as well as new ideologies and 
political discourses to represent themselves and deliver the wealth and progress that the 
state failed to fulfil. The idea was widely held that economic liberalization would lead 
to political liberalization and the chances of the Middle Eastern states to open 
themselves to liberal democracy, at a time when the citizens started to look for 
alternatives to the existing political system was growing. Economic liberalization 
leading to a political liberalization proved to be an optimistic and misleading idea for 
the Middle Eastern region as the economic liberalization itself remained as a cosmetic 
measure. The real problems and the urgent need for a genuine restructuring of the 
economic system were not addressed. This was also closely related with the increasing 
urge on the side of the elites to protect their interests in the domestic market under 
current conditions. On the contrary to political liberalisation, the change came towards 
further growth of authoritarianism and repression in the region. Rather than the 
weakening of the state apparatus and the increasing platforms for challenging the state 
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authority, as happened in the Western context, the state was becoming more and more 
repressive, ruling "through a sustained pattern of force and fear: by the infliction of 
bodily harm and through immobilising threat of violence" 78 in the Middle East. 
Despite limited political liberalisation that gave positive signals of opening up and 
democracy hopes in the region in late 80s and early 90s, these experiences were rather 
short-lived. By initially opening the channels of participation partially for a short 
period of time, the state managed to silence the opposition and further its interests in 
the economic aspects of liberalisation. 
The reasons for the growing authoritarianism in the region are several. 
But most significant of all within the context drawn here relates to the consequences 
of the selective measures of economic liberalisation. The ruling elite saw the 
potential of instability that the economic liberalisation policies might lead to. 
Despite a small group of winners - mainly the new bourgeoisie - that benefited from 
the liberalisations, large segments of the population were negatively affected from 
the cuts in subsidies, the lift of guaranteed state jobs and the increasing competition 
in an open market economy. In the West, the development of market based 
capitalism rested on the separation of politics from economics; the state served the 
market by providing the necessary framework through regulations, while limiting its 
involvement in the working of the market forces. In the Middle East the state mainly 
served itself, both in its own reproduction and the interests of the bureaucrats - as a 
state class. The selective economic liberalisation created new opportunities for the 
bureaucratic state class, but it also threatened the state's capacity to reproduce itself 
by diminishing its economic power and reach. For the regime to benefit, it had to 
reinforce coercive aspects of political power to compensate for the loss of economic 
reach as well as the loss of legitimacy. 79 The selective economic liberalisation had 
thus contributed to increasing rather than decreasing the authoritarianism in the 
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Middle East and proved the assumption of economic liberalisation leading to 
political liberalisation wrong for the region. 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST - ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS 
As the states of the region began to implement their rather selective economic 
liberalisation policies, corporatist structures were already making collective action 
through them difficult. This period of selective economic liberalisation would be 
expected to lead to changes in the political and collective action themes. As the 
state-led capitalist industrialisation and its social benefits have been brought to an 
end, without a successful heir, a strong challenge to the existing system could be 
expected as a collective action theme. However, it could also be expected that the 
collective action to replace the corporatist structures in the Middle East would be 
different from those of the West as the region had been trying to find a remedy to the 
failure of the developmentalist project, lagging behind the post-modem stage, in 
which the NSMs of the West emerged. Also the political environment within which 
this collective action would take place is different compared to the West. Therefore, 
the form of organisation, type of activity and how the social movements contribute to 
the political developments would be different than the NSMs. 
As culture and identity were the basis around which NSMs were formed in 
the West, it would seem reasonable to look at the prevailing cultural identity - Islam 
- as a potential source for a comparable phenomenon to that of the NSMs in the 
Middle East. Islam provides large portions of the populations of the Middle Eastern 
nation-states with a primary identity. It has traditionally been not just a cultural but 
also a political identity (e. g. the Caliphate) and thus might have an advantage over 
11 
other less widespread and less politically-friendly identities in the Middle East. 
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From 1970s onwards, it was the Islamist movements that had taken over 
the collective action in the region. This is not to say that there are no NSMs in the 
Middle East. Surely, there are New Social Movements in these countries; however, 
they remain confined to a limited segment of these societies. The Islamist 
movements make up the main collective action in the region. 
There seems to be a correspondence between the growth of New Social 
Movements in the West as a response to globalisation and transformation to a post- 
industrial stage on one hand, and the Islamist movements as a response to the 
collapse of the developmentalist project of the modernising state and the subsequent 
economic liberalisation on the other hand. 
What kind of evidence exists whether Islamist movements could be 
understood from the New Social Movements perspective, as a response to modernity 
and the dominant elite will be analysed in the following chapters through the Turkish 
case in line with the theoretical framework drawn in this chapter. Islamist political 
parties as the most significant of the Islamist movements in the country will be 
analysed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ISLAARST MOVEMENTS 
This chapter is a survey of existing approaches to the study of Islamist movements, 
identifying the causal factors for revived popular support for political Islam in the 
second half of the 20th century. The existing body of literature draws attention to a 
number of possible causal factors which some might argue are mutually exclusive. 
The main idea here is to show that all the different causal factors can be linked 
within one explanatory narrative: that of the modernity and the emergence of the 
New Social Movements. Such an approach will avoid reductionist materialist 
explanations while incorporating the various aspects of socio-economic, political and 
cultural alienation from the post-independence modernising Middle Eastern state. 
The common underlying ideology of the Islamist movements is their belief 
in establishing an Islamic state or order, where the Shari' a law can be implemented 
as the main guidance of society. The model designed by these movements is shaped 
around the `sacred history' of the original community of believers established in 
Medina in the seventh century by Prophet Muhammad and his rightly guided caliphs. 
The followers of Islamist movements today strive to bring what they see as the basic 
characteristics of this original community into the contemporary societies. In this 
sense, all Islamist movements are modem as they try to reconstruct a system in the 
modern society "in accordance with political and ideological positions taken in 
relation to current issues and discourses". ' 
When talking about Islamist movements, it is important to keep in mind' 
that they are not a monolithic entity. Each group has its own structures, strategies, 
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policies and- discourse formed according to the socio-political conditions in which 
they operate. Keeping this divergence in mind, the aim of this chapter is to present a 
general analysis of the Islamist movements and draw the framework within which 
the Islamist political parties in Turkey will be studied in the following chapters. 
Within the Islamist movements' discourse, man was created for a purpose 
- to embody the will of God by leading a righteous life and following the correct 
path. As man cannot live alone and cannot exist individually, building and 
maintaining a righteous community of the faithful and struggling to bring this order 
into society is the duty of every true Muslim. Islamist movements seem to alter 
Aristotle's concept of "man is a political animal" into "man is a religious animal" 2 
seeing religion as encompassing all aspects of life, in the contemporary Middle 
Eastern context. 
In order to understand the roots of Islamist movements, one has to go back 
to the 19th century reformist Muslim thinkers and their ideas that had a significant 
impact on contemporary movements. Reformist Muslim thinking was formed in the 
wake of European supremacy and expansion. It was during this period that Muslim 
religious leaders and politicians began to perceive their state of affairs as inferior to 
that of Europe and in a steady decline. Although the Muslim world suffered many 
defeats in its history against Europeans, it was in the 19th century that for the first 
time it was feeling weak and in decline and the need to borrow from its `enemy' - 
the West. It was this painful awareness that made the Muslim world to think about 
the defects and the weaknesses that it was suffering from and search for ways for a 
remedy. Thus, on the one hand, reformist Muslim thinkers embarked on a policy of 
studying the pre-industrial phase of European civilisation, in order to trace ways of 
building a strong state and economy, while, on the other, they were searching for a 
viable cultural paradigm capable of checking the power of Europe. One of the first 
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reformists - the first Muslim scholar from the Middle East to visit France and study 
in Paris, Rifa `a al-Tahtawi, is noteworthy to mention here, mainly because he 
recognised the conflict between Islam as a pre-industrial culture and the demands 
placed upon it by the technological-scientific age. 
The frustration of the early reformists with the status quo did not entail a 
- demonising of the West or even a rejection of modernisation per se. In their quest 
for progress, important Muslim reformists of the time like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 
and Mohammad Abduh looked upon the West both as a model and as a rival. They 
perceived the challenge that the Umma or the Muslim community was facing, as 
embodied in a need to readjust their worldview to the realities of the approaching 
new age. Both al-Afghani and Abduh, with their `school of thought' grew against a 
background of institutional changes and European expansionism and addressed 
themselves to the problems faced by the Muslims as a political community. 3 Islam 
was given the role of a defensive weapon upon which an order to stop the 
deterioration and check the decline of the societies could be built upon. Demonising 
the `other' and the theories of conspiracy were initiated by Rashid Rida and were 
affirmed later in the century by the Muslim Brotherhood. It was Rashid Rida that 
had more radical views about society as being corrupt and the heads of the states in 
the Arab world as apostates of Islam and shared the view about the implementation 
of Quranic punishments against these people. These three reformists desired to bring 
back the glory of Islam by embracing Utihad (independent reasoning), rejecting the 
superstitions of popular religion and the stagnant thinking of the ulama (the learned 
men of religion). They aimed at "creating a synthesis of Islam and the modem West 
rather than a purified society constructed primarily along Islamist lines". 4 
r 
How to develop and get the strength back against the Western world seem 
to be the main focus of the 19th century reformists. Although they differ in their 
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proposals, either via militancy or internal reform within the system, the aim was to 
stand against intrusions of the West. Getting developed to the level of the West and 
borrowing from the West to fight against it became the main target; while to which 
degree to borrow and how much to `modernise' became the major question. 
Adapting the Western technology and science and leaving behind the cultural factors 
became the main strategy of the Muslim reformist thinkers and ideologues in 
different countries. At the same time, another group - that of Westernised 
intellectuals - was emerging in these countries that sought to adapt all elements of 
Western `modernity', including cultural aspects, in an attempt to develop their 
countries. As the countries started to gain independence, it was generally these two 
conflicting tendencies - the Muslim reformism and secular modernism - that 
struggled to give shape to the future of the countries. 
The Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hassan al-Barina in 1928 in Egypt is 
given as one of the first examples of Islamist movements in modem sense. The 
Egyptian case is widely studied within the Islamist movements' research not only 
because of its long history, but also because of the influential ideology it developed 
and its changing relations with the state authority in different phases of the 
modernisation process. One of the members of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid 
Qutb, was especially influential in affecting the discourse both in Egypt and in other 
countries with his writings. According to Qutb, the countries of the region that claim 
to be Muslim, are not really Muslim and they do not stem from Islam, but from the 
jahiliyya - the state of ignorance or barbarity which was seen in pre-Muslim Arabia, 
before Prophet Mohammed in the seventh century. To get rid of the jahiliyya, one 
must stop governance by man and return to the governance of God. Only after that, a 
man can reach real Islams , These became one of the main discourses of the Islamist 
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groups in the following years, especially of those that resorted to militant means to 
get rid of the `corrupt' societies of their countries. 
The 1970s witnessed an Islamic revival in terms of national politics 
throughout the region after a prolonged period during which secular modernist 
nationalisms had dominated the agendas of the modernising states. The Iranian 
Revolution of 1979-, the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat in 1981 
by members of a militant Islamist group and a decade later in 1991, the general 
elections in Algeria - the annulment of the election results by the military and the 
following civil war - increased both the public and the scholarly interest in Islamist 
movements. Many studies focused on the topic, searching for answers to the growth 
of Islamist movements. As Baker notes, "political realities have no ultimate causes 
nor deep structured keys that unlock their secrets"6 but the quest to study Islamist 
movements, especially the underlying reasons of their growth attracted the attention 
of many. Most studies recognised the multiplicity of the factors in the growth of the 
Islamist movements but generally they differed in the importance given to some of 
the factors against others in the analysis. 
In the next sections, different approaches provided for analysing the 
reasons of Islamist movements is presented with their shortcomings. The 
inadequacies of existing understandings of Islamist movements will be shown by 
positing an alternative view that draws on the theories of the New Social Movements 
outlined in chapter one. In order to do this, firstly attention will be drawn to the 
range of analyses of Islamist movements. 
ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AS A RESPONSE TO THE FAILURE OF 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1" 
A significant number of scholars explain Islamist movements as a response to socio- 
economic developments. Economic development projects, which were generally 
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implemented with state-led capitalist industrialisation drives in the region, were 
mentioned in the previous chapter. The collapse of this economic order and the 
consequent mismanagement, poverty, large scale migration to cities, unemployment 
and the decline in the subsidies are studied in this approach as well as how different 
groups were affected from such a collapse. The failure of the state to provide 
economic prosperity to its citizens despite all the hope given in the post 
independence regimes is shown as the main reason for the growth of Islamist 
movements. Within this framework, a significant amount of research has been 
conducted. 
Looking at the members of Islamist groups and their socio-economic 
backgrounds constitutes a significant element of research within this analysis. The 
main conclusion of the research indicates that the lower and the lower middle classes 
were the main supporters of these movements as they were the worst affected 
segments from the failure of state developmentalist projects. 
Saad Eddin Ibrahim is one of the prominent scholars who studied the 
background and class positions of the Islamist movement members. In an interview 
held with him in Cairo, he repeated his well-written position that Islamic revivalism 
is a lower and lower middle class phenomenon and is directly related with income 
and class positions.? In his work written in 1980, Ibrahim gives the conclusions of a 
research conducted on two militant Islamist groups, their recruitment policies and the 
profiles of their members: Islamic Liberation Organisation (Munazzamat al-Tahrir 
al-Islami), known in the Arab media as the Jam `at al-Fanniyya al- `askariyya, 
(Technical Military Academy group), referred here as MA and the Jama `at al- 
Muslimin (the Muslim Group), known in the Arab media as Repentance and Holy 
Flight (al-Tamer w `al Hijra), referred here as RHF. 8 The MA group had been 
involved in a failed attempt to take over the Military Technical Academy in 1974. 
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The RHF had kidnapped the former minister of religious affairs and demanded the 
release of its imprisoned members. As this demand was refused, the organisation 
killed the minister that led to a bloody confrontation between its members and the 
police, which left many people dead and wounded around the country. 
The first point made in this study was regarding the recruitment 
mechanisms for these Islamist groups. Accordingly, both groups recruited followers 
from among students or recent university graduates. Three recruitment mechanisms 
were employed: kinship, friendship and worship. While the RHF relied heavily on 
kinship and friendship mechanisms, beginning to recruit members like the brothers 
and nephews, then enlisting their close friends and relatives, the MA group relied 
more on friendship and worship. Typically, the old members would observe the 
young worshippers in the college or neighbourhood mosque. If these young people 
appear highly religious, like the observance of the dawn prayer, they would be 
approached to attend the religious discussion after the regular prayers. It would be 
during these discussions that the potential members would be discovered, who was or 
could be politically conscious. 
The second point in the analysis focuses on the age of the members. 
Accordingly, the age of the `militants' ranged from 17 to 26 at the time of joining the 
groups as a fully-fledged member. The average age for MA was 22, for RHF it was 
24. Looking at their rural/urban background, the militants were noted as sharing 
rural and small town backgrounds and at the time of joining the organisation they 
were recent arrivals to the cities. Most of them came to big cities after their 
secondary education. Half of them were living by themselves or with roommates, 
but not with their parents. Ibrahim states that it is difficult to determine the class 
backgrounds of the n'iilitants. When the occupations of the fathers were considered, 
there was not much difference between the members of the two groups. About two 
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thirds of the fathers were government employees, mostly in the middle grades of 
civil service. Four members had fathers from high-level professional occupations: 
two university professors, one engineer and one pharmacist. Four had fathers who 
were small merchants, three had fathers who were small farmers and two had 
working class fathers. With regard to the education of the fathers, only seven (20 
percent) had university education. 19 of them (59 percent) had intermediate 
education while seven fathers were illiterate. Considering the occupational and 
educational positions of the militants, 29 out of 34 were either university graduates 
or still students enrolled in the university. The remaining five were secondary school 
graduates. Occupationally, 16 of them (47 percent) were classifiable, the rest were 
students. 12 out of the working 16 were professionals employed by the government: 
five teachers, three engineers, two doctors and two agronomists. Three were self- 
employed: a pharmacist, a doctor and an accountant. One was working as a 
conductor for a bus company. 
Commonly, a point made for the members of Islamist movement is that 
they are mostly students from science fields that are mainly concentrated on subjects 
dealing with or seeking for an absolute truth and not critical thinking as would be the 
case in social sciences. About the student members of the group, Ibrahim shows the 
science background of the members by saying that from the 18 members (53 
percent), who are examined, all except one was studying in science departments of 
the universities that require very high grades to be admitted in Egypt. Accordingly, 
six were studying engineering, four medicine, three agricultural science, two 
pharmacy, two technical military science and one literature. Ibrahim concludes that 
the members of both groups were decidedly high in motivation and achievement. In 
another article, Ibrahim underlines the point that "contrary to the common 
stereotypes about the radical groups that they attract a number of `misfits', 
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`marginals' and `abnormals', our research has shown that Egyptian Islamists are 
model citizens, modem young representatives of the Egyptian population". 10 
From the above information, Ibrahim concludes, "It is not unsafe to 
conclude that most members of these groups are from middle or lower middle class 
backgrounds". " The class factor in all cases is emphasized as having something to 
do with the collective status incongruity like strong achievement motivation, with 
justified high aspiration, yet little economic and political opportunity. Accordingly, 
it is the middle and the lower middle classes that felt this incongruity most sharply. 
It is interesting to note that the characteristic features of the Islamist militants (i. e. 
those members of Islamist movements who play an active political or even para- 
military role) are quite similar to those that have joined the leftist movements in the 
earlier decades. The only difference of the Islamists from the leftists is their rural 
backgrounds, compared to the urban background of the leftists. 
Writing about Tunisian Islamists, Susan Waltz reaches similar conclusions 
saying that cadres of the Islamist movements are filled up with young, highly 
educated people. According to Waltz, these people share common class 
backgrounds: they are young, having rural backgrounds and/or coming from petite 
bourgeoisie. The paternal occupations of the members are generally carpenters, 
mechanics and day labourers. An average Islamist militant's features are given as 
"young person, more than 20 years of age, born in one of the country's small 
communities, from the working class, or `lower middle class', and having received a 
higher education "without his rising mobility having led him to repudiate his 
origins". 12 It is also noted as an important point that most of the members are recent 
comers to the cities, they are first generation immigrants. 
Nazih Ayubi is a strong advocate of the socio-economic reasons for the 
rise of Islamist movements in the Middle East, especially the militant Islamist 
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movements of the 1970s and 80s. He made a detailed study of the al-Jihad group of 
Egypt that killed the President Sadat in 1981 and the socio-economic background of 
the members. Ayubi got similar results as Ibrahim, as the average age of the 
members was 28, most of them were bom in the countryside but they were active in 
the cities, where they had come for university education. 13 He writes that the 
Islamist movements are: 
all manifestations of and a reaction to a development crisis in the Muslim part of the 
Third world [... ] and they are almost all movements of the upwardly mobile, formally 
educated and recent urbanised youth [... ] whose sense of `relative deprivation' may 
explain much about their general anxiety and about the adaptation of religion as a goal- 
replacement mechanism. 14 
Tessler, while taking the socio-economic factors, as the main determinant 
of Islamist movements, concentrates on the `alienation of the youth' in the Middle 
East with unfulfilled promises of the states. 15 Accordingly, what came out of these 
unfulfilled promises are a web of disappointments and a crisis of frustration. As 
much as the expectations of youth from the state for upward mobility - jobs and 
increased social status - existed, the state had high expectations from the youth as 
well. The modernising elite thought of the youth as the future who constituted a 
critical mass that would reach adulthood within a few years and then by the virtue of 
its demographic, intellectual and political weight would provide a new centre of 
gravity and a foundation for progressive social engineering - the modernisation 
project - in the society. In the late 1950s and early 60s, the high proportion of young 
people in the society was seen as offering the opportunity to bring about rapid social 
and political change. However, the state started to face problems to absorb this 
`critical mass' into the ranks of the political and economic system as the 
developmentalist policies started to show signs of accumulated problems. 
Both employment and education became major problems in the region 
affecting the youth. Unemployment became a problem, as the countries of the region 
were not able to create jobs on a scale that was needed by the expanding population. 
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Poor economic performance and rapid population growth, culminating in large 
numbers of unemployed is seen as creating a suitable environment for the growth of 
Islamist movements. Among the urban poor, legions of young men, unable to find 
regular employment, spent most days on street corners or in coffee houses. In 
Algeria they are called "homeboys", boys from the neighbourhood, or "wall boys", 
unemployed youth having nothing to do and so "hang out" leaning against the walls 
that line many city streets - becoming ever more disillusioned and embittered. 
16 It 
was reported that by 1984, urban employment in Morocco was 18.4 percent with 
44.9 percent of those having jobs being either unskilled or semiskilled labourers. 
The state was becoming more incapable of creating jobs for the population 
increasing rapidly - at a rate of 2.5 percent per year in Tunisia. The study also shows 
that there is as much as downward mobility in the jobs of the youth as there is 
upward mobility in comparing the jobs of fathers and sons. It was reported that 41 
percent of the men between 16 and 19, who grew up and took primary education 
after independence, had jobs with lower status than their fathers, while 16 percent 
held better jobs. The point that most of the fathers did not have any education at all 
makes the results look worse. Although it can be argued against this view that the 
young people considered are still in the beginning of their careers and will have 
better positions in time, it is argued that Tunisian economy has not expanded rapidly 
to provide jobs that would provide upward mobility. '7 
The second disappointment of the youth, according to Tessler, was in the 
field of education. Although there was an increase in the number of students 
attending primary school, the growth at the higher levels was limited. '8 Thus, the 
youth's "formidable desire for change has been overtaken by a profound 
dissatisfaction, a deep disappointment". 19 
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Björn Olav Utvik also gives socio-economic factors an emphasis in the 
rise of the Islamist movements. Focusing on the economic opening policies and how 
it sharpens the already existing economic inequality in the Middle East, Utvik says 
that while the majority of the population saw their situation deteriorating for the last 
decades, they saw the increasing wealth of a small group in the upper echelons of the 
society. These groups had adhered'to Islamist movements that were seen as the least 
corrupt and the least alienated to their societies and values. It was this sudden 
increase of economic disparities and poverty as a result of infitah (economic 
opening) that is seen as the main reason for the growth of the Islamist movements. 20 
In the vast literature on the Iranian Revolution, the role of socio-economic 
development and its consequences for the Iranian society are mostly emphasized. 
Both Nikki Keddie and Henry Munson show rapid economic development followed 
by severe economic worsening as the main reason for the Iranian Revolution. 21 The 
oil boom and the following bust, its impact on the Iranian economy and the wide 
spread grievances of various social groups are noted within this study. Abrahamian, 
in his study on Iran, looks at "the interaction between the political organisations and 
the social forces" and looks at the role of the social classes in the Revolution. He 
presents how the traditional middle class, the bazaaris and the clergy, as the only 
sectors of the society independent from the state became the focal point of the 
Revolution with their generous financial support and nation-wide organisational 
network. 22 Fred Halliday in looking at the Iranian Revolution, in addition to citing 
other factors contributing to the revolution, notes, "The main reason why the 
revolution occurred was that conflicts generated in capitalist development intersected 
with resilient institutions and popular attitudes which resisted the transformation 
process". 
23 
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Nemat Guenena, while arguing about the rise of the Islamist movements, 
emphasises the concept of "social Islam" and its increasing role in the society. 24 As 
the state increasingly becomes inefficient in fulfilling basic functions, more room is 
left for the Islamist organisations to operate in the society. He says that together with 
the increase of violence, the 1990s witness an increase in social Islam - the birth of 
what Dennis Sullivan called the Private Voluntary Organisations. 25 Their birth goes 
back to the 1980s, but their proliferation is generally in the 1990s. Social Islam 
consists of a web of welfare services and developmental activities that have sprouted 
to fill the void caused by the government's absence from the development process. 
On this issue, Ghassan Salame argues that Islamist activism feeds on the 
government's failure to live up to people's expectations and the success of Islamist 
movements lies in their endeavour to deliver on the promises of the nationalist 
regimes. 26 Guenena argues that in Egypt, Islamist alternative is not popular because 
it is spiritually gratifying but because it offers concrete solutions to concrete 
problems. The beneficiaries of the services of the Islamist organisations perceive 
these services superior to not only the public ones but the private ones as well. 
Emmanuel Sivan names these Islamist organizations as the backbone of 
the Islamist movements. They carry out the work of da'wa (cause), spreading the 
word and establishing a counter-society to propagate the movement's ideas, create 
support networks for members, and show that Islamic values can be fully 
implemented in the contemporary world. 27 Emphasizing the socio-economic 
conditions in facilitating Islamist movements and giving them the room to perform 
public jobs, Sivan notes that "the continued vigour of the Islamist associations is a 
consequence, above all, of the budgetary woes of most Middle Eastern countries 
following the decline in oil prices after 1985, a decline that Had implications not just 
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for oil exporters but also for the poor countries, as Arab foreign aid dried up and 
employment for expatriate `guest workers' dwindled". 28 He notes that 
the revenue crisis helped the Islamists in two ways. First, regimes responded to this 
problem by breaking the unwritten covenant agreed to with their subjects in the 1950s and 
1960s in which the subjects relinquished their claims to basic human and civil rights in 
return for the state undertaking to provide them with education and health care, 
employment, and subsidies for such necessities as [... ] cooking gas, and transportation. 
The poorest and the young suffered these retrenchments the hardest29 
Thus, the "retreating state" of the 1990s created disgruntled citizens in the 
region: university graduates are no longer assured of a government job; workers are 
barely able to make out a living, let alone save for a dowry and establish a family; or 
masses of recent rural migrants who lack such basics as shelter. All these groups 
provide a pool of possible recruits for the rapidly growing network of Islamist 
associations. 30 
Related with this argument, Olivier Roy writes that the Islamists seem to 
be trapped in the society. They are seen as the by-products of economic 
development and modernisation. However, they "live precariously from menial jobs 
or remain unemployed in immigrant ghettos, with frustration inherent in an 
unattainable consumerist world". 31 It is this frustration and `rejection' that make 
Islamist discourse (i. e. the discourse of Islamist movements) more appealing for 
these masses. 
This approach that looks at socio-economic factors as the main reason for 
the rise of the Islamist movements, shows well the collapse of the economic aspect of 
the modernisation project - the state-led capitalist industrialisation - and focuses on 
the economic mismanagement, poverty and the frustration resulting from the 
unfulfilled promises of progress and development. There is merit in this approach in 
the sense that it draws a correct picture of the Middle East: The developmentalist 
project collapsed and it collapsed to the detriment of a large majority, leaving them 
with a search for a new ideology, rather a "soul-searching", to replace the nationalist 
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project. However, this is a very "materialist" interpretation of causation. This 
approach does not take into account other factors, like the state ideology, legitimacy, 
lack of democracy and a working civil society as well as the growing political 
authoritarianism and cultural insecurity in the nation-state and the region in general. 
In addition to neglecting other factors that contribute to the growth of Islamist 
movements, this approach does not look at and question why the response to 
economic crisis is pronounced in Islamic terms but not in another discourse. 
Moreover, the modernisation project of the post-independence states was never just 
an economic project. It had the attributes of nation-building, which include cultural, 
spiritual and communitarian features. So, the failure of the modernisation project is 
more than simply the failure to come up with the economic goods. It is also about 
the failure to create strong relations between state and society and between the 
components of the society that would have created legitimacy and political stability. 
Assuming that Islamist movements are becoming the most popular 
organizations with growing membership enrolment and the main opposition group in 
the countries they operate in because of increasing economic mismanagement and 
poverty brings with it the assumption that if the economy starts to develop and bring 
prosperity, then Islamist movements will fade away. However, as Johannes Jansen 
puts it, "Fundamentalism is not a protest against being poor. This approach does 
great honour to the intellectual influence of Marxism, but people do not turn 
fundamentalists because they are poor. Poverty cannot cause fundamentalism. 
Prosperity does not cure it. "32 
Despite the shortcomings and limitations that this approach carries, socio- 
economic factors are still important that must be taken into account, contributing to 
the analysis of the movements. One still needs' to question whether the Islamist 
movement would have been so strong in the region if the state had been successful in 
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its economic development project. In looking at the Islamist movements, -socio- 
economic factors should constitute one of the components of the analysis, keeping its 
limitations in mind. 
ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AS A RESPONSE TO STATE 
Another approach to the study of Islamist movements focuses on the nature of the 
Middle Eastern state and the political system. Being closely related with the socio- 
economic approach told above; the political structures and shortcomings for a 
working democratic system constitute the main focus in this approach. 
The artificiality of the nation-state in the Middle East and its imposed and imported 
nature was mentioned in the previous chapter. Ayubi's quote from Waddad Sharara 
reveal this point clearly: 
There is nothing new about the state (i. e. the apparatus of domination) trying to confront 
social disintegration and to consolidate the society. What is historically specific in the 
case of the Arab state is that this state has not emerged as a result of an internal conflict 
that had divided the society and its blocs, enabling one of them to establish its dominance 
through a long process involving the actual condensation of contradictions in society [... ] 
The State in our societies was, by contrast, born as an `external' power, thus rendering it - 
together with its personnel, apparatuses and intellectuals - marginal in the literal sense. It has not succeeded in overcoming its marginality even at the peak of its dominance when 
it held the reins in government, political organisation, the means of production and 
official ideology. It has therefore faltered at the first shock, and the carefully erected 
facade has cracked open to reveal all manner of horrid monsters that many thought 
history had long since laid to rest. 33 
Related with the arguments of failure of economic development, the 
fragile nature of the Middle Eastern state is mentioned in this context. The inability 
of the state to lay down a hegemonic ideology34 to keep different segments of society 
together and get legitimate support is one of the explanations that is proposed by this 
approach for the growth of Islamist movements. As the legitimacy of the state rested 
on the economic progress in general, nation-state vastly lost its support base in the 
1970s. Islamist movements increased their support base, in contrast to the state, 
1' 
during this period as they proposed to deliver what the state could not - not only 
economically but socially and ideologically as well. Islamist movements, or what 
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some might agree with Sharara to call them as the `most horrid monsters', became 
the main opposition force against the state within this context. 
The elements of the modernising state and the modernising elite are seen 
as contributing to the phenomena as they are resisted by the Islamist movements. 
Fred Halliday emphasises that "Islamism" is a response against the modernising 
state. He sees the core of the Islamist movements anchored in the quest to "resist the 
alien and the oppressive state, and through the tactics to maintain and obtain control 
of the state. "35 
Islam was used as a source of legitimacy in the states' discourse during the 
nation-building process in the Middle East and this is shown as an important factor 
that contributes to the growth of the Islamist movements in this approach. In many 
cases in the Middle East, Islam was seen as a unifying ideology and a source of 
legitimacy by the state. The states chose to use Islamic symbols and rhetoric 
whenever it suited the conditions, and the unity of the society needed to be 
underlined. Nationalism and Islam went hand in hand in the state discourse in many 
cases. Even in secular countries like Turkey, Islam was used by the state to appeal to 
the masses and get the support of different groups, in addition to nationalism. 
Ironically, the Islamic rhetoric used by the state later became an independent source 
that challenged the state's power and understanding of Islam in the hands of the 
opposition. This is seen as a significant aspect of the growth of Islamist movements 
in the region in this perspective. 
Charles Tripp writing within this approach argues that the main reason for 
the rise of Islamist movements and `the social protest in the language of Islam' is the 
"dichotomy between the recent `modern' state formation in Middle East, and its 
patrimonial state characteristics that are based on patron-client relations and the 
networks this creates. "36 Tripp emphasizes that the states of the Middle East are 
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"hybrid creatures" that are on the one hand largely modelled on the Western state 
tradition with territorially defined sovereignty, institutions to represent the 
sovereignty, constitutions, and bureaucracies and on the other hand shaped by the 
authoritarian structure that revolves around the personalisation of power. 
Accordingly, as a part of the nation-building process, the ruler and the ruling elite of 
the states will try to use some ideologies to maintain cohesion of the society and 
would deploy all `emotive' themes to `authenticate' and `indigenise' their power. 
Islam generally took the role of this unifying ideology, according to Tripp. It was at 
this point of state definition and management of Islam that some of the conflicts 
began to manifest themselves. It was these conflicts that created a conducive 
environment for the Islamist movements to operate, both "ideationally and 
pragmatically". 37 By using Islam for this purpose, they provide the opportunities for 
the `conscious' Islamist groups to oppose its power and legitimacy and raise their 
voice in criticising its basics. 38 
Aziz al-Azmeh notes that the states in the Middle East, especially Egypt 
and Algeria, made abundant use of populist demagogy after the failure of the 
developmentalist efforts. In an attempt to win the popular support and increase 
government legitimacy, policies "allowing the media to be invaded by obscurantist 
language hostile to rationality and progress" were pursued. Thus, "just in a couple of 
years as it happened in Iraq, the nationalist discourse has been reformulated in the 
religious language". 39 By allowing the Islamic discourse to occupy a central position 
in the public debate, the state itself created the conditions necessary for the triumph 
of the Islamist movements. Writing on the Egyptian case, Malika Zeghal presents 
how al-Azhar was used both by the Nasser and the Sadat governments to legitimise 
their actions. 40 Especially the support given to- al-Azhar against the militant Islamist 
groups under Sadat increased the importance of this institution and contributed to 
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making it an important actor in social and political affairs. As al-Azhar began to 
cooperate with the state, the alternative preachers and religious figures that opposed 
the state's policies and therefore this cooperation activated the public debate with 
their sermons and preaching, Islamising the society from below. By letting the 
moderate Islamist institutions to operate freely as a countering force to militant 
groups, and legitimising them, the state itself contributed to the growth of Islamist 
movements in the country, according to Zeghal's analysis. 
In contrast to the usage of Islam by the state, its lack from the state 
discourse is also noted as a factor in this phenomenon. Talking about the Turkish 
case, in contrast to the use of Islam by the state in increasing the Islamist movements, 
serif Mardin talks about the removal of Islam from the state discourse under the 
secularist policies of the reformers as a factor contributing to the Islamist movement 
in Turkey. Mardin writes that Turkish reforms by bringing secularism and carrying 
religion out of politics and the public space destroyed the unifying element among 
individuals and between the individuals and the state - Islam. This unifying element 
was again built with some religious orders (tarikat) and their networks, most 
important of which is the Nur Tarikatc. According to Mardin, Nurculuk (the ideas of 
the Nur Tarikat) is playing the role that the Republic could not accomplish in our 
time: linking the individual to the state, the unification of the individual with the 
state. According to Mardin, that is how we began to see the role of Islam in the 
society. al 
The growing authoritarianism of the Middle Eastern state, as noted in the 
previous chapter, is also noted as an important factor contributing to the Islamist 
movements within the framework of this approach. Raymond William Baker notes, 
in line with this argument, that the authoritarian characteristic of the sthte lead to the 
creation of certain groups that see their future as different from that designed by the 
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state. 42 Within this argument he looks at Islamist movement as one of the many 
organisations that strive to design a new future for Egypt, noting that it is the 
strongest one at the moment. 3 The limitations on organisational rights and lack of a 
working civil society as well as the increasing authoritarian nature of the state are 
noted as leaving little room for political opposition. As the state becomes 
authoritarian, the resentment against it increases but as the channels of opposition are 
limited and opposition in general is repressed, the only alternative is the Islamist 
movements. Islamist movements might not be the solution for everybody and its 
ideology not appealing for many people, but most of the time they are seen as the 
only party opposing the state and challenging its legitimacy. In Egypt, the leftist 
secular parties seem to ally with the state - the main threat for most of the citizens 
with its increasing authoritarianism - leaving the Islamist movements as the only 
opposition force 44 Not only the decreasing power of the leftist ideology after the fall 
of the Soviet Union, but also the alliance with the state against the Islamists seem to 
decrease the power of the leftist parties, in Egypt. 
In such an environment, it is argued that feeling alienated and having 
problems with socialising, the young people generally attended the mosques, on a 
regular basis where they met with the members of Islamist movements and were 
recruited into the ranks of these organisations. There is an agreement among 
scholars of this approach that the increase in the number of private mosques and 
independent preachers and imams contributes to the increase of members of Islamist 
organisations. Mosques are seen as an important component of the Islamist 
movements since they are serving as the meeting places of inclusive groups. Susan 
Waltz says that this is the result of lack of any other political participation channels. 
11 
I She argues that because political participation is blocked or limited the only cliannel 
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to discuss and form political opinions is through mosques that contribute to the 
increasing number of recruits. 
Jansen also notes that in the "totalitarian societies of the Middle East, the 
only permitted social network, apart from family ties, is the mosque; the possibilities 
growing up of new intellectual, political or social movements that are not mosque 
related are extremely small. Hence the-only movement with the capacity to grow is 
the Islamist movement. 45 
Talking about the social network formed by the Islamists in Algeria and 
how the newly arriving immigrants are integrated into the network, Rabia Bekkar is 
asked whether Islamist movements are becoming "a state within a state". 46 As an 
individual arrived in the city, how the neighbourhood community helped in building 
a house, how the mosque network provided a community feeling is emphasized as 
well as the opportunity that this provides for FIS for coming in at this point and 
politicising these already existing networks. One of the successes of the Islamist 
groups is shown in their ability to form organisations and groups that emphasize 
solidarity and community and manage to provide for their members. 47 
Despite pointing out an important aspect in understanding the growth of 
the Islamist movements, this approach analyses the Middle Eastern state independent 
of its economic and cultural aspects, neglecting the two important factors in the 
phenomenon. 
ISLAMIC REVIVALISM AS A CULTURAL RESPONSE 
Culture and identity became important factors in the analysis of the collective action 
and social movements, attracting wide scholarly attention in current literature as told 
in the previous chapter. This approach locates Islamist movements within this 
framework. In the study of Islamist movements, culture and identity issues come 
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into the analysis in two different ways. A group of scholars, that takes the `clash of 
civilisations' as their main argument, focus on the rather unchanging `characteristics 
of the Arab culture' and link the growth of the Islamist movements as the collective 
action in the region to the traits of an `Arab mind'. The other group look at the 
Islamist phenomenon as shaped against the Western culture and values that were 
imposed on these societies first with the colonisation and later with the 
modernisation process. The second approach will be the main focus of this section; 
however, the first group and their'ideas will also be shortly mentioned here. 
THE NEO-ORIENTALIST APPROACH 
The group that we can call here as the neo-Orientalists see the Islamist movements 
and their anti-Western discourse as stemming from the inherent characteristics of the 
society in the Middle East. Bernard Lewis sees in the core of these movements and 
their growth a mixture of "humiliation, envy and fear" against the growing power of 
the West. According to Lewis, the reaction of the Islamists go beyond any specific 
policies of their governments and is "no less than a clash of civilisations - perhaps 
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian 
heritage, our secular present and the worldwide expansion of both. 108 Samuel 
Huntington writes that this clash occurs mainly because Islam is incompatible with 
the fundamental Western philosophical notions such as democracy and modernity. 49 
Daniel Pipes writes that the combination of the attractiveness and the power of the 
Western culture with the historic rivalry between Islam and Christianity "lead the 
Muslims to fear it and fight it". so 
Cudsi and Dessouki seem to share the neo-Orientalist approach. They 
r 
underline the theme of status quo in Muslims' understanding of history and analyse 
the Islamist movements through this theme. They write that for Muslims history 
78 
meant the struggle of building up a true Muslim society, which had culminated in the 
establishment of the first Muslim community under the Prophet Muhammad. After 
this was achieved, history had no more lessons to teach. If there was any change, it 
could only be for the worse and could be cured by renewing what had once existed. 
Whenever the Muslim society diverted - as with the introduction of modernity; 
secular leftist movements, and Western culture and values - struggle for renewing the 
old system would be needed. Thus, "the need for a renovator (mujaddid) has become 
the launching pad for revivalist movements. 51 
I will not go into the details of this approach, as it is limited in 
understanding the dynamics of the Islamist movements. Rather than referring and 
trying to find answers in unchanging cultural characteristics positioned against the 
Western powers, studies that take into account the cultural response within the nation 
state shaped through the colonial experience, modernisation process and 
globalisation will be analysed below. 
CULTURAL RESPONSE TO COLONIAI. ISiNI 
Colonialism is shown as one of the main factors whose legacy continues to affect the 
socio-political context of the Middle East and the contemporary Islamist movements. 
Cultural responses against colonialism, or what is perceived as its remnants in the 
post-colonial states, constitute an important aspect of this approach. Francois Burgat 
and William Dowell in their book on Islamist movements in North Africa present a 
good example of this approach. They see colonialism as the main factor in 
producing these movements and note that it is necessary to contextualise the Islamist 
movement not only in "the contradictions linked to post-independence's rapid socio- 
economic development" but in the didlectical framework of colonisation/ 
decolonisation. 52 They argue that 
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the South after having undertaken to disconnect its political future from the West (through 
independences) and then to win more autonomy in the management of its material sources 
(by nationalisations), it now turned towards the terrains of culture and ideology, domains 
previously conquered by the North and which now it seeks to reappropriate. Even if it is 
far from representing the outcome, Islamism, "the rocket of decolonisation's third stage" 
manifests the acceleration of the process by repositioning the South in relation to the 
North. And it is an essential step. 53 
Burgat and Dowell note that the economic domination by the colonial 
powers of Northern Africa meant social destruction for these territories in the sense 
that when the economic logic of a society is disturbed, the social balance is affected 
as well. It was only when the economy and the social structures were profoundly 
damaged and the group's capacity to resist seriously weakened, that foreign 
penetration gradually took over the cultural sphere and extended its ability to 
dominate completely. 54 Now that these territories had built up an economic 
independence and their nation-state, it was time to declare their war of cultural 
independence and this is what the Islamist movements are doing in these territories. 
Burgat and Dowell give the statement of Eddine Jourchi, one of the 
founders of the Islamist movement in Tunisia who reflects the position of the 
Islamist movements against colonialism and its continuity. Jourchi says that "there is 
nothing strange about one nation trying to take the other one. What is strange is the 
nation that is invaded accepts and blesses this occupation and puts all its energy into 
deepening it and helping it to take root. "55 
Gilles Kepel writing within this approach in his analysis on Algeria notes 
that 
France was denounced both for its pernicious influence which lasted beyond colonisation, 
the French occupation was seen above all as a policy of cultural Westernisation, marked 
by the spirit of the crusades, with the aim of destroying Islam and for the plots it_ was 
supposed to be continually hatching to combat the FIS as the incarnation of Islam. The 
legislative elections of 1991 were therefore presented as a battle between the party of the 
Arabic, Islamic civilisation which represents the majority of the people and the French 
Language party which had been in power since 1962.6 
In an attemptrto show the position of the Islamist movement in Algeria 
against France and the Western culture that it symbolises, Kepel quotes from Ali 
Benhadj, the FIS's star preacher who says that "My father and my brothers may have 
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physically expelled the oppressor France from Algeria, but my struggle together with 
my brothers, using the weapons of faith is to banish France intellectually and 
ideologically and to have done with her supporters who drank her poisonous milk. 1957 
Talking about the Algerian case, Marina Lazreg also emphasizes the de- 
colonisation logic of the Islamist movements and link the phenomena into the 
colonisation/decolonisation context. Larzeg argues that the FIS (Front Islamique du 
Salut) intend to present itself with "the mission of relinking the society with its pre- 
colonial past, thus is forging ä historical continuity that somehow bypasses the 
colonial era. "58 The FIS is said to be `recolonising' the cultural sphere of the society, 
just like the French did in the 19th century within their civilising mission, displacing 
local values and norms to suit their political purposes. 59 In trying to direct the socio- 
political evolution of Algeria through cultural recolonisation, the Islamist discourse 
centres on the colonial past, intends to erase it and promises a future that is not 
deemed colonial, according to Larzeg. The fact that Algeria is no longer a colony 
does not alter this view according to the author, since the present Algerian regime is 
seen as the continuation of the colonial rule. She argues that what is ironic in this 
case is that the Islamist discourse continues on the lines similar to those pursued by 
the colonial powers by privileging the cultural and the political over the social and 
the economic. 60 Lazreg argues that Islamism does not provide a solution to the issue 
of identity: It is less about identity and more about power politics, just like 
colonialism was less about `civilising mission' than power. 61 However, she still 
emphasises the attempts of FIS to try to create the feelings of "us" and "them" for the 
government, and create a sense of identity against its followers. 
In this approach to Islamist movements, by emphasizing the legacy of the 
colonial rule, domestic developments, especially the process of the nation-state 
formation and how it failed, are rather not analysed. Why the Islamist movements 
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came to the political scene at the time that it did and not before is not answered. The 
colonial legacy is an important factor that is underlined by many analysts especially 
in the North Africa context where the impact of colonisation was much stronger 
when compared with the rest of the Middle East. It is a factor that should be taken 
into account when writing about the Islamist movements but other factors are 
necessary that help us explain why and how the Islamist movements were formed 
and strengthened at the certain period and not before that. 
CULTURE AND THE MODERNISING STATE 
The imposed nature of the modernising policies and the powerful modernising elite 
that adhere to "modern" principles and Western values are shown as elements that 
lead to the rise of Islamist movements in these countries. 
Munir Shafiq underlines that there are two societies in the Arab world at 
the moment. The modernised, secular elite and the traditional or, what he calls, 
`original' societies. Accordingly, the modernised segment of the society is installed 
by the West to divide the Arab unity and increase the dependence of the region on 
the West as a whole. Politically, systems of government are formed to imitate the 
Western powers and culturally, these modernised segments, in their lives imitate the 
West and are seen as being under the Western domination, in a relationship of 
subservience. It is the duality within the society that causes problems and the way to 
get rid of this dependence is to implement the values of the `original society', the 
values of Islam. 62 
Bassam Tibi argues that the reason behind the rise of the Islamist 
movements is "the structural integration of the Middle East into the global networks 
alien to domestic cultures". 63' The imported project of modernity and especially its 
cultural and secular aspects that accompany the modernisation efforts lead some 
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groups to resent the Western ideas. Tibi talks about the dream of the 
`fundamentalists' about Islamising modernity by means of an instrumental adoption 
of its material achievements while furiously rejecting its rational man-centred view 
of the world. 64 This "revolt against the West" is represented with positive attitudes 
regarding the modem science and technology while it is negative about the rational 
- outlooks and cultural networks that stem from it. 
In his book, The Crisis of Modem Islam, Tibi talks about a worldwide 
conflict between the "dominant 'scientific technological Western European culture 
and the pre-industrial non-Western cultures which enjoy only a very low degree of 
mastery over nature". 65 According to Tibi, the process of Westernisation in the pre- 
industrial societies, like the Middle East, produces people with "damaged 
identities". 66 Within this context, Western culture is seen as threatening, according 
to Tibi, and people turn to their "autochthonous culture", reactivating it as a social 
identity and arming themselves with it against the menacing dominant culture. It is 
noted that this is not a new phenomenon limited to 1970s and after, but this had been 
the case since the 19`h century. However, what is new according to Tibi is that this 
turning away from the dominant culture is becoming a mass phenomenon and 
consequently a political force. 67 Thus, the Islamist movements and "modern Islam" 
are diagnosed as "defensive culture", against the Western modernity within the 
nation states of the region. 
Bruce B. Lawrence, in his study "Defenders of God" says that 
`fundamentalists' of all religions, Christians, Jews and Muslims, must be considered 
within the same context of modernisation. He argues that all the `fundamentalists' 
are moderns. "They, like other moderns, recognise that the world in which they 
t 
strive to locate their deepest identity is constantly shifting, that there is an 
unbridgeable gap between who they are and where they want to be. "68 Accordingly, 
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`fundamentalists' are modems but they are not modernists. They oppose modernism 
and its proponents. They have been catalysed by "their unremitting opposition to all 
those who equate modernity as an index of material potentials with modernism as the 
sole value orientation appropriate to citizens of the modem world". 69 According to 
Lawrence, fundamentalists divide modem consciousness into two categories: 
objective givens and ideological variables. Accordingly, "modernisation may be 
epitomised as that complex of material structures, derived from technological 
innovations and abetted by capitalist initiatives that launches a process sustained by 
its own momentum. Modernism on the other hand connotes simply a species of pure 
spirit, evolving in its accord with its own autonomous artistic and intellectual 
imperatives. " 70 Modernism foresees that with the advent of modernisation, the 
political significance of religion will decrease and individual attachments to religious 
values will weaken in time. It is also argued that with the spread of modernisation, 
traditional religious institutions will weaken and religious control over society and 
culture will diminish. It is assumed that religion, rather than being a source and a 
force of collective action for the society, would simply become a private issue for the 
individual. According to Lawrence, the `fundamentalists' are at once the 
"consequence of modernity and the antithesis of modernism". 71 He sees Islamist 
`fundamentalism', just like Jewish `fundamentalism' and `fundamentalism' of the 
Protestant Christianity as a reaction to modernity. Thus, `fundamentalism', within 
the larger context of the three religious belief systems, must be understood as a 
"series of parallel socio-religious movements in the modem world that accepts the 
instrumental belief of modernity but not its value reorientations. All over the world, 
the catalyst for the fundamentalist loyalty is the hatred of the modernist value 
agenda". 72 The single and most consistent denominator of the `fundamentalism' is 
the opposition to all those individuals or institutions that advocate Enlightenment 
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values and wave the banner of secularism or modernism. According to Lawrence, 
"Whatever the outcome of the fundamentalist challenge, its origins are inseparable 
from the spectre of its declared enemy: the Enlightenment. " 73 Lawrence also 
emphasises the importance of scripture in the fundamentalist movements. He says 
that in the study of `fundamentalism', scripture becomes a crucial, defining element. 
"Remove scripture, and you no longer have `fundamentalism' but some other, 
nonreligious social movement. "74 
Seeing the Islamist movement in Iran as presenting an alternative to 
Western modernity, Ali Mirsepassi writes that the Islamist movement in Iran 
articulated an alternative discourse to overcome the Western-centric projects of 
modernisation, enabling Iran to try and accommodate modernity within the context of her 
own historical and cultural experiences and specificities [... ] This was an ideal, real or 
imagined, that no other modem movements were able to achieve (or even able to offer). 
Therefore the hegemony of political Islam was made possible through capturing the 
"imaginary" of the Iranians in a way that presented itself as the only desirable answer to 
the country's dilemmas. 75 
Ahmed and Donnan, writing about the Islamist movements and the impact 
of globalisation on Middle Eastern societies, underline rightly that post-modernity as 
a social, political and cultural configuration, is affecting everybody to varying 
degrees and Muslims are no exception to that. 76 They note that the post-modem 
culture had entered the houses of the majority in the Middle East with TVs and 
VCDs and it created different reactions, among different echelons of the society. 
Generally, stuck between the post-modern culture based on 
youth, change and consumerism and the traditional religious culture emphasizing balance 
and discouraging change, one response comes from the Islamic fundamentalists 
concerned about the pace of change and what this will do to the next generation, people 
genuinely worried that their culture and traditions that they held for a thousand years will 
now be changed and even be in the danger of being wiped out. 77 
Globalisation is seen as influencing the traditional cultures in such a 
dramatic way that a response to deal with the new challenges has become necessary. 
his approach focuses on the intrusions of the global culture in everyday lives of the 
people and the ordinary men, who try to reconstruct and give meaning to their own 
world in this highly globalised technological age. This is seen as the central debate 
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at the moment in the Middle East as well as in the West, to reconstruct and give 
meaning to the individual lives. Thus, in the Middle East Islam is shown as the main 
anchor in giving meaning to the lives of the people in this rapidly changing 
environment in this perspective. 
Anthropological studies conducted on women who started to wear the veil 
recently indicate the search for a meaning and identity in a highly globalising world. 
The study of Juliane Hammer on Palestinian women shows how the women see 
Islam as providing meaning, moral orientation, feeling of safety and emotional 
stability. 78 Arlene Elowe Macleod's work focuses on the women in Cairo and argues 
that "the women's experience with rapid change in Cairo is shaped by the search for 
an `authentic identity' coherent with traditional culture, and a search for modernism 
that builds on traditional culture and traditional sources of women's power [... ] in a 
world that is shaped by the dramatic confrontation of tradition with Western 
values". 79 Not only for the women, Islam is seen to provide meaning and a reference 
for businesses in the region as well. In a recent study on Islamist movements in 
Turkey, Aye Bugra writes about Islam as the new network provider for the small 
businesses of the peripheral areas in a highly competitive and changing economic 
environment-80 
Despite representing a strong argument and an important aspect of the 
growth of Islamism, neither modernisation nor globalisation is merely a cultural 
intrusion into societies and they carry significant economic and political aspects. 
Talking only about their cultural components would again lead to reductionism, this 
time in cultural terms. 
I 
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A NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH - MODERNISATION PROCESS 
Each of the approaches mentioned in the chapter takes one of the aspects of the 
Middle Eastern state and links the growth of the Islamist movements to this factor. 
Therefore, it remains short of explaining the whole picture and taking into account 
the multiple factors that affect the growth of Islamist movements in the region. What 
is needed is an approach linking the three important aspects of the Islamist 
movements explained above. Locating the Islamist movement in a modernisation 
process -a modernisation that 'takes the economic, political and cultural aspects 
together, can achieve this aim. 
Within this perspective, and in looking at Islamist political parties in Turkey 
as a case study (the political parties being one, and arguably the most important 
manifestation of Islamist movements in Turkey), a historical framework of 
modernisation with its economic, political and cultural aspects will be drawn in the 
following chapters. Whether the Islamist movements could be understood as a 
response to modernity, in line with the NSMs perspective, will be analysed through 
the political parties in Turkey. The role of the Islamist political parties as the most 
important manifestation of the "peripheral culture" (Islamic culture) in the political 
arena as well as their instrumentalist approach in using Islamic discourse for power- 
seeking will both be discussed. How and if these political parties respond to 
modernity will be analysed within the modernisation process of the country in the 
following chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TURKEY 1908-1946 - TIE YEARS OF THE KEMALIST 
MODERNISATION PROJECT 
The "Eastern question" or the partition of the Ottoman Empire, had been settled by 
secret agreements between Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy during World War 
1. After the War, being on the defeated side, the Ottoman state's territories were 
opened for foreign occupation. In February 1919, French forces entered Istanbul and 
in May 1919 Greek forces supported by the British and the French entered Izmir, 
starting the partition of the Ottoman territory and leaving a small territory in Central 
Anatolia for the Turks. National resistance and the War of Independence fought 
against the occupying powers by Mustafa Kemal and his friends resulted in the 
independence of the current Turkish territories and the formation of a Turkish 
Republic in 1923 in Ankara. Between 1923 and 1946, the Republican People's 
Party, founded by Mustafa Kemal, ruled the country as the single ruling party and 
carried out reforms that aimed at the "modernisation" of the Turkish Republic. 
In order to understand how the modernisation process was initiated and 
how the society was shaped through a process of social engineering by the Kemalist 
modernising elite, it is imperative to understand the developments of the late 
Ottoman period. There is continuity both in the intellectual debate of modernisation 
and the state elites from the late Ottoman period to the Turkish Republic. In order to 
demonstrate this continuity and the background of the reform and modernisation 
project, this chapter will shortly examine the Ottoman structure later relating it to the 
economic, political and collective action themes of the Republican period. Drawing 
on the argument of the first chapter about the nature of modernity and its three 
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aspects (industrialisation, nation-state and the class structure) the aim here is to look 
at how modernity in Turkey, introduced through the ambitious modernisation project 
of a military-bureaucratic elite, was initiated, and later shaped the society. 
FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE TURKISH REPUBLIC 
Modernisation efforts in the Ottoman Empire started in the late-18th century with 
Selim the Third (1789-1807) and continued during the reign of Mahmut the Second 
(1808-1839) who initiated reforms in the military field with the abolition of the 
Janissary system. A medical school and a military academy were established in 
Istanbul and centralisation efforts that strengthened the role of the bureaucracy were 
carried out during the latter's rule. New policies that would enhance the 
`modernisation' of the empire were implemented and were institutionalised with the 
administrative and legal reforms during the period of the New Order (Tanzimat) 
between 1839-1871. Seeing the economic and military supremacy of the West and 
having faced a series of defeats at the hands of the Western powers, the "genuine 
belief that the only way to save the Ottoman Empire was to introduce European style 
reforms"1 had already started to take root in the ruling circles of the Empire. In an 
attempt "to save the country", significant reforms in the military, administrative and 
judicial fields were announced and implemented during this period. These reforms 
went parallel to those that improved the position of the Christian minorities in the 
Empire. It was generally under pressure from the European powers that the Sultan 
granted equality before the law to all his subjects, enhancing the `second-class' status 
of the Christians to that of the Muslim majority, at least on paper. 
Secularisation of laws became an important component of the Tanzimat 
reforms. The canon law of Islam, the Shari' a, despite' never being abolished, was 
limited to cover only the sphere of the family law and it was codified along European 
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lines between 1865-88. The statesmen of the Tanzimat created new laws, especially 
those regarding the rights of the non-Muslims. A new commercial law was applied 
in 1850, copied from the French code; the maritime trade law was implemented in 
1863 while in 1867 foreigners were given the right to own land in the empire. 
The increasing trade of the Ottoman Empire, especially as a result of the 
agreements signed with Britain and France that gave these two countries capitulative 
rights in 1838, had made these new laws necessary. One of the consequences of the 
capitulations regime was the withdrawal of local merchants from the trade scene and 
their replacement with Greek, Armenian and other non-Muslim minority tradesmen 
who carried passports of the foreign countries and therefore were immune from the 
Ottoman tax and legal systems. They started to act as the intermediaries of the 
foreign firms conducting business in the Empire. As tobacco, cotton and fruit 
exportation started, Ottomans began to integrate with the world economy and 
became a part of the international division of labour. 2 There was a class of small and 
medium scale Turkish-Muslim traders mainly concentrated in domestic trade within 
the Empire, but compared to the wealthy and powerful minority merchants they were 
weak, unorganised, scattered and generally dependent on the latter's activities. 
As a part of the Tanzimat, significant reforms were carried on in the 
central bureaucracy in line with the principles of rationalisation and specialisation. A 
complete set of ministries and boards, as in the European system, were established in 
the capital Istanbul. In addition to the ministries, consultative assemblies and 
commissions were formed that aimed to help prepare the new measures and 
legislation in areas like building and trade. 4 Secular education institutes were formed 
during this period to train the future bureaucrats and army members. 
These reforms involved a major reorganisation of the society in the 
administrative, educational and judicial fields. They created a new elite from the 
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ranks of the military and the bureaucracy (that will henceforth be called "the 
military-bureaucratic elite"), who constituted the major actors in the late Ottoman 
and new Turkish Republic's political life. While this new elite, educated in the 
secular institutions of Istanbul, was promoting constitutionalism and adhering to 
Western ideas and seeking the Westernisation of Ottoman political and social life, 
the remainder of the population continued to stick to traditionalist values. Thus, as 
Mardin notes, "the ensuing duality appears in a number of guises that sets a neat 
separation between the Ottoman political society and civil society" s during this 
period. This duality was produced and "reproduced in the course of modernization 
of the Ottomans, representing the `high' `palace' culture or the culture of the elites 
and the `little', `folk' culture, respectively". 6 
The Tanzimat Statesmen and their cohorts had established the upper spheres of 
officialdom in the capital a fair replica of the life style which one would find in greater 
European capitals. Istanbul had been invaded, not only by the imported cloth and printing 
presses but by cafes and dance halls. These new-fangled institutions were concentrated in 
Pera, the European quarter of the capital, where the royal Prussian orchestra gave 
concerts, Sarah Bernhardt performed and where Cafe Couronne had gathered pretty 
Austrian girls as serveuses. In Pera, one could receive mail through the uncensored postal 
services of foreign powers; one could also buy books and newspapers which would have 
placed their purveyors in greater jeopardy on the Turkish side of the town across the 
Galata bridge"7 
Zürcher emphasises that the Tanzimat reforms were "never based on 
popular demand. They were imposed on Ottoman society because the leading 
bureaucrats deemed it necessary or because they were forced to act by the 
representatives of the great powers. Support for the reforms was therefore never 
broadly based". 8 During the 1870s, antagonism towards the reforms intensified on 
the part of the Ottoman Muslim community, who saw the reforms as subservience to 
European powers and non-Muslim communities whose power and wealth was 
increasing. Parallel to this antagonism in society, the main opposition to Tanzimat 
developed from within the reformers of the period. Gathering around Namik Kemal, 
the group later called as `Young Ottomans', criticised the Tanzimat policies as 
"superficial imitations of Europe, without regard for traditional Ottoman and Islamic 
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values, and as subservient to European interests. "9 They claimed that the regime was 
becoming a bureaucratic despotism, destroying the former checks and balances, 
especially that of the ulema. They saw the solution to the ills of the Tanzimat system 
in a constitutional, representative and parliamentary system that would build up a 
true feeling of citizenship and loyalty to the state among all Ottoman subjects, 
Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The Young Ottoman attempts to install a patriotic, 
constitutional system that included all the groups in the Empire did not materialise as 
nationalism among different groups was already taking shape. However, they 
contributed to the building up of a constitutional system in 1876 and they can be 
regarded as the first ideological movement among the Ottoman elite to try to create 
and influence a politically conscious public with their writings. 
The first Ottoman Constitution was enacted in 1876 and the first 
parliamentary elections were held in December 1876 and January 1877. However, 
the parliamentary regime was rather short lived as Sultan Abdulhamit closed down 
the Parliament in 1878 and started a period of repression in the Empire. Abdulhamit 
had gone so far as to form a group of spies and agents to alert him to any 
development that was going on among his subjects. Despite high level of repression, 
agitation was starting to develop among the students. The first opposition group 
against the rule of Abdulhamit was formed among the students of the Military 
Medical College in 1889 who formed themselves into the Ottoman Union Society 
(Ittihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti), aiming to reinstate the constitution and the Parliament. 10 
Against the repressive rule, other secret organisations like Independence (Hürriyet) 
and Motherland and Independence (Vatan ve Hürriyet) were founded around the 
Empire. In time some of the members of these groups were arrested and most fled 
abroad, mainly to, Paris where they carried on their activities against the repression in 
the Empire. They founded a small committee, the Committee of Union and Progress 
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(Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti - CUP), under which most of the secret organisations 
united. They started publishing a newspaper in Paris called Me, veret (Consultation) 
from 1895 and described themselves as the Young Turks (Jeunes Turcs - Jon 
Türkler) in France. The military-bureaucratic elite constituted the main group within 
the CUP organisations. Against the growing support and increasing strength of the 
CUP, and the failure of the Sultan's forces to crush the organisation, Abdulhamit was 
forced to accept the reimplementation of the Constitutional rule in 1908. The 
elections for the Second Parliament were held after a thirty-year break and resulted in 
the total victory of the CUP. The other party entering the elections, the Party of 
Ottoman Liberals (Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi), got only one seat in the 288 seat 
parliament. 
Despite the role the CUP played in the termination of the repressive 
period, the victory of the CUP in the elections and the active role it started to play in 
the political life of the Empire was not without opposition. There was an opposition 
growing from the conservative religious circles to the reform minded, Western 
oriented cadres of the CUP. Various magazines that were published during this 
period advocated "Islam as the powerful ideology" as an alternative to the CUP 
ideology to save the Ottomans from declining relative to the West and to help return 
the empire to the glorious periods of the past. On 13 April 1909, some of these 
groups gathered in Istanbul against the Young Turks and the Committee of Union 
and Progress and revolts started with the slogan of "We want Shari'a rule! "', The 
reaction of the Union and Progress was harsh. They repressed the revolt, dethroned 
Abdulhamit and brought Viehmet V to the throne. Under Mehmet V, they came to 
power through the Parliament, forming the government and consolidating their rule. 
During the rule of the CUP, three main ideological lines of thought 
continued to develop in the Empire: Ottomanism, (Pan)Islamism and (Pan)Turkism. 
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Ottomanists adhered to the Young Ottoman ideal- of the unity of the different 
communities around the Ottoman throne, (pan)Islamism sought to regenerate the 
empire on the basis of Islamic practices and solidarity within the Muslim umma 
(Muslim society) and Turkism sought the unity of the Turkic peoples under the 
Ottoman flag. Within these ideological circles, the discussion as to how much to 
Westernise and what should form the basis of loyalty in the future Ottoman state 
constituted the main differences between groups. Ottomanism became the main 
ideology of the CUP after 1908 and remained as such until the 1913 Balkan wars. 
Turkish nationalism was a rather latecomer into the picture and was strengthened as 
different territories, one by one, declared their independence from the Empire. As 
leading the main opposition to the CUP, the (Pan)Islamists were deeply suspected by 
the regime after the 1909 demonstrations. However, thinking of the (Pan)Islamist 
group as being only composed of reactionary forces to the Westernised, reform- 
minded CUP members would be misleading. There were a significant number of 
Muslim reformers and modernists like Sait Halim Pasha and Mehmet Akif at this 
time, who saw the future of the Empire in an Islamic structure and advocated a return 
to Shari' a believing this would strengthen the Empire. 
Especially after the rise of the nationalist movements all over the Empire, 
Turkish nationalism started to dominate more strongly over the ideas of Ottomanism 
and Islamism. A strong Turkish nationalism, with some Islamic overtones became 
the unifying ideology to be pursued by the reformers - the CUP that remained in 
power until the end of World War 1. 
One of the main priorities of the CUP upon coming to power in 1908 was 
to develop a basis for national economy. Because Ottoman industry was very weak, 
the working class constituted only the very minority of the urban population at this 
time. The wage earners were generally the employees in the service sector, 
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especially of the railroad network (that was owned by foreign companies), 
municipality works, and construction or trading. State officials, in contrast, 
constituted a powerful stratum of Ottoman society and a large majority of the city 
population. However, their salaries would greatly decrease with the war, reducing 
their economic power. Within the agricultural sector, deliberate acts of the 
Committee of Union and Progress right after 1908 could be seen to implement some 
policies for middle and rich peasants, especially in places where agricultural 
production for the markets carried importance. 
As the non-Muslim commercial class was mainly involved in foreign trade 
rather than developing local markets and investing in manufacturing, and as the 
Muslim business class was very weak, the bureaucrats of the new regime intended to 
take the initiative to "develop an indigenous industry". The aim of creating a 
"national bourgeoisie" with the backing of the state became a priority in the 
development of the country. The 1914 Law for the Encouragement of Industry 
(Tepik-i Sanayi Kanunu) was passed with the aim of developing national 
production. In 1915, Muslim businessmen founded the Tradesmen's Association 
(Esnaf Cemiyeti), to take the internal market under their control. 12 In 1916, the 
Parliament (Meclis-i Mebusan) approved a new customs law saying that the 
government would apply between 30% and 100% customs duty on imported goods 
to encourage and protect local production. 13 While the policies of encouraging 
industrialisation and the creation of a native bourgeoisie continued, World War I and 
the War of Independence changed and affected the whole of the peninsula, resulting 
in the abolition of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of the Turkish Republic. 
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THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
Entering the War on the side of the Axis powers, the Ottoman Empire was defeated 
in World War I, and its territories were divided among the Alliance powers. As 
foreign occupation took place, national resistance organised under the leadership of 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, announced the partition of the territories as unacceptable. 
Mustafa Kemal is often noted to have been an early member of the CUP, one of the 
inner circle activist officers who took part both in the events leading to the 
reinstatement of the Constitution in 1908 and suppressing the opposition in 1909. He 
had distanced himself from the CUP during the War and was no longer associated 
with the organisation as the war ended and national resistance started in 1919. He 
made a heroic name for himself during the War in the Dardanelles and had led the 
brigade in charge of all the troops on the Syrian front. In 19 May 1919 Mustafa 
Kemal travelled to Samsun, in a move, which is seen as the start of the National 
Resistance movement against the invading powers. It was decided in various 
congresses held in the Anatolian cities that in case the Istanbul government could not 
secure the independence of the country in its current borders, then a government that 
would be formed by a National Assembly would bring all the national resources 
together and fight for national independence. As the Alliance powers started to 
invade Istanbul in 1920, there was no need to wait for Mustafa Kemal and his 
colleagues to announce the formation of a National Assembly in Ankara and initiate 
the War of Independence against the invading powers that would result in victory. 
The support of the (Pan)Islamists 14 is considered to have been an 
important contribution to the victory in the War of Independence. The anti-Western, 
anti-imperialist discourse of the Kemalists during the War was especially appealing 
for the (Pan)Islamist-conservative circles in Anatolia and was supported, as a part of 
the desire to live independent of Western influence. Mustafa Kemal and his friends 
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were well aware of the support of religious circles and they, rather than emphasising 
the nationalist drive behind the war, encouraged cooperation and alliances with these 
groups for independence. Thus, people of religion in the first Turkish national 
Assembly amounted to one fifth of the members - among them 14 mufti and eight 
leading members of different religious orders. 15 They played an active role in the 
parliamentary meetings and eagerly participated in the debates - the bills that 
abolished the caliphate and the Shari' a ministry were both sponsored by clerics. 16 
But during the following years a radical decline in the numbers of the ulema within 
the ruling elite was to be seen. 
In addition to collaboration with the ulema, the cooperation of the 
"intermediary classes" like the local notables is important to note at this point. The 
War of Independence was financed with the help of these groups. According to 
Arnold Leder, there was almost no support for the War of Independence from the 
peasants and if there was any support, "it was given reluctantly after much 
pressure". 17 Leder says: 
For the most part, the villagers or peasants of Anatolia viewed the War of Independence 
with suspicion. They had for hundred of years been subject to military conscription and 
arbitrary taxation by one authority or another. When war came to Anatolia, the greatest 
concern of the villagers was to escape from military conscription - Ottoman or nationalist 
[... ]. Thus, the peasants were in no mood to join the nationalist forces. 18 
In order to gather support against the occupation of the country the new 
regime sought the support of the local notables who could force the peasants to 
cooperate in their cause. 
It is apparent that in the view of the historical fatigue of the peasants and 
their ties to traditional leaders the War of Independence could only be wori by 
relying on the tribal chiefs, local notables and religious leaders who could exercise 
some influence on the peasants. And in this case it was only in the face of the Greek 
and Armenians that these elements began to resist. 19 In that period, the local 
notables of Anatolia, that is the most prominent local leaders, were the spokesman of 
0 
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the people. Granted, in almost every case, this resulted from the exercise of arbitrary 
power. Next to the local notables stood the local ulema (learned men of Muslim 
theology), muftis and the turbaned sheikhs (heads of religious orders) all of whom 
served as the spokesmen of the local notables who were the power behind them. 
Mustafa Kemal during the entire course of nationalist movement encountered local 
notables acting as the leaders of the people. 20 
The class of local notables would constitute one of the main allies of the 
Kemalist regime after the war as well. There was willingness on the side of the 
notables to collaborate and be a part of the new elite - the modernizing military- 
bureaucratic elite - as this would give them the opportunity to be a part of the 
regime. 21 The local notables delivered their support for the Kemalist elite, as long as 
they were allowed to retain their land, status and local influence. In return, the 
regime allowed the local notables to keep their influence as long as the countryside 
was peaceful and orderly. 
The War of Independence resulted in the victory of the Turkish forces and 
the independence of the country from foreign occupation. The economic and social 
conditions of the country were very poor after long years of continuous warfare. 
What was left of the Ottoman Empire, the future Turkish Republic, was highly 
depopulated, impoverished and was in ruins in every sense. The emigration and the 
expatriation of the non-Muslim communities during and after the war led Anatolia to 
lose ten percent of its already much reduced population. This had two other major 
consequences: firstly, the migrations led to a highly homogenised Muslim 
community in the territories and secondly, they resulted in the loss of the most 
entrepreneurial and industrialist capital, that was owned and run by the non-Muslim 
communities. With them, the technological know-how and international links were 
102 
also lost to a great extent. Mustafa Kemal and his associates would soon embark on - 
a project to develop the country and take it out of the ruins in which it found itself. 
THE KEMALIST MODERNISATION PROJECT 
After the victory of the War of Independence, energies were diverted towards the 
future of the country and what direction political and the social development would 
take. Mustafa Kemal had already started to consolidate his political position before 
the Peace Treaty of Lausanne was signed. The Sultanate was terminated in 1922. 
The People's Party was founded under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in 
September 1923. By taking over the main organisation of the war time resistance to 
foreign occupation, the People's Party gained an already established network all over 
Anatolia. The first Parliament that carried out the War of Independence was 
dissolved and new elections were held that mainly carried People's Party members to 
the Parliament. The consolidation of power in the National Assembly and the Party, 
which were both under the control of Mustafa Kemal, continued as the main feature 
of the coming decades. Thus, the period between 1925-1945 is generally referred to 
as either the "consolidation period"22 of the new republican regime or as "the heyday 
of Kemalism". 23 
Once power was secured, a reform package, more of a "modernisation 
project", was designed by Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues that would lay the 
foundations of Turkey's future. This "modernisation project" was formed with the 
goal of developing the country and "catching up with the developed countries of the 
West". To make the country a developed, modem and respectable nation in the 
international sphere had become the main aim of the new ruling circle of the 
countl jy. `4 
i 
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It is important here to understand and clarify the basic components of the 
Kemalist modernisation project. The first pillar of the modernisation project 
consisted of capitalist industrialisation which the Kemalists saw as the key to 
replicating the success of Western European economies. Economically, the country 
was seen as weak and backward and efforts were canalised to industrialise the 
country and incorporate her economy to the capitalist international markets on an 
equal basis. 
The second and third pillars that go hand in hand were nationalism and 
secularism. The new state was being formed around the notion of Turkish 
nationality and Turkishness. Religion was assigned a minimum role in public life 
and was seen as reserved for the private sphere, as a belief system only relevant to 
relations between the individual and the God. The unifying role that had until now 
been assigned to Islam was given to nationalism. Thus, `Islam as the unifying 
ideology' was replaced with Turkish nationalism under the Kemalist rule. 
The notion of a state based on the tenets of Islam was the anathema of the 
Republican elites, of Mustafa Kemal's People's Party. 25 They wanted Turkey to 
reach to the level of the contemporary civilization by emphasising notions such as 
science, modern education, rationality and secularism. The long discussions as to 
how to modernize were concluded at this point. The idea advocated by some groups 
of taking Western technology but leaving Western cultural influences was rejected 
and Westernisation with its technological, and socio-cultural aspects was determined 
as the policy that the Turkish Republic would implement as a tool in its 
modernisation project. However, to what extent this ideal was incorporated into 
society is still debatable today. Taking Western technology but holding on to 
r Muslim values was to remain the main point of the opposition in Turkey, even 78 
years after the formation of the Republic. Thus, the "enduring strength of the 
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conservative appeal" was to continue despite the changes in the economic and 
political map of the country. 26 
To summarize, the Kenialist modernisation project consisted of capitalist 
industrial development, nationalism and secularism in a Westernization context. 
Reforms were initiated to realise this modernisation project and they were 
- implemented under the single party rule of the People's Party that was later re-named 
the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - RPP) after the 
announcement of the Republic on 29 October 1923. 
THE REPUBLICAN POLITICS 
The most suitable political structure within which the modernisation project could be 
realised was thought to be a Republic. The Republican regime was declared on 29 
October 1923, with Mustafa Kemal becoming the President and Ismet tnönü the 
Prime Minister of the country. Despite these changes, the Caliph continued to retain 
his popularity and see himself as an autonomous centre of power in Istanbul. 27 As 
Ahmad says, during the long centuries of its rule, the Ottoman rulers had created a 
vast network of institutions and loyalties, especially religious loyalties almost among 
all social groups. 28 In the Kemalist modernisation project, there was no room for 
religious loyalties and alternative power centres that could hamper the development 
and Westernisation of the country. Thus, the caliphate was abolished in March 1924, 
leading to the growth of a political opposition. The first main organised opposition 
developed from within the ranks of the RPP in the Parliamentary group. 
In November 1924, some members of the RPP separated themselves from 
the cadres of the party to form the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver 
r 
Cumhuriyet Firkasi - PRP). The PRP announced its-basic aim as the protection of 
individual rights against the growing "oligarchic power of the rulers". 29 
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Republicanism, liberalism and democracy were the other principles espoused by the 
PRP. Despite the principle of liberalism, the party basically aimed to protect religion 
and took a stand against the secularist principles of the government. Article six of 
the PRP's programme suggested that the religious beliefs of the people were under 
threat and in need of protection30. This party organisation posed a challenge to the 
Kemalist modernisation project, especially to its secularism pillar. Prime Minister 
Inönü and the reforms were the main targets of the opposition. 
Some months later, by the beginning of February 1925, the Kurdish 
population of East Anatolia started a rebellion against the Republic under Sheikh Sait 
with the aim of founding an independent Kurdish state and reinstating the caliphate. 
The abolition of the caliphate, an important religious symbol that bound the two 
communities - Turkish and Kurdish - together had inspired resentment against the 
RPP. In addition to that the nationalist ideology of regime, constructing a new 
national consciousness around Turkishness, had led to a repressive policy against the 
Kurdish identity. 31 The public use of the Kurdish language and the teaching of 
Kurdish were prohibited under this policy. As the rebellion broke out, martial law 
was declared by the Ankara government and the Law for the Maintenance of Order 
(Takrir-i Sukun) was passed by the Parliament, giving the government absolute 
power to fight against opposition in an attempt to crush the rebellion. In addition to 
these measures, the Independence Tribunals that had been formed in 1920 to deal 
with cases regarding treason and offences against the regime and that had the right to 
carry out death sentences without the sanction of the Assembly were reinstated. The 
rebellion was easily suppressed with these policies and from that time onwards, a 
separate Kurdish identity was officially denied. 
After the rebellion had been suppressed, the attention of the government 
turned to the political opposition coming from the newspapers and the PRP. Eight of 
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the important Istanbul newspapers - conservative, liberal, and Marxist - were closed 
down and some of the journalists of the eastern provinces were arrested and tried in 
the courts. 32 Having taken control of the opposition media, the attention of the 
government now turned to the opposition party - the PRP. This party was closed 
down in June 1925. The multiparty experience was left behind as a short-lived one, 
strengthening the single party government that had by now extended its power to 
every region and corner of the country and curbed the political opposition against its 
project. After 1925, new reforms were implemented. 
In 1925, all religious shrines and religious orders (tarikat) were closed 
down. In 1926, with the changes in the civil Law, Shari `a laws regarding the family 
and individual were abolished. Besides, the regime stopped religious education 
activities under its supervision and adopted strict measures on "secret religious 
education activities" with the aim of "creating a new culture independent of Islam". 
Berkes notes that in the fight for "the freedom of conscience and the independence of 
the nation, every anachronism left as the heritage of the the Tanzimat - the medrese, 
the caliphate, the Shari' a courts and the sultanate - all of which proved to be nothing 
but burdens in the national struggle for survival or obsolete institutions creating 
nothing but waste and complications in a time of economy and rationalisation - had 
to be thrown overboard. " 33 By the end of the decade, reforms like the 
disestablishment of the state religion (1928), adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928) 
and the use of the Turkish in the Islamic call prayer (1932) were passed. 
In line with the goals of the modernisation project, the first reforms of the 
Republican period were directed towards secularism and the imposition of 
modernisation based on rationalisation of knowledge and science rather than on 
religious principles. The main aim was to create the modern nation state and the new' 
free individual. In addition to the Kurdish identity being denied after the rebellion in 
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1925, a Muslim identity was also rejected for the future of the population with the 
reforms. Turkish identity was put forward as a "supreme identity" that the 
individuals would adhere to, subordinating all other identities to it. 
While the urban centres and the intellectuals accepted the secular 
principles quickly, in the provinces and the rural areas the dominance of religion in 
daily life continued. Despite the consequent development of this "duality" in the 
society between the urban and the rural centres, these reforms that aimed at an 
overall change and creation of the "new Turks" in the society met with little public 
protest other than some minor disturbances. The glorious victory of the War of 
Independence and the heroic stories of the army and the new politicians, as well as 
the anti-imperialist discourses of the regime, worked to decrease the opposition to the 
regime from society. 
THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
The economic policy of the state was shaped around state-led capitalist industrial 
development. As mentioned earlier, under the Committee of Union and Progress 
measures to encourage the manufacturing sector and the development of the national 
bourgeoisie had already been implemented. Nationalism became one of the main 
pillars of the Kemalist modernisation project, not only in the political and ideological 
levels, but also in the economic field. The nationalist stand of the Kemalist regime 
can be seen in the economic congress of Izmir in February 1923, where the statement 
was made showing that the leadership was unified in wishing to establish a national 
economy in order to become completely sovereign. Now that political independence 
was gained, it was time for economic independence. Mustafa Kemal in his opening 
speech said that military victories alone could not secure the future of the nation 
without simultaneous economic victories. 34 The economic congress resulted in new 
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measures such as a protectionist tariff policy, the nationalisation of foreign trade, 
monopoly rights for foreign capital, the establishment of a national bank, and revived 
opposition to concessions. However, the economic implications of the Lausanne 
Treaty prevented the implementation of these policies. Lausanne was not only a 
Peace Treaty but also a framework that drew up the international economic relations 
of the new Turkish Republic. As the Lausanne Treaty was signed, three main 
economic guidelines for Turkey's relations with European powers were also 
designed. The first was the abolition of the capitulations that provided concessions 
to foreign powers during the Ottoman period. Secondly, the Ottoman external debt 
was renegotiated and apportioned between the successor states such that Turkey was 
due to pay 67 percent of the total in gold sterling beginning in 1929. Thirdly, the 
free-trade treaties that had been renewed periodically during the 19th century were 
discontinued. It was agreed that the existing structure of low tariff rates and 
restrictions against quotas would continue until 1929, when the new republic would 
be free to pursue its own commercial policies. 35 
During the period between 1923-29, capitalist development took its place 
on the agenda of the government as the main pillar of the modernisation process. 
The main aim of "forming" a national bourgeoisie for development and 
modernisation continued. The state supported the "formation" of a bourgeoisie as 
the main actor in the process of industrialisation and an active policy of intervention 
was pursued to favour the private sector. State monopolies in areas such as matches, 
alcoholic beverages, gasoline importation and port management were transferred to 
private firms, under favourable terms. They were given over to be run by some 
"privileged" individuals and companies, who generally had political connections to 
the ruling Republican People's Party (if they were themselves not top level 
politicians). 36 It is important to keep in mind at this point that people having 
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connections to the political power were made the first capitalists of the country. 
During this period, foreign capital was also invited to the country and cooperation 
with local capital was especially encouraged. Generally while the foreign company 
would provide the capital for the business, the local partner would run it, with its 
connections to the political power. 37 caglar Keyder notes the important effect of the 
minorities that were "forced" to leave Turkish territories between 1923-29. He says 
that this process resulted in the expropriation by the state of the estates and property 
that the minorities left and that this resulted in a great accumulation of wealth in the 
hands of the state, helping the formation of capital holders in the country. 38 
Although encouragement of the industrial sector was the main task of the 
ruling elite, agriculture still remained the leading economic sector in the country at 
the time. Industry was developing at a rate of 8.5 percent, per annum but agriculture 
still constituted the bulk of economic activity. Keyder notes the importance of the 
abolishment of the tithe (ö, cür vergisi) in 1925, which constituted the 1/8`h of the total 
production that the peasants were forced to give to the central authority as tax. When 
this kind of tax collecting was terminated, peasants that were left with the amount of 
production to sustain themselves under tithe taxing, were now left with an excess of 
production that helped to integrate them to the market without any intermediaries. 39 
The commercialisation of agriculture by the peasants themselves can be said to have 
materialised during this period and this helped to increase the income of the peasants 
and the villagers as a whole. 40 Owen and Pamuk make note of the opinions that the 
abolition of the tithe was a concession by the new regime to the big landowners for 
their support during the War of Independence. However, they later argue that it was 
also a policy to alleviate the poverty among the bulk of the peasants that suffered 
from the heavy burden of the war. In addition to that the abolition of the tithe led to 
the abolishing of the tax farming system in the countryside, where the "economically 
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powerful strata" like the large landowners, merchants, moneylenders and urban 
notables lost the mechanism to appropriate agricultural surplus". So, in the long run, 
both the abolition of the tithe and of tax farming was to the benefit of small peasant 
ownership and production. 41 
The policies pursued since 1908, which focused on creating a national 
bourgeoisie and on "enriching" individuals through state intervention proved to have 
been successful to a certain extent by the end of 1929. The cooperation of Turkish- 
Muslim trading bourgeoisie, political cadres and high level bureaucrats helped in the 
formation of a "new wealthy" strata that managed to replace the traditional, non- 
Muslim bourgeoisie and in some cases acted as the intermediaries and partners of 
foreign companies in the country. However, it would be too optimistic to say that a 
real bourgeois class had evolved during this period. The members of this `group of 
the new wealthy' could be considered as not more than a group making use of the 
benefits of the state policies and they were generally concentrated in trade capitalism 
rather than in industrial capitalism. 42 
THE SHORT MULTIPARTY EXPERIENCE OF 1930 
During the period of Republican People's Party rule until 1946, reforms were carried 
out and the modernisation project was pursued without much opposition. The 
country was ruled by a single party regime of the RPP, except for a short-lived multi- 
party experience in 1930. By 1930, an opposition party was being encouraged by 
Mustafa Kemal as he thought that the "Cultural Revolution" was now completed 
with the reforms secularising the laws and the education system as well as the daily 
life and that it was time for Turkey to be a democratic republic in line with the ideal 
P 
of Westernisation. 43 1930 was also an important year as the impact of the 1929 
economic crisis was being felt in the Turkish territories and the political circles of the 
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time were engaged in discussing what kind of an economic strategy to adopt for the 
coming years. The main impact of the 1929 economic crisis on the Turkish economy 
was the decline in agricultural commodity prices. Compared to 1925, prices of 
agricultural goods fell by one third in the beginning of the 1930s and, since Turkish 
exports were mainly agricultural goods, this had an enormous impact on the balance 
of trade of the country. The severity of the crisis forced the government to take some 
serious measures in moving towards protectionism and asserting greater control over 
foreign trade and foreign exchange. In June 1929, tariffs were implemented such 
that the average tariff rate on imports was increased from 13 to 46 percent. ` 4 In 
addition to the people that supported a more active state role in the economy and an 
increasing protectionism as a response to the crisis, there was another group that 
argued instead for a liberal economic policy with limited state intervention. As this 
debate was intensifying, in August 1930, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk announced that one 
of his closest colleagues, Fethi Okyar, was going to create an opposition party - the 
Free Party (Serbest Firka - FP). Okyar had liberal ideas about the economic system 
and was basically opposed to the etatist stand of the RPP after the 1929 economic 
crisis. The main divergences between the RPP and the FP revolved around the 
abolition of monopolies and tax cuts and the importation of foreign capital. Weiker 
notes that, had the FP continued its existence in the political scene longer, it might 
have taken the representative role of the industrial-commercial bourgeoisie and 
contributed to the development of class politics in Turkey. 45 
However, rather than attracting the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, 
the FP gathered under its umbrella the reactionary forces that were against the 
Kemalist modernisation project. The idea that the "cultural revolution" had been 
successful proved to be wrong and within weeks of its formation, the FP became the 
centre of the counter-revolutionary reaction. The number of applications for party 
112 
- membership reached 13,000 in the first two weeks. 
46 This seems to approve the idea 
that some of the reforms that were implemented in line with the modernisation 
project were not accepted by a large group in the society. Thus, the FP as a party 
that was formed against the RPP was widely supported by these opposition groups. 
The local elections that were held in October 1930 resulted in the FP 
gaining 30. out of 512 seats. Despite the low level of success in this election, it was 
enough to surprise and alarm the RPP. The FP members accused the RPP of fraud in 
the elections, leading to open and fierce attacks between the two parties. Mustafa 
Kemal, in this environment of tension, announced that it was impossible for him to 
be partial anymore as the President, siding with the RPP. Fethi Okyar was left with 
the only option of closing down the Party, as he was aware of the impossibility of 
conducting politics against Mustafa Kemal at the time. The FP closed itself down on 
16 November 1930. 
After 1930, the political scene was dominated by the suppressive and 
authoritarian tendencies of the regime. Becoming aware of the strength of the 
opposition to the reforms and the RPP, the ruling circle increased controls and 
measures against the opposition and started ruling more forcefully in advancing the 
reforms. New powers were given to the RPP to close down any organisation and 
newspapers that contradicted the general policy of the regime at this time. Both the 
press and the educational institutions were mobilised to spread the Kemalist message 
- the modernisation project. In 1931, the basic principles of the modernisation 
project, the Kemalist principles, were laid down officially in the RPP programme. 
They were listed as: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism and 
revolutionism. These six principles, represented by arrows, constituted the RPP 
emblem after this date. Populism was incorporated into the principles as a means to 
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promote solidarity and cooperation in the society, which was seen as becoming more 
and more reactionary and fragmented against the reforms. 
CORPORATIST STRUCTURE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POPULISM 
_ 
Despite the policy of creating industrialists and capital accumulation in the hands of 
a bourgeoisie, "class" was a concept that was highly disliked by the RPP elite. 
Kemalism as a set of ideas considered the interests of the nation as superior to those 
of any group or class and denied the existence of any classes in the European sense 
in Turkey as well as prohibiting any political activity based on class interests. 
Populism and the emphasis on national solidarity became one of the main principles 
of the Kemalist project. Ziya Gökalp is seen as the major ideologue of Turkish 
nationalism with his ideas about corporatism constituting the basis of the Kemalist 
populist principle. In his sociological works, which are highly influenced by the 
works of Durkheim, Gökalp's primary purpose was to define the cultural basis of 
Turkish nationalism in order to show that modernisation was compatible with 
retaining a distinct Turkish identity. The main contribution of Gökalp that will be 
noted here is his idea about "solidarism" and corporatist organisational structure that 
became the basic characteristic of collective action in the early Republican ideology. 
Gökalp emphasises subordination of occupational associations to the state. 
In the hierarchical classifications of nations that he analysed, the conclusion was that 
the "highest form of civilisation [... ] is [... ] the corporate nation, whose basic units 
are corporate bodies which have a national character". 47 Within the policy of 
catching up with the West, corporatism was foreseen as a prerequisite for social 
organisation by Gökalp. "The most advanced nations of Europe are developing in 
1" 
this direction and the Turkish nation currently belongs to a communal type of nations 
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(those with an urban basis), that in the future will develop into a corporate nation" 
writes Gökalp regarding the necessity of developing a corporatist structure. 48 
Gökalp's writings about the need for corporatist structures in maintaining 
solidarity of the population were important in the formation of the populist ideas of 
the Republican regime. The ideas relating to populism were used within the context 
of solidarity by Mustafa Kemal before and within the early years of the Republic. 
New Turkey was characterised as "a society united in terms of race, religion and 
culture, filled with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice and having a common fate 
and interest". 49 Later as the economic policies were being discussed and economic 
development was pursued as the basic prerequisite for modernisation, populism was 
promoted to create a balance between the different classes. It was emphasized by the 
rulers of the country that the Turkish nation was not composed of different classes 
and class interests but was a corporatist framework composed of different 
occupations, coexisting within the same system peacefully, mutually cooperating, not 
in a struggle to pursue different interests. In a report published by the RPP in 1931, 
the aim of populism was given as being to "unify the nation by avoiding class 
struggle". Populism was the rejection of class struggle in the society. At the Fourth 
Party Congress in May 1931, it was said: 
It is one of our main principles to consider the people of Turkish Republic , not as 
composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions 
according to the requirements of division of labour for the individual and social life of the 
Turkish people. The farmers, handicraftsmen, labourers and workmen, people exercising 
free professions, industrialists, merchants and public servants are the main groups of work 
constituting the Turkish community. The labour of each of these is indispensable to the 
life and well-being of the others and society in general. The goal at which our party aims 
with this principle is to obtain social order and solidarity instead of class conflict and to 
establish harmony of interests so that they will not injure one another. Interests will be 
balanced according to their degree of capability, knowledge and contribution. " 
It has been noted by many scholars that such an approach was used to 
justify the existence of a single party regime during the period. Since the Republican 1 
People's Party was representing the totality of interests in the society, there was no 
need to form other parties that might threaten the unity. Accordingly, there were no 
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class struggles in the society because it was not composed of different classes but of 
occupational groups. Thus, interest articulation and collective action was seen along 
these lines, in a corporatist fashion, away from class interests. This understanding of 
populism was accompanied by a shift towards etatist economic policy and provided 
much of the ideological justification for Kemalist experiments with state corporatism 
during the 1930s. Between 1932-34, a nationalist corporatism was developed by a 
group of intellectuals gathering around the journal Kadro. The Kadro group 
portrayed the Kemalist modernisation project as a struggle against capitalism and 
imperialism, arguing that Turkey was representing an economic development 
without the social contradictions that this would bring. They were arguing that 
Turkey would be accumulating capital while avoiding the class struggle. 5' 
The RPP started to use populism as a term to describe itself as "the 
synthesis of the people and as the sole authoritative interpreter of the national 
interest". 52 Representation of interests through alternative, non-party or non- 
bureaucratic channels was regarded as unnecessary and as encouraging the 
acquisition of illegitimate privilege. Despite the idea of using the party and 
bureaucratic channels for interest representation, the organisations within this line 
were also very limited until 1946. Populism and corporatism were understood more 
as the gathering of all ideas within the cadres of the RPP and there was no necessity 
for any other organisation as this party thought of all the interests even without their 
representation. Thus, between 1925 and 1946, Turkish associational life is noted as 
having been "virtually non-existent, with only a few modest attempts to sponsor 
corporatist professional organisations. "s3 
For the workers, there was not even such sponsoring of corporatist 
P 
organisations. The labour law o¬1936, while bringing some safeguards to workers'in 
industry (but which materialised only after 1946), prohibited the formation of trade 
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unions and the call for strikes. The outlawing of any form of organisation for the 
working class in this period led some to conclude that there was no corporatist 
structure in Turkey in this period. 54 It could be argued here that the corporatist idea 
was well integrated into the RPP discourse, but was hardly implemented in the 
society during the period under consideration. 
STATE-LED CAPITALISM - THE ETATIST YEARS 
As mentioned earlier, 1929 was- an important year in Turkish economic development 
as it was both the year ending the economic implications of the Lausanne Treaty and 
the year of world economic crisis. With the ending of the provisions of Lausanne, 
the Turkish Republic was now free to determine the tariffs and quotas it would 
impose on foreign trade. But more important than this freedom was the impact of the 
world economic crisis on the Turkish economy, as noted above. The significant 
decrease in agricultural commodity prices hit the Turkish economy hard as an 
agriculture exporting country. Between 1929 and 1932, the export price of hazelnuts 
declined by 73 percent, wheat by 63 percent, dried figs by 52 percent, tobacco by 50 
percent and cotton by 48 percent. 55 
Having consolidated its powers and secured its position through the 
elimination of the opposition from the FP that advocated liberal policies, the RPP 
was now free to implement an active role for the state in the economy. In addition to 
high tariff rates, in 1931 a quota system started to be implemented towards foreign 
trade. It prohibited the importation of goods that could be produced at home. 
Imports of processed food, alcoholic beverages, perfumes, cloths, shoes and leather 
merchandise were completely prohibited. 56 Protectionist measures were all over the 
economy now. The necessity of creating an indigenous industry, independent of the 
7j 
foreign powers, was emphasized in the speech of government officials as well: 
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Despite the political and economic disagreements between them, the powerful industrial 
countries are in agreement in reducing agricultural countries to a status of primary 
producers and in dominating their internal markets. To this end, they will eventually use 
their political influence to prevent the present movement in the agricultural countries [... ] 
this reality drives us to establish the industry we need without delay. 57 
In addition to the international factors, Keyder notes domestic factors that 
contributed to the formation of the protectionist drive for industrialisation. The 
world economy had continued its enlargement all through the 1920s and within the 
enlarging economies, the merchant capital had been able to make use of the benefits 
of the system with least political limitation and when the political authorities were 
least interventionist. So, as long as the bourgeoisie was economically dominant and 
the merchants constituted either the political elite or the circles close to the regime, 
liberal policies were most demanded. However, as the economic growth started to 
decline due to the world economic crisis and the trade lost its most profitable 
condition, political authorities became relatively more autonomous and the suitable 
environment was "created" for the etatist policies of the 1930s. The 1930s became 
the years of the "state" and etatism that favoured policies for industrial capital rather 
than merchant capital. 58 The corporatist and populist discourse was already designing 
the legitimising ideological framework for this. 
Especially from 1932 onwards, the state's role in investment, management 
and production became the main feature of the period. It was during this period that 
the first serious steps were taken for industrialisation. The first five-year economic 
plan was concluded in 1933, aiming to establish the following industries: textiles 
(cotton, hemp, wool), mining (iron, semi-coke, coke, copper, sulphur), cellulose 
(paper and artificial silk), earthware (ceramics, glass and bottles) and chemicals 
(chlorine, caustic soda and super-phosphates). 59 The basic goals of this plan were 
"self-sufficiency"; to produce the goods r)ecessary for local consumption in peace 
and war and to establish industries that utilised local raw materials. The first five- 
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year plan was implemented to a large extent successfully and most of the basic 
industries were established by 1938. 
Agriculture developed quite well during the period as well. The foreign 
trade deficit recovered and, except for 1938, the Turkish trade balance was positive 
during the period. During 1930-39, the trading bourgeoisie that had become strong 
during the previous-years lost its privileged position; especially those among them 
who were engaged in importing goods now subject to protectionist policies. On the 
other hand the elements of the bourgeoisie that had supplemented the state's 
investment rather than acted as its rival, and that acted in cooperation with the state 
in the industrialisation project, managed to benefit greatly from the etatist policies. 
Owen and Pamuk note that it would be difficult to say that the advent of the state 
sector had hurt and led to dramatic declines in the profits of the private productive 
capital. They say that the state, by investing in large, expensive projects in 
intermediate goods and providing them as inputs, helped the growth of private 
enterprise in the manufacturing of the final goods for the consumer. The private 
sector continued to be supported and subsidised all through the 1930s. Although the 
benefits to the bourgeoisie were significant, it should also be noted that there was a 
growing concern in the private sector about the increasing pace of state sector 
development and about how far the growth of the state sector would leave them room 
to operate in the market in the future. 
1940-45: Wt ECONOMIES 
With the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, on November 10`h, 1938, Ismet Inönü 
became the President of the Republic and single party rule continued. Strict 
compliance with the Kemalist principles was pursued up until 1946, when multi- 
party politics became operational in the country. Then, some concessions, especially 
119 
in the religious education would be given, which would affect the developments in 
the coming decades. 
During the 1939-45 period, the Turkish economy was affected by the war 
economics. Although Turkey did not enter the Second World War and remained 
neutral until the end, it was affected by shortages in the world market. It had to 
increase its army from 120,000 to 1.5 million and keeping and equipping this army 
brought great economic strains for the economy. 60 The government had to increase 
taxes and print money to finance these expenses. In 1940, a new wave of state 
intervention came with the implementation of the National Defence Law (Milli 
Koruma Kanunu) that gave the government full authority to fix prices, demand 
materials and impose forced labour. 61 An important development was the initiation 
of the "wealth tax" that was put into force by the RPP during this period to increase 
the state budget. Although it was a tax imposed on all wealthy people, the national 
minorities were the most affected ones. The main implication of the "wealth tax" 
was that it led to the suppression and impoverishment of the minorities that had loose 
ties with the authorities. Most of the members of the minorities had to sell their 
property to pay the tax, generally to the "nouveau riche" of Anatolian roots. During 
this period there were stories about the newly urban conservative people (haczaga) 
that bought the properties of the minorities for very low prices and then became 
richer by using these properties. 
The war years also enriched the landowners and the merchants that 
depended on trading agricultural products. This period is significant in the sense that 
although some groups, like the high bureaucrats and the Anatolian merchants that 
had special ties to the ruling elite, had been enriched by the policies of the RPP, the 
r 
rich bourgeoisie of Istanbul that had international links and was composed of 
minorities was estranged by the "wealth tax"; so were the big farmers and 
120 
landowners by the "soil products tax" (toprak mahsulleri vergisi) and the "Law for 
Village Institutes and Land- Giving Policy for Peasants" (Köy Enstitüleri ve ciftciyi 
Topraklandirma Kanunu). 
Table 3.1. Basic Economic Indicators, 1923-46 
1923 1929 1939 1946 
Population in millions 13 14 17.5 19 
Life expectancy at birth 35 35 35 38 
Share of urban population (%) 16 17 18 18 
Share of agriculture in labor force % 80 77 77 
GNP in current USSm 570 1000 1600 2450 
GNP per capita in current USS 43 70 90 130 
Share of Agriculture in GNP % 40 52 39 46 
Share of manufacturing in GNP % 12 9 17 13 
Share of total industry including 
construction in GNP (%) 
16 14 22 18 
Source: Roger Owen and &vket Pamuk, A History of Mittale East tconomies in me twentieth 
Century, p. 244 
By 1946, as can be seen from the table, the GNP of the country had 
increased greatly since 1923. The population increased since the war and mostly 
remained rural during this period. The share of industry and manufacturing 
increased during the first years of the etatist period, jumping from 9 percent to 17 
percent, but with the beginning of the Second World War it began to decrease. The 
wealth tax that was implemented at this point, and the moving of minorities that were 
the main group of industrialists out of Turkey also had a significant impact on this. 
A decrease is seen in agriculture contribution between 1929-39 as the state had 
embarked on a state-led industrialisation drive, and agriculture was rather neglected. 
However, its increase is again seen with the war years. Within a few years, change 
was to come to the Turkish political and economic scene with transition to multi- 
party politics. 
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AN EARLY `ISLAMIIST' RESPONSE 
As shown above, it is interesting to see that any time a political party as an 
opposition was founded all the conservative and anti-secular elements gathered 
around and supported this party. This shows the reactionary nature of the Islamic 
response in the initial years of the Republic. Reaction was generally voiced against 
the reforms and the definition of modernisation. The abolition of the caliphate and 
the implementation of secularism as a principle of the Republic particularly alienated 
the religiously conservative segments of the society and led to their opposition 
towards the regime and the ruling elite. However, the regime was successful in 
suppressing the reactionary opposition and was also successful in enlarging the circle 
of centre forces, making alliances with different groups. Bureaucrats, officers, 
teachers, doctors, lawyers and entrepreneurs of larger commercial enterprises became 
the backbone of the Kemalist regime and supported the modernisation project, while 
large segments of the rural population, small craftsmen and traders remained 
attached to the traditionalist culture in the country. 
It should be kept in mind that the Kemalist secularism was not against 
religion and the religious practices within the society; however, it was against the use 
of Islam for political purposes, especially the mobilisation of the masses against the 
modernisation process. In time, the policies of the government that aimed to control 
religion led to even greater opposition in the society, being understood as measures 
against Islam itself. Despite restrictions, during this period, Muslim movements that 
we can identify as exhibiting an early `Islamist' tendency continued their existence 
even if they were pushed into the underground organisations. The religious orders, 
especially that of Sait Nursi, known as Nurculuk became an important movement 
r 
that conducted activities via an underground organisation in the 19S0s. -- 
Authenticating modernity, taking God's unity as the basis of the individual's life but 
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at the same time learning about technology and science and using them in the cause 
of Islam, was the basis of his ideas. While rejecting both secularism and nationalism, 
his reserved position from politics enabled him to survive political oppression. 
Although his writings were banned by the RPP regime, they were reproduced and 
distributed in hand-written forms by the members of the Nurcu order and its 
popularity grew in Turkey during this period. 
Apart from the growing popularity of the religious orders, working from 
their underground organisations; there were critical opposing voices in the press. 
The journal called "Movement" (Hareket) started its publication in 1939 and is 
considered as the first legal Islamist opposition in the Republic. 62 $aylan notes that 
Hareket was able to gather the traditionalist and religious circles around its 
publication during these years. However, it did not constitute a major opposition and 
remained as a weak voice. 
Until 1946 and the beginning of multi-party politics in Turkey, the issue of 
secularism and the role of Islam in the society were not openly debated in the public 
space. Expressions of identity based on ethnic and religious terms were suppressed 
and a nationalist, populist discourse dominated the public space. Turkish nationalism 
was seen as the melting point of all identities; Westernisation and secularism 
constituted the basic components of modernity in Turkey, and state-led capitalism 
was the key to economic development and prosperity. All these components of 
Turkish modernity were seen as unquestionable, as the only way to catch up with the 
Western powers. The demands for change in these principles and especially the calls 
for a more significant place for Islam in society were heard loudly after 1946, with 
the implementation of multi-party politics. Until that period, the reforms that started 
with the Tanzimat period. and reached its peak with the Kemalist modernisation 
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project went rather unchallenged and if there was any challenge it was harshly 
suppressed. 
SUMMARY 
The period under consideration is characterised by a definition of modernity that is 
composed of capitalist industrialisation, nation-state structure and a homogenous 
national identity that rests on secularism and Westernisation. The nascent Islamist 
circles challenged the notion - that modernity was necessarily equated with 
Westernisation and in particular they challenged the secularist pillar of the 
modernisation project during this period. At the same time, the regime's policy of 
industrialisation started the process leading to the evolution of new classes in the 
country. However, the combination of corporatist rhetoric and single party rule 
made collective action based on class difficult. The collective action during this 
period revolved around the theme of `duality' in the society as the class based 
collective action was not possible at the time. However, all kinds of organised 
opposition were suppressed by the state - the military bureaucratic elite - to secure 
the continuation of the modernisation project. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TuRKEY 1946-1980: MULTI-PARTYISM AND CLASS BASED 
SociAL MOVEMENTS? 
During the period under consideration in this chapter, multi-party politics and 
democratic elections were held- regularly in the country, confirming the Kemalists' 
perception of the nature of the public space. In 1960, a coup d'etat was carried out 
by the military and the role of the army in the Turkish political life became more 
explicitly evident although the country returned to democratic rule in 1961. Military 
intervention was repeated in 1971 with a memorandum sent to the government and in 
1980 with another coup. Different class identities and collective action based on 
class were seen during this period. However, class was not the only source of 
collective action. Vertical stratification patterns and ideological cleavages also 
played roles in parallel to that of the class and the duality in the society shaped 
around the elite-mass gap occupied a major place in the political life of the country. 
THE INTRODUCTION OF MULTI-PARTY POLITICS - 
A TURNING POINT IN TURKISH POLITICS 
It is important to understand the factors that contributed to the introduction of multi- 
party politics at this stage. As the Second World War ended, the domestic forces in 
Turkey combined to demand political and economic changes from the government. 
Many social groups were already dissatisfied with single party rule by 1946. 
Wartime policies, especially the economic policies of the RPP, alienated a large 
group of the population. The dissatisfaction and differences of opinion within the 
RPP also intensified and turned into an intra-party opposition during the discussions 
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on the land reform in 1945. The Republican People's Party had been proposing a 
land reform law to improve the rapidly deteriorating conditions of the peasants. 
Despite increasing agricultural production, the peasants were the most badly affected 
segment of the society during the Second World War. This was due to some new 
regulations implemented as the war started such as the obligation to sell agricultural 
products to the state, which set the prices lower than the market price in order to keep 
the price of bread and cost of food at a low rate in the cities. The amount of 
production that was asked from the peasants was determined by the state before the 
product was actually produced and the amount except those left for the subsistence of 
the family and the seeds for next season were to be sold to the state at a low price. ' 
In the face of the dissatisfaction of the peasants with these policies the government, 
in order to get their support, proposed a land reform bill in May 1945, which became 
a Law in June 1945. This bill led to open opposition to the RPP from the large 
landowners who had been the main allies of the regime in the countryside. 2 The 
Land Reform Law foresaw the redistribution of land and supplied the necessary 
equipment for those landless peasants or those that own very small amount of land. 
The lands to be distributed were firstly those that belonged to the state, the 
municipalities and the charitable organisations and those privately owned land that 
amounted to more than five hectares. In places where this distribution would not be 
r 
enough, private land that was more than two hectares would be confiscated for 
distribution. The mostly debated item in the law was regarding the places where this 
distribution would not be enough either. Then the state would be able to confiscate 
land that was less than two hectares. This led to harsh criticisms in the Parliament as 
land ownership in Turkey was generally between 0.2-2 hectares and its confiscation 
effectively meant the abolishing of the landowning class all together. The support of 
the local notables with large land-holdings for the RPP in the countryside was 
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weakened with the discussion of the land reform-in the Parliament. The reform in 
fact did not materialise as the debate intensified and opposition became more 
forceful. But it was significant in the sense that it alienated the landowners that were 
one of the main supporters of the RPP rule and strengthened the opposition to their 
rule. 
After the debate on the Land reform started in Parliament, in June 1945 
some prominent members of the RPP3 submitted a petition saying that the time had 
come for the democratisation of political life in Turkey. The petition called for more 
active parliamentary control over the government, increased individual liberties and 
especially more room for opposition. Despite the support of President Inönü for such 
a proposal, the party group of the RPP in the Parliament rejected the proposal leading 
to the resignation of the MPs that had supported the petition from the cadres of the 
RPP. 
Facing such demands for democratisation, President Inönü was willing to 
open the political arena to democratic competition. He was well aware of the 
growing dissatisfaction with the RPP policies in society and knew that "heavy- 
handed autocracy would not be able to suppress it indefinitely". 4 Besides, Inönü 
himself is noted by many to have believed in a democratic experience for the 
betterment of the country, basing his argument on the view that "it has always been 
Atatürk's aim to see the opposition party in the country". 5 Democratizing the 
political structure would also mean, according to Inönü, that another component to 
the Kemalist modernisation project formula - to make Turkey completely Western 
with a democratic political structure - would be manifested. 
In addition to these domestic factors, external factors were also important 
F. 
for shaping this decision. The necessity for Turkey to "make friends in the West" 
against the growing aggression of Russia - seen especially in the latter's increasing 
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demands on the Straits - drew Turkey closer to the West. Thus, the opposition and a 
working democratic competition in politics was an important component in this 
attempt. A new era was beginning in Turkey with the decision to embark on a 
transition to multi-party politics as "perhaps the most momentous decision affecting 
Turkish domestic politics in the post-Atatürk period". 6 
Despite the reluctance of the RPP group in Parliament President Inönü 
declared in a speech on 1 November 1945, that the main shortcoming of the Turkish 
democracy was the lack of an opposition party and he announced the advent of 
general elections in a multi-party system scheduled for 1947. Shortly after the 
announcement, new parties were formed and most of them tried to reach the rural 
population by building party branches in all large communities as well as small 
towns and villages. 24 different parties were founded, most of which emphasised 
traditionalist values and the Islamic principles in their programmes. They were 
mainly challenging the secularisation and Westernisation pillars of Kemalist 
modernisation project. However, open attacks on secularism and Kemalist principles 
were not allowed according to the Constitution so the parties chose to attack the RPP 
as the vanguard of secularist principles, while calling for an increased emphasis on 
Islamic principles in political life. 7 One of the newly founded parties, the Nation 
Party (Millet Partisi - NP), openly advocated an increased role for Islam in public 
affairs. 
Among many parties that flourished at the time, the formation of the 
Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti - DP) on January 7,1946 under the leadership of 
Celal Bayar and by the MPs opposing the Land Reform Law in Parliament and 
resigning from the RPP as a result of the discussion can be considered as an 
important development in Turkish politics. Shortly after its foundation, the DP 
leaders started to enjoy enormous support and were seen as the saviours of the people 
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from the `elitist one-party rule' of the RPP. All the opposition forces to the RPP rule 
gathered around the DP as this new party had taken the mission of "mobilisation for 
freedom" or what the DP members termed "movement against despotism". 8 This 
was manifested in their election slogan of "That's Enough! " (Artik Yeter! ). DP 
candidates were met with great enthusiasm during their visits to different cities and 
became highly popular not as a result of the programme they were advocating, but 
mainly based on the credentials of being "against" the RPP rule. Their speeches 
revolved around issues like the high cost of living, lack of freedom and liberties and 
antidemocratic laws. Being alarmed with the increasing popularity of the opposition, 
the RPP government decided to hold the elections a year earlier, on 21 July 1946, 
trying to make use of the still unorganised party structure of the DP. Despite high 
support, having been formed just six months before, the DP could only put forward 
273 candidates for the 465 seats in Parliament in the elections and surprisingly had 
only 62 of its candidates elected. This led to some rumours spreading about fraud 
and the RPP having manipulated the election results in its favour. The RPP received 
395 of the seats, while six seats were taken by independents. 9 
Despite winning the elections with a large majority, the RPP was aware of 
the support that the DP gathered. By 1947, the Republican People's Party started to 
implement some policies advocated by the opposition, like the greater reliance on 
private capital and a new definition of etatism. The new five-year economic plan 
that was formulated by former Kadro members in 1946, with an emphasis on state 
control and etatism, had been amended in 1947 to suit the wishes of the Istanbul 
business `Turkish Development Plan' of 1947, which emphasized free enterprise, the 
development of agriculture and agriculturally based industry instead of the heavy 
industry drive of the earlier periods. 10 Economically, there was almost no difference 
between the programmes of the two parties - the RPP and the DP - after this 
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amendment. The only difference was that the DP wanted to sell state enterprises to 
the private sector, while the RPP wanted to keep them in parallel to the private 
sector. In the social rights sphere, in 1946 the RPP government lifted the ban on 
organizations with a class base, resulting in the formation of a number of trade 
unions. In 1947, with a new `Law on Trade Unions', workers were given the right to 
organise in trade unions, but at-the same time all political activity by trade unions as 
well as strikes were forbidden by this law. Despite the prohibition of politics in the 
trade unions, both the RPP and the DP tried to get the support of the trade unions for 
the coming elections. The DP promised to grant the workers the right to strike in 
return for their support in the next elections. " However, this promise was soon 
forgotten. 
The main policy shift in the RPP after the 1946 elections came in response 
to the increasing opposition from other parties for a more liberal understanding in 
religious affairs. The DP joined the demands of the NP for a greater role for Islam in 
public affairs, "since Turkey was an Islamic country", and called for a moderate 
implementation of the principles of secularism without "damaging the religious 
feelings of the population". 12 Seeing the support such statements provide for the 
opposition, the RPP felt it necessary to implement some policies to enhance the role 
of religion in the society. During the RPP Congress in 1947, it was decided that 
policies about religion and secularism should be reconsidered and more moderate 
and tolerant policies against it should be developed. The main idea of this new 
policy was to see religion as a necessity in daily life and that people need religion 
like they need food for survival. 13 Within this framework, religious education was 
introduced into primary schools, foreign currency was provided for people making 
hajj and a faculty of religions was founded in Ankara. From 1946 onwards, the 
Quranic courses were legalized and they spread all over the country in a very short 
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time. The religious orders that had been operating secretly after they were closed 
down by the reforms in 1924, had the chance of organising themselves within these 
Quranic courses with their legalisation. The graduates of these courses were 
appointed as imam and mufti and they started working as state officials, 
strengthening their position in the country. These groups would play a vital role in 
the "islamisation" of the country and the increasing religiosity in the following 
decades. By permitting and legalising these courses, the RPP gave the greatest 
support to its main opposition- the religious- traditional circles. So, we can say that 
the first liberalisations in religious affairs and a looser understanding of secularism 
started to be adopted during the multiparty years, between 1946-50 by the RPP 
government. 14 
1950-1960: THE DEMOCRAT PARTY YEARS 
Despite adapting the policies advocated by the opposition, the RPP was not 
successful in winning the support of the majority of the population. The second 
multiparty elections held on 14 May 1950, resulted in the victory of the DP. The 
election results are shown below: 
Table 4.1. Result of the 1950 General Elections 
Total number of votes cast: 7 953 055 
Participation rate in the elections: 89.3 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percent. of votes 
Republican People's Party 3 176 561 69 39.5 
Democrat Party 4 241 393 408 52.6 
Nation Party 250 414 1 3.1 
Independents 383 282 9 4.8 
aource:, )tat: stccat Yearbook of L urkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 200 
When the Democrat Party (DP) won the elections in 1950, a new era in the 
Turkish democratic experience began. The single party regime ended and the 
democratisation of the country had a chance to progress within this new 
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environment. After the elections, Celal Bayar became the President of the country 
and Adnan Menderes became the Prime Minister. 
As noted above, the DP and the RPP were not very different from each 
other in the policies they proposed to pursue once they were in power. Their main 
difference stemmed from the composition of the party members and their origins. 
The RPP, in general, was composed of "elitist bureaucrats" - the military 
bureaucratic elite - that were removed from or never had local connections and roots. 
In the 1950 Parliament, the proportion of deputies representing their localities, places 
where they were born, increased to 60 percent15, in contrast to the figure of 34 
percent in the 1935 Parliament. This supports the generally agreed idea that the DP 
was composed of members that had strong ties to local communities. This made 
them have a more traditionalist and conservative approach. 16 
The victory of the DP was often linked to its appealing policies for the 
masses. It was perceived as giving the ordinary citizens the chance to contribute to 
the political life. In the past, the only powerful people in the decision-making of the 
country were the elite - the military-bureaucratic elite. The peasants and the workers 
did not have any representatives in the decision-making process. The RPP found its 
supporters among the classes that would benefit not from mass mobilisation but from 
the expansion of state authority. Although the symbol of the peasant as a 
"fundamental Turk" came up very early in the Kemalist ideology, not much was 
done to alter the position of the peasants in the society. '7 Although land reform was 
proposed, this came rather late and did not in fact materialise as it harmed the 
interests of the allies of the RPP in the countryside - the landowners. 
The rural population was aware that it was paying for the prosperity of the 
cities, receiving very little in return. Despite providing for the urbain population, 
their religious culture that constituted a significant factor in rural everyday life was 
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denied -by the regime. 18 Behice Boran in her work on Turkish villages in 1940s 
concluded that as the villages came into closer contact with the towns, the villager 
felt that his ways were inferior to those of the town and city. 19 Just as these feelings 
of inferiority were escalating, the election campaigns started. By legitimising Islam 
and traditional rural values the DP was saying to the rural population that their ways 
were not inferior. 20 The politics of the RPP had already become fragile and its 
leaders could not manage to relate to the society they were living in, continuing their 
elitist approach. Thus, as state officials, the RPP adopted "an utopian vision of 
positivist social harmony". 21 Against this utopia, the DP managed to formulate a 
programme that appealed to the masses and took over the power from the RPP. 
The DP was the chance for the masses to be represented in the Parliament 
and it used the support of these groups to come to power. The DP was promising 
that it would bring services to the peasants; it would take the problems of his 
everyday life as a legitimate concern for politics; it would debureaucratise Turkey 
and liberalise religious practices. In C. H. Dodd's words, 
The Democrat Party [... ] fell foul of the bureaucracy [... ] and began to mobilise people 
[... ] in a populist fashion. They made a direct appeal through religion and other symbols, 
there being no classes or institutions through which to work as intermediaries. 
Until the 1950, there was full agreement between the state elites and the 
political elite. Özbudun names this as the "unity of the elite", around the mission of 
transforming and modernising the Turkish society, defined by the Kemalist 
modernisation project. "Under the Kemalist rule, the elite is said to have become 
accustomed to unchallenged power and the prestige that accompanied it. Thus the 
RPP was bureaucratised and bureaucratic and political power was fused to create an 
apparatus to impose the officials' will on the public. "23 When the DP came to power, 
the "unity of the elite" was broken. Democrats mistrusted the military and the 
bureaucracy that they inherited from the old regime and devoted their efforts in 
controlling these circles. 
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THE GROWING POWER OF ISLAMIST POLITICS UNDER THE DEMOCRAT PARTY 
When the Democrat Party came to power, its leader Adnan Menderes submitted the 
first government programme to the Parliament. It is important to note here that 
Menderes was making a separation between those Kemalist reforms that were 
accepted by the public as a whole and implemented and those that were not 
welcomed by the masses and were leading to resentment among major segments of 
the society. This distinction brought the questioning of secular reforms and opened 
the discussion of whether secularism was accepted in the society. By bringing the 
reforms into the realm of public discussion, the DP leadership was opening the 
"modernisation project" up for debate. 
Although the evolving Islamist circles were supporting the Nation Party 
during the 1950 elections, the NP did not achieve the expected success in the 
elections, getting only one seat in the Parliament. 24 The Islamist media approached 
the victory of the DP with suspicion as the party did not make explicit claims or 
present a clear programme regarding their approach to the role of religion in the 
beginning. But with the issue of secularism starting to be discussed and the initial 
changes brought with it like the law enacted for the call for prayer to be done in 
Arabic (it had been done in Turkish under the Republican People's Party), the 
reading of Quran and the programmes about Quran sent from the radio stations and 
the elective religion courses turning into must courses in high schools, these circles 
began to offer their support to the DP regime. The government made large amounts 
of funds available for religious education and imam-hatip schools during this period. 
Many new mosques were built - 15,000 between 1950 and 1960 - and Muslim 
tombs and shrines were reopened with the reasoning that they were "historical 
monuments". 25 Intensive religious instruction to groups of children in many rural 
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localities was conducted. 26 Prime Minister Menderes made speeches in city 
congresses saying that Turkey was Muslim and would remain Muslim "regardless of 
the ideas of the staunch reformists". 27 The Islamist media was applauding such 
speeches and were writing that the "Islamists are from now on willing to be the 
slaves of the DP regime". 28 As the leaders of the DP made such speeches, demands 
for an Islamist society started to be heard from the city congresses of the party more 
loudly. There were discussions in party gatherings regarding the permission for 
religious clothing (fes ve sarik), the shifting of the weekend holiday from Sunday to 
Friday, restrictions on the working of women, demands for the expelling of female 
workers from workplaces, polygamy and multiple marriage, and the ending of girls' 
education after primary school. Some of the MPs of the DP also started to give 
speeches regarding the Muslim nature of Turkish society and severely criticising the 
Kemalist period and the reforms. 29 Duman links the growing appeal of Islamic 
revivalism within party politics to the nature of the DP and its formation. 
Accordingly, the DP was composed of different groups of people gathering around 
the same aim: to abolish single party rule and to democratise the country. As a result 
of this general aim, it consisted of different people sharing different ideas. In 
addition to this, the Party was mainly based on local ties and local culture, compared 
to the universalist ideas of modernity of Republicans. This basis made the 
conservative elements more significant and the calls for an emphasized Islamic 
conduct more important in their discourses. 
Despite such developments, the DP was not an Islamist party. It was 
rather trying to authenticate the modernisation project and make it more acceptable 
for the masses that until now had perceived it merely as an elitist, alien project. 
According to the leaders of the DP, by opening the secularisation pillar to delate, 
and giving more room for religion, the issues contested by the rural population could 
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be eased and the modernisation project with its capitalist development, nationalism 
and a loosened version of secularism and Westernisation could continue with 
increasing support. However, as the Islamist circles started to act more assertively 
within the DP, the party was forced to implement policies to curb their power. 30 The 
propaganda of the Islamist media against the Kemalists had intensified severely, 
beyond the limits of bringing authenticity to the modernization project. In the 
summer of 1951, some measures were taken against the Islamist media, Büyük Dogu 
and Sebilürrefat, members of the Ticani tariqat who had filled the media with their 
attacks on Atatürk's statutes and Republican symbols, were arrested and the Law for 
the Protection of Atatürk was passed. The DP had to take some more measures when 
the writer of the newspaper Vatan was attacked and wounded in Malatya in 1952 and 
it was discovered that the Islamist media and groups had organised this crime. It was 
mainly after this event that the Menderes government started to make speeches to the 
effect that it would not let violence take root in the country. The city congresses of 
the party were also warned against allowing speeches against the secular order and 
some MPs were expelled from the ranks of the party. In 1953, a law was enacted 
prohibiting the use of Islam as a tool for seeking personal and political interest. 
These developments indicate the point made earlier that the DP rule was not against 
the modernisation project per se but rather aimed to authenticate it within a loosely 
defined secularism rather than the strict secularism of RPP. While doing this, 
although measures were taken against the Islamists at a later stage, the initial 
concessions given to these circles had encouraged the Islamist media and circles such 
that now they were ready to launch their independent movement and organise 
independently, without the protection of any other party. 
1 The liberal environment that came with the DP in the early 1950s began to 
revert itself to `authoritarian party' rule as the economy started to show signs of 
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stagnation and spiralling inflation by 1954.1 Measures against the opposition were 
increasing with amendments that tightened the Press Law, decreased the power of the 
opposition parties by amending the electoral law and curtailed the power of the 
bureaucracy by giving the executive powers the right to retire civil servants, 
including the university professors. 32 The popular response against such measures 
was decisively negative. In the municipal elections of 1955, the RPP and the NP 
boycotted the elections and the electoral turnout remained only 37 percent. In the 
end, the DP had to make some adjustments in the amendments that it had made in the 
previous year and give assurances regarding the democratic nature of the country. 
ECONOMY UNDER THE DEMOCRAT PARTY 
The DP had advocated a liberal and anti-etatist economic policy since its foundation. 
Upon coming to power, it directed all its efforts at loosening the state controls on 
economy and encouraging the private sector. One of the first statements of the DP's 
Minister of Economy and Trade was that the government would take all basic 
economic decisions in collaboration with the business circles. Capitalist groups were 
strongly encouraged and the policy of creating a national bourgeoisie continued as 
the economic priority of the period. Manufacturing industry consequently increased 
as will be shown in the table below. The 1950s became important years for capital 
accumulation and the foundation of new private businesses. Most of the businesses 
that operate in Turkey today were formed in 1950s under the DP rule. 33 The number 
of private establishments more than doubled during this period, as well as the 
number of employees working in the private sector. 
I 
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Table 4.2. Manufacturing Industry 
Year 
Number of 
Establishments 
(Total) 
Number of 
Employees (Total) 
Number of 
Establishments 
(Private Sector) 
Number of 
Employees (Private 
Sector) 
1950 2618 162 859 2515 86 826 
1952 3026 181 856 2911 99 741 
1954 3850 217 121 3704 139 160 
1956 4610 241 578 4443 136 058 
1958 5121 290 541 4926 172 689 
1960 5503 295 989 5284 168 001 
Source: Statistical Indicators 1923-1998, State Institute of Statistics, Republic of Turkey, p. 286-288 
While the annual rate of growth for agriculture decreased from 11.5 
percent between 1947-53 to -2.1 percent between 1954-62, the manufacturing 
industry's annual rate of growth increased from 6.5 percent to 7.6 percent for the 
same period. 34 One of the main mechanisms that encouraged the private sector was 
the credit provided by the state on favourable terms. The Industrial Development 
Bank (Sinai Kalkinma Bankasi), founded in 1950, played an important role in 
providing credit for the private industrial sector. The infrastructural projects that the 
DP government embarked upon provided an opportunity for the private businesses to 
prosper by working under state contracts. This kind of work proved to be most 
profitable for the private capital. In addition to that, foreign capital was encouraged 
and the integration of the indigenous bourgeoisie with Western capitalism and 
markets was supported 35 The importation of necessary products and raw materials 
for the state sector industries was passed to the hands of the private sector during this 
period opening up another profitable area for the businesses. Unsurprisingly, the 
rumours of corruption in import documentation and the close relations between 
certain businessmen and politicians were widespread at this time. The cooperation 
between the bureaucrats, party officials and capitalists worked for the benefit of the 
capitalist class as state projects and credit opportunities were used to enrich the 
capitalist class further. 36 During thin period, the inflationist means of financing the 
capitalist development led to increasingly unequal distribution of income and the 
concentration of capital in the hands of the privileged few: the big capitalists. 
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Besides a developing capitalist class, labour was also developing during 
this period. In 1952 the Türk-I, c Workers Union was founded as an organisation to 
represent the interests of the labour class. However, the promised grant of `right to 
strike' was forgotten by the DP regime and the position of the workers remained 
poor with low wages, long working hours and no bargaining power. Besides the 
increasing importance of the capitalist class and the working classes during this 
period, what is interesting to note here is the development of what Boratav calls a 
"buffer" group. 37 The growing number of people involved in small-scale production 
and services as well as the unstable lumpen-proletariat started to be seen during this 
period, increasing steadily in the following years. 
The process of industrialisation was leading to the formation of class 
identities among the two main groups: capitalists and workers. However, the strong 
limitations on the formation of a class society have to be mentioned at this point. In 
addition to the recent nature of the industrialisation process, the profitability of 
investing in speculative areas for the private sector had obstructed a full-scale 
industrialisation. The opposition was challenging the DP's slogan of "a millionaire 
for each neighbourhood" (her mahalleye bir milyoner) as it was encouraging solely 
capital accumulation, not investment. 38 The dependence of private capital on the 
state and state credits and projects was on the other hand hampering an independent 
bourgeois class and the deepening of class identities. In addition to these factors, the 
duality in the society between the military-bureaucratic elite and the traditional- 
liberal circles also affected collective action. The horizontal stratification, 
developing with the classes, went hand in hand with the vertical ties and the duality 
that underlined the differences based on non-class factors. Therefore, it is difficult to 
talk of a class structure and identity at' this period or of collective action that was 
based on class. 
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Within the economic policy of the DP, not only the private capitalist sector 
but also agriculture was given an important place. Drawing most of its support from 
the countryside, the DP rule contributed to the economic improvement of the 
agricultural sector. During this period, the high increases in the cultivated area - 55 
percent - led to a doubling of the agricultural output. The government implemented 
the Land Distribution Law of 1946, not for the distribution of large private 
landholdings as it originally foresaw, but for the distribution of state owned lands. 
Under this law, communal pastures were transferred to peasants and village 
cooperatives. This also served to strengthen small land ownership across Anatolia. 
One of the important contributions was made with the mechanisation of agriculture. 
The Democrat Party used Marshall Plan aid to finance the import of agricultural 
machinery and especially tractors. Wealthy landowners purchased most of these 
tractors with favourable credits from the state banks. This helped to increase the 
cultivated area and productivity in the agricultural sector. Despite these policies, the 
weaknesses of the agricultural sector nonetheless became evident especially after 
1953. Anatolia continued to rely on dry fanning; irrigation was not one of the 
priorities of the government and with the ending of expansion of cultivated land, the 
stagnation in agriculture started to show itself. 
After 1954, Turkish trade balance deficits became chronic and IMF policy 
advice regarding stability policies became the main issue in the political economy of 
the country. However, against all the "advice" of the IMF for devaluation, 
deflationist policies and liberalisation of foreign trade, the Democrat Party regime 
chose to implement the National Protection Law (Milli Koruma Kanunu), to control 
prices and markets, implement import substitution policies and pursue inflationist 
policies that were followed by the populist policies. 39 Constituting two thirds of its 
electoral power, the Democrat Party could not accept low incomes for the 
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agricultural sector. This was one of the reasons why it started to implement subsidies 
and protective measures for the agricultural sector, which would later cover most 
sectors of the economy. 40 It was only after the 1957 elections that the government 
agreed to implement IMF policy advice, introducing a major devaluation and 
implementing the stabilisation programme that included import liberalisation, 
changes in export regime, removal of price controls, increases in the prices of state 
economic enterprises and a rescheduling of external debt. While inflation was 
reduced and the balance of payments picture was improved as a result of these 
measures, the severe recession continued into the following decade. 
As the economic situation of the country began to deteriorate by the late 
1950s, again the use of Islamic symbols as propaganda increased in the ranks of DP, 
indicating an Instrumentalist use of Islamic discourse by this party. Even alliances 
with some religious orders were openly pursued in order to make up for the losses in 
the economic sense. Besides, attacks on the Republican People's Party and Kemalist 
principles were openly continuing in the Islamist media and the DP was seen as the 
party encouraging such attacks. 
THE 1960 MILITARY COUP 
The Turkish military initiated a coup on 27 May 1960. Although this coup had many 
reasons, the attacks on Islam and the Kemalist principles were offered as one of the 
main explanatory factors. There is agreement among many researchers that the 1960 
coup demonstrated the quest of the military-bureaucratic elite to return to the centre, 
to revive their diminishing role in the nation's politics. William Hale notes that 
under the DP regime, which encouraged the individual citizen, rather than the state 
(primarily represented by the army and the civil bureaucracy-the military- 
bureaucracy), the army officers "felt robbed of the central role in Turkish political 
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culture that they had traditionally enjoyed". 4' Since Ottoman times the army played 
a major role in the political life of the country and this had been sustained under the 
RPP. However, during the era of the DP rule, a policy of "debureaucratizing" the 
country was pursued and the official elites lost not only their representation in the 
parliament and their close links with the political elites but also much of their 
economic power, prestige and influence in the society. Özbudun says that this coup 
can be seen as a reaction of the official elites - both the military and the civilians - 
against the decline in their power, prestige and status in the society. 42 Hale writes 
about the deteriorating conditions of the military economically. He quotes from 
Kenneth Fidel saying that 
the army was not the only group that was hurt. The teachers and the government 
employees were also pushed aside by these people from the villages. They could no 
longer afford to live in the good quarters of the town [... ]. They could not afford to buy 
clothing any more. All these people were stripped of the one thing that kept them proud 
throughout the years - the self-respect and their pride at being the most advanced sector 
of the population was taken away by the cost of living and the newly rich farmers and 
merchants. 43 
Mardin notes the point that the 1960 coup once again underlined the 
"cleavage between the centre, now identified with the preservation of the static order 
and the periphery - the real `party of movement"'. 44 It seems that the mobilisational 
character of the rural populations that was achieved as a result of the reforms that 
were implemented during the RPP rule itself was not approved by the modernist- 
elitist cadres that initiated it. 
No matter what the main motive of the officers was, they claimed to have 
intervened because "Atatilrk's reforms were betrayed". When some of the 
interviews with the cadres that exercised the coup are considered, they were saying 
that "the 27 May Revolution (1960 coup) was a rising up of the present generation 
trtined by the revolution of the great Atatürk from those who, during the past ten 
years, wanted to upset and destroy it out of a thirst for power". 46 
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The reaction of the Islamist circles during the coup period is interesting to 
note here. In the beginning, they were surprised and there was no reaction. But as 
the military leaders announced their respect for religion and did not ask for a return 
to prayers in Turkish, they started publishing articles supporting the army and the 
coup. They started to demand more religious freedom from the military leaders and 
asked for a complete retreat of the state from the religious affairs, leaving the ground 
for private institutions. Against such demands, the reaction of the army was very 
strict; it announced that it would "kill any kind of fundamentalist movement that 
would bring Turkey backwards. "47 
Samuel Huntington notes that by the time the military in other countries of 
the Middle East started to play a reforming role; the Turkish army was intervening in 
politics "to curb the rise to power of a new business class supported by the peasants. 
The soldiers had not changed; they still supported the reforms of the Kemalist era. 
But now they were unwilling to admit to power social classes which might make 
changes in those reforms". 48 The case of Turkey is a proof, according to Huntington, 
that peasant support alone is not enough to sustain the regime of the masses; support 
of at least one of the major urban elements is needed: that of the intelligencia, 
workers or army. 49 The army had been an important part of the modernist-elitist 
project in Turkey. Yet, none of the other groups was strong enough at that time to 
create an alternative to the modernizing scheme. As the Islamist movement would 
start to produce its own intellectuals and "counter-elite", which is also a result of the 
Republican reforms, then the strength of the Islamist movement would grow in 
Turkey. This was to be the case especially after the post-1980 period. 
The environment after the 1960 coup was relatively more liberal than the 
past, The new constitution that was enacted by the military rulers in 1961 guaranteed 
basic rights and freedoms and adopted a more liberal approach to secularism, religion 
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and freedom of will. The main aim of the authors of the Constitution was to prevent 
a power monopoly of any political party and, therefore, counterbalancing institutions 
to the national assembly were founded. A second chamber called the Senate 
(Senato) was introduced and the regulation that all legislation had to pass through 
both chambers was brought into force. An independent constitutional court was 
introduced, which could check whether the laws were made according to the 
constitution or not and universities and media were guaranteed full autonomy under 
the new system. A full bill of civil liberties was attached to the constitution. 
Through the constitution, the military carved itself a special place within the politics 
of the country via the establishment of a National Security Council (Milli Giivenlik 
Kurulu - NSC); its constitutional duty was to advise the government on different 
policy issues. Composed of the leaders of different military forces and the head of 
the general staff as well as the related ministers - changing according to the subject 
under consideration - the role of the NSC increased in time, extending its influence 
in government policies. 
According to the 1961 constitution, it was permitted to proselytise Islam 
and to spread its ideas, while it was forbidden to ask for an Islamic state and to try to 
change the basic principles of Republic in line with Islamist prescriptions. The 
so controversial point here is that asking for an Islamist order was forbidden. 
1961-1971: THE JUSTICE PARTY YEARS 
On 13 January 1961, the ban on political activity was lifted and 29 October 1961 was 
set as the date of the return of power back to civilian forces after the elections that 
would be held on 15 October. The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - JP) and the New 
Turkey Panty (Yeni Tiirkiye Partisi - NTP) were formed on the rightiof the political 
spectrum to channel the votes of the now banned Democrat Party. The Justice Party 
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claimed that it was the continuation of the DP, S1 but the NTP offered a similar 
political claim. Another party that entered the elections was the Republican 
Peasant's Nationalist Party (Cumhuriyetci Köylü ivIlllet Partisi - RPNP). This party 
was formed in 1948 as the representative of radical nationalist groups. They were 
entering the elections for the first time in 1961. They followed a "populist discourse 
and became the party of conservative, nationalist, rural middle classes"52 during the 
1950s. The election results of 15 October 1961 are shown in the figure below. 
Table 4.3. Result of the 1961 General Elections 
Total number of votes: 10 522 716 
Participation rate in the elections: 81 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of Votes 
Justice Party 3 527 435 158 34.8 
Republican People's Party 3 724 752 173 36.7 
Republican Peasant's 
Nationalist Party 1 415 390 54 14 
New Turkey Party 1 391 934 65 13.7 
Independents 81 732 - 0.8 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1YYY, p. 2UU 
Coming to power after eleven years in opposition, the RPP under the 
leadership of Ismet Innnil worked to form a coalition government. The first 
government was formed with the JP but this coalition did not work due to differences 
in party programmes and controversy regarding the amnesty of former DP members. 
Inönü initiated another coalition government in June 1962, this time with the NTP 
and RPNP. It was during this government that the first Five Year Development 
Program was put into effect and workers' rights were recognised. Details of the 
economic developments will be presented below. However, the differences between 
the parties of the coalition again rendered the working of the government inefficient. 
Issues regarding the five-year plan and the working of ministries caused great 
controversy between the parties. Thus, the RPP. started negotiations for a third 
coalition government in December 1963, its partners in the second coalition having 
withdrawn from the government after one such disagreement. This time, the RPP 
148 
formed a minority government and managed to get support from the NTP in the 
Parliament, who saw that the Cyprus issue was escalating at the time and the 
necessity of a government to tackle with the issue was pressing more strongly in the 
Parliament. 
In November 1964, Silleyman Demirel -a young and ambitious politician 
- had been elected to the leadership bf the JP, after the death of the head of the party, 
Ragip Gümüýpala. Demirel aimed to prove the strength of his leadership and the 
new dynamism that came to the party with his election. It must be mentioned at this 
point that the leader of the party until that date - GUmil§pala - was a former chief of 
staff. The former DP supporters of the JP had resented the presence of a military 
figure as the leader of the new party. Under Demirel, they were integrated into the 
cadres, increasing the support for the JP in society. 53 In a bid to show his power in 
the parliament, Demirel carried out propaganda that resulted in the rejection of the 
1965-year budget of the Inönü government. The government resigned as a response 
to this rejection and four rightist parties formed a temporary government that would 
last for eight months and carry the country to the new elections of 1965. 
Like the DP, the JP under Demirel pursued populist policies. Demirel 
often repeated that the JP was a mass party "which represented the interests of all 
classes - city dwellers and villagers, workers and employers". 
54 The JP program 
gave significant importance to economic growth as a priority. This would require 
collaboration and harmony among different classes according to the JP; and such a 
harmony could be achieved by "melting particular interests into the nationalist 
one". 55 Nationalism was seen as the guarantee for the unity of the country and class 
struggle was clearly rejected. However, class structure was emerging as capitalist 
industrialisation, despite being under state supervi§ion, was taking root in the 
country. This would be seen in the coming years. 
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Just as the JP was enjoying the change with Demirel's dynamism, there 
was a change in the cadres and ideology of the RPP as well. As early as October 
1964, the signs of this change were seen as the party adopted a declaration in its 
congress titled "Our Ideal of a Progressive Turkey" (written by Turhan Feyzioglu 
and Billent Ecevit, "two intellectual leaders widely regarded as the rising stars of the 
party"). 56 In this declaration emphasis was put on land reform, social justice, social 
security, economic development, `democratic' etatism, education, secularism, the 
fine arts, nationalism, and youth. 57 In order to secure its position and increase its 
popularity, the RPP leadership had adopted a new slogan determining their place in 
the political spectrum: "left of centre". JP had attacked this new positioning of RPP 
by saying that the party was becoming leftist, on the "road to Moscow" (ortanin solu, 
Moskova'nin yolu). 58 The JP was emphasizing leftism as the basic threat to the unity 
of the country and was bringing an ideological aspect to politics that would lead to 
clashes along the right-left debate in the coming years. 1965 was the beginning of 
this dimension in Turkish politics. 
The change of leadership in the JP and Demirel's populist discourse led to 
the victory of the JP under the leadership of Demirel in the 1965 elections. The 
election results were as follows: 
Table 4.4. Result of the 1965 General Elections 
Total number of votes: 9 748 678 
Participation rate in the elections: 71.3 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of Votes 
Justice Party 4 921 235 240 52.9 
Republican People's Party 2 675 785 134 23.6 
Republican Peasant's I 
Nationalist Party 208 696 11 2.3 
Nation Party 582 704 31 6.3 
Turkish Workers' Party 276 101 14 3.0 
New Turkey Party 336 514 19 3.7 
independents 296 523 1 3.2 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 203 
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The 1965 elections are important firstly because of the transfer of power - 
once again from the RPP that still represented the military-bureaucracy and the 
support for secularism and Westernisation in adherence to the Kemalist 
modernisation project, to the JP that represented the traditionalist-liberal forces. 
Another important aspect of the 1965 elections was the participation of a socialist 
party - Turkish Workers' Party (Turk I, sci Partisi - TWP). The 1961 constitution 
supported associational rights, providing leftists with the opportunity to develop their 
own organisations. The project of developing the capitalist class had been successful 
to some extent and started to bear its fruits by 1960s. The working class had been 
developing and increasing its power and collective action based on class had been 
emerging in the society. The TWP was formed as the representative of the leftist 
groups and the workers and working class identity in the country in February 1961 
by a number of trade unionists. According to the party programme, except for the 
ownership of major means of production, private property would be supported and 
certain economic activities would be left to private initiative in a mixed economy 
framework. Despite its moderate stand, with no mention of socialism or a socialist 
economy, the party was questioning the capitalist development and state led 
capitalism in the modernisation project formula, rather aiming to form a "non- 
capitalist path to development". 59 The TWP contributed to the ideological aspect of 
politics that developed after 1965, as mentioned above, by forcing other parties to 
define themselves more clearly in ideological terms. 
Another party that entered the elections and got 31 seats in the Parliament 
was the Nation Party that represented the Islamist-conservative circles in the society. 
Founded in 1948, and having contested the 1950 elections before, the party 
programme asserted that the NPirecognised the high importance of belief, morals, 
traditions in the formation of the social order. 
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CLASS IN THE POST-1960 PERIOD 
The important point after 1962 is that the economy was regulated by 5-year plans. 
The main industrialisation strategy that was implemented after 1960 was the import- 
substitution industrialisation (ISI). The main industrial goods that had previously 
been imported were now to be produced by the domestic market, under the state's 
supervision. Until the 1970s, domestic markets produced basic consumption goods. 
With the 1970s, intermediary goods and investment goods started to be produced as 
well. ISI depended to a large extent on the growth and dynamism of the Turkish 
market. The state was supervising the process with precautions against external 
competition, production of basic goods and services, control mechanisms for 
distribution of resources, laws and regulations regarding the working conditions. 60 
There was, in fact, a division of labour between the state sector and the private sector 
during this period. The state industries were directed to invest in large-scale 
intermediate goods industries, while the private firms took advantage of the 
opportunities in the heavily protected and more profitable consumer goods sector. 
From food processing and textiles in the 1950s, the emphasis in the private sector 
shifted towards radios, refrigerators, television sets, cars and other consumer 
durables. 61 Within the "early" stages of ISI, as can be seen in the experiences of 
other developing countries, there were no problems in production and demand in the 
market since priority was given to consumer goods with a large market and easy 
technology. 
During the 1960s, the private sector continued to enlarge and consolidate a 
foothold in the system. Some people have argued that the state and private capital 
collaborated during the 1960s. 62 However, some others see this relationship as the 
dependence of private capital on the state and the former's vulnerability to policy 
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changes. 63 But whether as an equal partner or as a dependant on the state-, the 1960s 
witnessed the significant growth of the big businesses. The role of the capitalist 
classes in the economic activity had been increasing since 1950 and the 1960s led to 
the further development of this class but in an unclear and insecure environment. 
The state was acting freely in intervening into the markets and issuing new 
investment plans whenever it thought appropriate regardless of the effects that these 
policies might cause for the private sector. In the 1960s, this arbitrary state 
intervention had become a common theme in the economy and the demand from the 
capitalist class for a more planned economy consequently increased in the belief that 
this would help them predict the actions and policies of the state. They demanded 
that the areas of operation of the state and the private sectors should be clarified so 
that businesses would know in which areas to invest and would be secure in such an 
investment. There were talks during this period about establishing holding firms and 
a new legal framework for family businesses, which would secure and 
institutionalise the business community. 
In addition to the arbitrary interventions in the market, the system was 
criticised by small businesses for favouring the big Istanbul capitalists to their own 
detriment. Special incentives for businesses were granted during this period for the 
private sector but the eligibility criteria and the offices where the applications should 
be made were not clearly defined. In addition to that, low interest investment credits 
were provided by the state but the requirements that were necessary were again not 
specified. Both the bureaucrats and the politicians had a say in who could get the 
credits and apply for these special arrangements provided for businesses. This 
resulted in the big and established businesses having a greater chance in the 
P 
competition for state credits than the smaller firms. The small businesses did not 
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have the same opportunities in this sense, struggling to survive and invest in areas in 
which the big industries were not interested. 
The development of a capitalist class and the growth of capital 
accumulation in private hands were leading equally to the creation of a workers class 
and class-consciousness, an important aspect for the development of class politics. 
In the beginning of the 1960s, the workers' rights were seen as an important issue but 
nonetheless had a secondary importance to the place and rights of the businesses 
themselves on the agenda. Getting the right to strike with the 1961 Constitution, the 
workers were beginning to play an important role in the economic and political scene 
of the country. The secondary position of the workers started to change as their 
negotiating power against the employers increased and strikes were held in many 
instances. 
Realising the increasing power of the classes, the JP regime tried to 
introduce corporatist structures to the rising classes - both the capitalists and the 
workers - in an attempt to control and incorporate both groups into the political life. 
The Justice Party was advocating a corporatist structure for the workers' union by 
saying that an independent and politically active labour union would promote class 
warfare and present new challenges to the authority of the state. 64 By the end of the 
1960s, the Türk-Ic leaders had brokered an agreement with the Justice Party leaders 
in which they were given the right to represent the workers and guaranteed access to 
policy-making, in return for continued moderation in exercising rights to strike and 
engage in collective bargaining. Thus, the "semi-official status and secure 
clientalism were to be exchanged for cooperation in reducing working-class demands 
and promoting social peace". 65 However, this corporatist effort of the JP did not 
work. The factionalism inside the Turk-Is and the increasing power of the leftist 
ideology opposed a cooperation with the JP. The support of the workers was mainly 
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directed towards the RPP's new `left of centre' "discourse during this period and the 
support for the JP within the union was marginalized by the end of the 1960s. 
The corporatist effort of the JP with the capitalist class was more 
successful as ideologically both sides shared common interests. The National Union 
of Chambers and Commerce, Chambers of Industry and Commodities Exchanges 
(Türkiye Odalar Birliii - TOB) represented simultaneously the interests of all 
merchants, industrialists and commodities brokers. The close cooperation of its 
members with the JP, most of whom had top positions in the JP provincial 
organisations, increased the importance of this board in the 1960s. However, within 
TOB the commercial interest groups were dominant and it was mainly with this 
group that the JP had close ties. The industrialists were not well represented in the 
organisation. Although they were cooperating closely with the JP in projects for 
investments, the industrialists also started to press the government for a change in the 
economic policy-making in their favour as against the commercial groups as the end 
of the 1960s was approaching. By the late 1960s, there was a growing demand on 
the side of the industrialists to transform the manufacturing sector into the fastest 
growing sector in the economy and they were making ambitious plans to accelerate 
expansion and compete in the foreign markets. As they were pressing for new 
arrangements from the government that favoured rapid industrialisation, they were 
facing resistance from the commercial circles. This conflict of interests was 
manifested in several occasions when the industrialists entered into confrontation 
with the commercial groups in the TOB: with the importers over foreign exchange 
rates and allocation of import licenses, with large retailers over price controls and 
distributorship rights, with agricultural exporters over taxation policy and land 
reform and with private bankers over interest rates and lending practices. 66 In 'an 
attempt to differentiate themselves from the commercial groups, in 1967, they 
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founded the Union of Chambers of Industry, but it was still under the directorate of 
TOB and the founding of an Industrial Committee with an independent budget and 
administration was not possible at this time. Therefore, efforts were channelled into 
the unofficial, voluntary organisations sphere and the industrialists founded the 
Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (Turkiye Sanayici ve 
I, cadamlari Dernegi - TÜSIAD) in 1971: This association mainly represented the 
interests of the big industrialists, and aimed to promote capital accumulation in the 
hands of the industrialists at the' expense of the merchant, banking and agricultural 
interests. Organised mainly by the Istanbul industrialists, the aim of forcing Turkish 
industry out of the protectionist shelter to make it competitive in the international 
markets was repeated as the strategy of TUSIAD as against the calls for 
protectionism from the commercial sectors of the TOB. Calls to move away from 
producing high priced low quality consumer goods for domestic markets towards 
exporting competitive consumer items and earning foreign exchange from industrial 
as well as agricultural commodities were made in the meetings. This foreign 
exchange in return could be used to finance large scale importation of technology for 
the private industry to produce intermediate and capital goods. 
The big industrialists managed to organise under TUSIAD and became an 
important group in the interest representation of the Istanbul capitalists. Commercial 
capital was still represented in the TOB, in more of a corporatist fashion, in close 
relation to the ruling party - the JP. Within this context, the small industrialists that 
could not compete with the Istanbul capital in their drive for exports and were still in 
need of state protection were not represented and were faced with growing labour 
demands as cheap labour was becoming a thing of the past. 
I 
I 
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ISLAMIST POLITICS IN THE POST-1960 PERIOD 
Until the 1970s, the Islamist circles continued their support for the JP, without 
realising that it was not the party of the masses but of capital. After the 1960 coup, 
the Islamists were seen by the rightist political parties not only as an electoral 
constituency but also as active members of the struggle to fight communism and the 
"dangerous leftist threat" in the country. They were incorporated in the Justice Party 
as a support against the "most evil threat of the time - communism". Thus, during 
the JP rule in the country the number of Imam-Hatip schools increased from 4,548 in 
1960-61 to 49,308 in 1970-71, with an increase in the number of teachers working in 
these schools from 337 to 1,547 for the same period. 67 The number of Islamist 
journals increased rapidly and the works of Islamist thinkers were translated into 
Turkish during the 1960s. 68 This was also the time when the influential work of 
Sayyid Qutb was translated. Turkish Islamist thinking was modernised, refined and 
shaped with the implementation of the new ideas of these thinkers. At the same time, 
the number of illegal Islamist organisations - in cell-like units - was increasing. 
Islamist associations among university students are important to mention here as well 
as the Associations for Establishing, Supporting and Maintaining Quran Courses in 
Turkey (Türkiye Kuran Kurslari Kurma, Koruma ve Idame Ettirme Dernekleri), the 
Federation for Assisting Men of Religion in Turkey (Tflrkiye Din Adamlari 
Yardimla, ma Federasyonu), and the Society for Distributing Knowledge (Ilim 
Yayma Cerniyeti). The number of these organisations reached 10,730 making up the 
28.4 percent of all the associations of the country. 69 
Just as the JP was cooperating with these groups to get their votes, 
Islamists were willing to be incorporated in the JP mainly because they thought the 
JP was representing their economic interests as well as their cultural and ideological 
positions. However, they would soon discover that the Justice party was not a 
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continuation of the DP as the party of the masses but rather served the interests of big 
capital. The interests of the small producers were neglected and policies were 
implemented to enrich the few big capitalists. The Islamists that supported the 
Justice Party soon felt the need to found another party that would represent their petit 
bourgeois and small handicraft interests. The National Order Party (Milli Nizam 
Partisi - NOP) was founded by Necmettin Erbakan on 26 January 1970 within this 
context. Mardin notes that the formation of a party, representing the interests of the 
Alevi population of Turkey, within the liberal context of the 1960s, also encouraged 
the formation of a Sunni Islam party (NOP) by the beginning of 1970. The Alevi 
Party, Unity Party (Birlik Partisi) was not successful in the elections but it played an 
important role in the formation of a Sunni Islam party in the country. 70 
THE NATIONAL ORDER PARTY 
Necmettin Erbakan had been a professor of engineering at Istanbul Technical 
University, he worked in many industrial enterprises and, on 26 May 1969, he 
became the president of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. In 
politics, he was a prominent member of the Justice Party, where he represented the 
conservative-Islamist minded faction. 71 He was an advocate of private initiative and 
he was trying to outbid Demirel and become the leader of the JP. Demirel was aware 
of the competition from the Erbakan side and played his cards to give the JP a 
younger and less conservative look. When Demirel was successful in this campaign, 
Erbakan decided to enter the Parliament as an independent MP and he was elected 
from the conservative city of Konya. Soon he formed the NOP, which the Islamist 
media welcomed. The daily Bugiin assured its readers that the party would be the 
representative of the rightists and even announced the establishmdnt of the party, 
before it was set up. 72 The daily Babi All 'de Sabah wrote that NOP was the party 
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"expected by every conservative (mukaddesatci) in Anatolia, the answer to all those 
who thought that the JP had veered leftwards, a right-of-centre party to protect the 
real interests of all rightists... and the proof of all these was that the party was 
anchored in Islam". 73 In the party program, it was claimed that it was an ideological 
party with a forward look. The basic aims of the NOP were listed as: 
realising the potential for the Turkish nation for morals and virtue, bringing order, 
freedom from anxiety and social justice to society, happiness and peace to all Turks, and 
moral recovery based on positive sciences and technology". Call for "moral and material 
progress, a synthesis of Turkey's great historical values and the democratic rule of law- to 
bring about prosperity, and happiness, together with the civilisation that would serve as a 
model for the world. "74 
The NOP seems to represent the continuation of the pre-Republic ideas 
advocated by the conservative circles at the time, revolving around taking Western 
technology and leaving behind the cultural components. Thus, the positive sciences 
and technology would be taken but it would be combined with the "morals and virtue 
of the Turkish nation", not Western culture. By emphasizing the ideological 
component in the programme, the NOP had placed itself safely into the rightist 
political spectrum, within the growing ideological politics of the 1960s. 
By the end of the 1960s, class identities had developed to an extent that 
allowed the parties to base their policies on class. Being stuck between the big 
industrialists and the increasing power of the workers, the petit-bourgeoisie - the 
small traders, small producers and handicraftsman - felt the need to represent its 
interests within the traditionalist-Islamist politics. This point is seen in the party 
programme of NOP as well. Within the economic principles of the party, while it is 
against the concentration of capital in the hands of the few, it calls for more state 
support and help for the "industrialists" of provincial towns and the periphery 
(ta, ra). The NOP was not against capitalism per se, it was questioning the Kemalist 
modernisation project and presenting an alternative to it in an Islamic moral order. 
NOP, which was born as a reaction of the small city bourgeoisie that could not compete 
with the bigger industry and trade bourgeoisie and could not get its share from the 
economic activity, has been perceived as the defender of Islam and by incorporating 
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economic discourses and means within its ideology, it gained an Islamist party 
character. " 
The petit-bourgeoisie thought that it would find in Islam what it had been 
losing under the capitalist system, and the NOP was successful in bringing the losers 
of the system together under the banner of Islamists politics. 
However, it is not enough to explain the formation of the NOP only in 
terms of economic reasons. The ideological component, which stems from the 
duality of the society and goes hand in hand with the class identities, has to be 
considered here. The NOP represented the anti-Western, anti-secular reaction to the 
modernisation project of the Republic and the first independent representation of the 
"Islamists" that was until now being represented in the centre-right parties of the DP 
and JP. It is important to see during this period that class based social movements 
and action had been important but other culturaUidentity dualities have to also be 
considered as a response to the Kemalist modernisation project. The NOP had 
represented the interests of the petit-bourgeoisie and appealed to their economic 
needs but it also presented an alternative ideology against the secular/Western 
conception of the modernisation project -a politicised version of Islam. But while 
doing this they did not challenge Turkish nationalism or modernisation per se. 
According to the NOP ideology, Turkey's domestic problems could be 
divided into two: The first problem was economic: the dependence of the Turkish 
economy on foreign markets and capital and the low income per person with the 
unjust distribution of wealth posed a challenge to the nation. The second problem 
was what the NOP had been distinctively emphasising in its programme: the moral 
sphere. Accordingly, the Turkish educational system could not train the Turkish 
youth in line with the national targets because of the rejection of its history with the 
Kemalist reforms. The details of the NOP discourse will be presented in the 
following chapter on the discourse of Islamist parties in Turkey. The main point that 
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should be kept in mind ät this point is that the NOP mainly adhered to the small 
businesses, which were excluded from the state - big capitalists cooperation and who 
were in the periphery with their anti-Western, anti-secular stand against the Kemalist 
modernisation project. 
The military intervention of 1971 resulted in the closure of the NOP. by the 
order of the Constitutional Court on 20 May 1971, on the grounds that it was against 
the basic principles of the Republic, especially those based on secularism. 
MILITARY INTERVENTION OF 1971 
Turkey was in turmoil during the 1960s. By the end of the decade, the struggles 
between the extremist movements on both the right and the left culminated almost in 
a civil war. The victory of the JP in both the 1965 and 1969 elections showed that 
there was no problem in gathering a majority in the Parliament and the government 
seemed to be successful with the seven percent annual growth rate of the GNP. 
However, the income was far from being evenly distributed. The radicalisation of 
the population, especially the university students, during the 1960s made a great 
contribution to the development of events. The Turkish Workers Party (TWP), in 
particular contributed to the radicalisation of the political scene. The disagreement 
within this party as to what kind of a strategy should be adopted to attain power led 
to confusion among party members and by the end of the decade the operations held 
by the leftist urban guerrilla groups became a part of everyday life in Turkey. The 
leftist formations and their radicalisation in turn led to a harsh response from the 
Turkish right and led to the formation of the `'Society for the Struggle against 
Communism". In addition to this organisation, which gathered the centre-right under 
r 
its banner, the formation of the radical nationalist grodps, gathered under the 
Nationalist Action Party (the former Republican Peasant's Nationalist Party which 
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had radicalised its ideology during the 1960s and started to be known as the Grey 
Wolves) added another dimension to the whole picture. Details of these events will 
not be studied here, as this is not the main topic to be discussed. What must be kept 
in mind is the radicalisation of politics in Turkey especially by the end of 1960s 
when the nationalists and the leftists clashed with each other openly and when 
killings and attacks -on each other almost led to a civil war in the country. This is 
what was named above as the "ideological clashes", struggles shaped around the 
different ideological positions taken by the left and the right since 1965. 
In June 1970, industrial workers in the Istanbul-Izmit area joined in a 
massive march to protest a new law regulating union organisation and collective 
bargaining. The march soon erupted into a workers' riot involving over one hundred 
thousand demonstrators. This was the largest and most violent workers protest in 
Turkish history. 76 Nine months later, the government announced an austerity 
programme that led to further large political protests from every organised group in 
the society. Urban guerrilla groups launched a campaign of bank robberies and 
kidnappings to finance their activities. The Demirel government seemed to be 
paralysed in the face of all these developments. It was neither able to curb the terror 
in the streets and campuses, nor able to pass any legislation through the parliament. 
On 12 March 1971, the generals sent a memorandum to the Demirel government, 
demanding a strong and credible government "which will be able to end the anarchy 
and carry out reforms in a `Kemalist spirit"'. 77 The government was warned that if 
these demands were not met, the army would exercise its constitutional duty and 
intervene directly. The military was once more on the political scene of Turkish 
politics, this time not terminating civilian politics but intervening with a 
memorandum. Mardin underlines that whatever demands were made for a return to 
law and order in the country by different groups, the 1971 coup was again seen by 
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the periphery as a desire to "return to the rigidity of the old order. "78 The Demirel 
government resigned after the memorandum and a board of technocrats was 
appointed as the new government of the country. 
THE NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY 
The Turkish Workers Party was closed down after the 1971 military memorandum 
and in March 1971, the NOP was closed down. On the Islamist scene, after the NOP 
was closed, it became necessary to form another party, with a similar agenda. On 11 
October 1972, the National Salvation Party (Alfilli Selamet Partisi - NSP) was 
founded. 79 The NSP entered the general democratic elections in 1973 and got 11.8 
percent of the votes, gaining 48 seats in the Parliament. 
Following the basic ideas formulated in the NOP Programme, the NSP 
adopted a more detailed and sophisticated programme with matured ideas. As the 
details of the discourse will be presented in the following chapters, only the main 
points in the NSP program will be mentioned here. According to the NSP, Turkey 
had a distinguished history in which it combined military power with the building of 
an Islamic civilisation. However, 
the statesmen of Tan imat had made an erroneous assumption in which the decline in the 
military power was seen as stemming from Islam and as a remedy decided to Westernise 
the country. It was rather this process of Westernisation that brought the glorious days to 
an end rather than Islam. In order to become a powerful world leader again, Turkey 
should abandon the Westernisation process and stop reliance on the Western countries. 80 
According to NSP, there were three main opinions in the Turkish political 
life: the Republican People's Party represented the "leftist opinion", the Justice Party 
represented the "liberal opinion" and the National Salvation Party represented the 
"national opinion" (milli görüs). Accordingly, ideas other than the national opinion 
are materialist: for thetRPP, everything is material; for the JP, everything is money; 
while for NSP everything is morality. The RPP and the JP represented the two 
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infidel ideologies, which were doomed eventually to collapse, leaving the Islamist 
"national opinion" of the NSP dominant. 8' 
The NSP's economic ideology, just like that of the NOP, is dependent on 
the idea that the backwardness of the Turkish economy is due to its dependence on 
Western economies and capitalism. Turkey should use its own resources to develop 
its economy, rather than being dependent on Western capitalism. Developing the 
economy to the level of the industrialised countries is the main aim and the way to do 
it is to use the national resources. This approach was welcomed and supported 
especially by the small tradesmen and producers that were on the verge of becoming 
capitalists. 
Regarding the question as to what kind of an electorate the NSP appeals, 
the results are similar to the supporters of NOP. Toprak writes that it receives its 
support mainly from the "marginal groups", meaning both economic and social 
marginalisation. Mardin's answer to the same question is revolving around the 
"centre-periphery" debate, as he says that 
individuals who are unassimilated into the `modernist' centre tend to support NSP in 
greater numbers than other groups in society. The prototype of a NSP supporter is a small 
merchant or an artisan; the man of the bazaar[... ] It is precisely these social and economic 
failures with whom Kemalism has proved unable to cope, who in turn return to religion as 
an alternate reference point. 82 
As with the experience of the NOP, although the supporters generally 
occupy lower-middle class backgrounds and local roots, the NSP candidates and 
parliament members are well educated, professionally successful, presumably from 
middle or upper middle class and relatively young. Thus the elite and mass culture 
has taken a new dimension during the 1970s and there no longer exists a monolithic 
elite culture, as existed after the formation of the Republic and which was 
represented by the military-bureaucratic elite. With the modernisations and reforms, 
a "counter-elite" had emerged, mainly from the countryside, bringing their 
conservative and traditional characteristics and different cultural orientation, 
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different than the Kenialist Westernists. Making use of the mass education 
opportunities and increasing mobility they became the "new elite" with "old values". 
Thus, within the context of the NSP in addition to the elite-mass gap that was 
explained above as the centre-periphery difference or as the duality we witness an 
"elite-elite gap", 83 with different cultural orientations. 
THE 1973 ELECTIONS 
The 1973 elections came at a time when class politics were at an intense stage in the 
country. This election is significant especially in the sense that it revealed the class 
structure, reflecting the different class positions in politics, making some to conclude 
that Turkish society was becoming a Western type of society divided in line with 
class differences. 84 This feature could, indeed, be seen clearly in the electoral 
campaign. The Justice party was advocating the interests of the bourgeoisie and the 
status quo. By pursuing populist policies, and claiming that they were the 
continuation of the DP, they were also giving the agricultural sector a place in their 
discourse, encouraging the support of the peasants. The RPP shifted more to the 
leftist discourse with its `left of centre' slogan and was supporting the rights of the 
workers and the recent immigrants to the cities that generally filled the labour class 
positions and were politically conscious. The RPP designed its election campaign 
based on the concept of "change". The `new' RPP was promising a `new' order 
under its `new' leader Bülent Ecevit. The NSP was attacking the present order, 
asking for votes to change the status quo in favour of the interests of the petit- 
bourgeoisie and the small business and tradesmen of Anatolian cities vis-a- vis the 
rivalry of the big capitalists of Istanbul and Ankara. 85 
It must be emphasised once more here that, despite the class basea 
political formations and the collective action, the duality in the society also 
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underlined some important aspect of political competition of the period. The 
disagreement between the reforming military-bureaucracy (following the Kemalist 
modernisation project) and the traditionalists (who called for an authenticised version 
of modernity, questioning the secularism and Westernisation pillars, or rejecting 
modernity altogether), developed side by side with class action. The analysis of the 
collective action of this period must take into account both the class dynamics and 
class based social movements as well as the duality and response to the Kemalist 
modernisation project. The development of political Islam in Turkey should be seen 
from this perspective. 
Table 4.5. Result of the 1973 General Elections 
Total number of votes: 11 223 843 
Participation rate in the elections: 66.8 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of votes 
Justice Party 3 197 897 149 29.8 
Republican Reliance Party 564 343 13 5.3 
Republican People's Party 3 570 583 185 33.3 
Democratic Party 1 275 502 45 11.9 
Nationalist Action party 362 208 3 3.4 
Nation Party 62 377 - 0.6 
National Salvation party 1 265 771 48 11.8 
Turkish Union Party 121 759 1 1.1 
Independents 303 218 6 2.8 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, IYYY, p. 2U. 5 
As shown in the figure, the RPP won 185, the JP won 149, and the NSP 
won 48 seats in the parliament. The `left of centre' discourse was delivering positive 
results for the RPP in this election as it now started to represent the urban, working 
classes. There had been a significant shift in the RPP's voters' profile. In the 1950s 
and early 1960s, the main groups that voted for the RPP were the military, 
bureaucracy, state officials and the local notables in the small cities and provinces. 
Thus, the RPP used to get most of its votes from the least developed regions of the 
country where the local notables were cooperating with the party and channelling the 
votes of the area they influenced. 86 In the 1973 elections, the RPP got its greatest 
support from the most highly developed provinces; getting more than 50 percent of 
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the vote in the largest cities of the country (Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir). The 
leadership change for the first time since 1938 gave the party a dynamic outlook and 
the new `left of centre stance' helped to gather the urban vote under its banner. 
While the JP was getting the support of the capitalists and the agricultural sector, 
through its populist policies, the NSP was now on the scene getting the support of the 
traditionalist, conservative petit-bourgeois groups. 87 
It is interesting to see that as it entered the Parliament, the NSP built a 
coalition government with the RPP, which it had been opposing as anti-Islam, 
Western, immoral, infidel. It is interesting to see that the two groups that had been 
struggling within the political and societal arena for influence, and who personified 
the Western, anti-Western debate that had been going on for at least a century were 
now coalition partners destined to rule the country together. Despite all the 
differences in the ideology, Ahmad has said that the two parties shared a series of 
common points: 
Both claimed to believe in democracy that guaranteed the fundamental freedoms, a mixed 
economy, and economic and social development with social justice [... ] Both were 
committed to the protection of tradesmen and artisans and their small enterprises, which 
produced capitalist goods. Both sought working conditions that were humane and 
democratic, as well as social security and opposed to the exploitation of the people by 
88 `big capital'. 
As the NSP came to power with the RPP, it made great efforts to realize 
the "moral development" (manevi gelicme) that was noted as the number one priority 
in the party programme; it had built more than a thousand mosques, opened the 
secondary level of religious schools (imam hatip okullarinin orta krsmi), giving the 
right to religious school graduates to enter any faculty after graduation like other 
high schools, and introducing courses on morality to secondary and high schools. 
In line with the expectations, the coalition government of the RPP and the 
NSP did not last very long and in March 1975, a new coalition was formed, this time 
between the rightist parties of the period: the Justice Party, the NSP, the National 
Action Party and the Republican Trust Party. Being a part of the coalition 
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government for both terms, the NSP had the chance of filling up the state cadres with 
its supporters. It is noted that out of the additional 79085 cadres that were created, 
20337 were filled by the institutions and organisations linked to NSP. 89 
The 1977 elections resulted in the victory of the RPP. Now the `left of the 
centre' discourse was bringing more supporters to the party under the leadership of 
Ecevit. This was also in line with the increasing immigration to the cities and the 
increase in the workforce. In the 1977 elections, the vote percentage of the NSP 
declined from 11.8 to 8.6 percent, decreasing the seats in the parliament from 48 to 
24. Still, the votes of the NSP were coming mostly from the underdeveloped regions 
of the country. However, it lost some of its votes to the National Action party, which 
was linking strong nationalism with Islamism as its main ideology. As the 
percentage of its votes were declining (the number of votes had still increased from 
1265771 in 1973 elections to 1271621 in 1977), the NSP was adapting a harsher 
tone, posing a more severe criticism against the government and asking for the 
implementation of Islamic laws more loudly in the post-1977 elections. 
LATE 1970s - THE BUILDING UP OF THE CRISIS 
As the end of the 1970s was approaching, Turkish socio-economic indicators showed 
a more populated country, with increasing urbanisation. The decrease in the share of 
agriculture in the GNP led to increasing migration to the cities, providing a 
workforce for the growing (albeit it gradually) industry. 
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Table 4.6. Basic Economic Indicators, 1950-1980 
1950 1960 1970 1980 
Population in millions 21 28 36 45 
Life Expectancy at Binh 44 50 58 62 
Adult Literacy Rate (°ö) 33 38 52 69 
Share of Urban Population (°'o) 25 32 39 44 
Share of Agriculture in the Labour Force (%) 80 75 66 58 
GNP in millions of USS 3.4 10 19 70 
GNP per capita in USS 166 359 539 1539 
Share of Agriculture in GNP (oha) 42 38 36 25 
Share of Manufacturing in GNP (oho) 10 12 12 13 
Share of Total Industry in GNP (%) 14 17 17 18 
Source: Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth 
Century 
Despite the huge increase in the GNP, economically the situation of the 
country was not good as the end of the 1970s was approaching. ISI had reached its 
second stage where the production started to demand more capital and high 
technology. With the increases in industrial production, importation for domestic 
production needed to be increased, leading to a foreign exchange crisis and a 
production crisis. The shrinking domestic market, decreasing productivity, world oil 
shocks and the increasing price costs for production and the lack of any formal 
mechanisms that could prevent the decreases in industrial profits as a result of 
populist policies that tend to increase the wages and salaries of working classes, all 
led to the crisis of the ISI regime. Within the context of world economic crisis in the 
late 1970s, Boratav and Türkcan name this small scale, low productive, high 
protection and increasing cost industrial structure as the "latest" phase of 
industrialisation where by production stagnated in Turkey by the late 1970s. 9° 
When the effects of industrial development of ISI are examined within the 
context of income distribution and income proportions we can say that until 1977, 
when signs of the crisis would be seen, economic growth continued to increase the 
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real incomes of the population in general. However, inflation rates started to rise 
steadily as well. Under ISI, industry developed faster than agriculture. However, 
populist policies towards the agricultural sector played a crucial role. Despite 
increases in industrial production, the agricultural support policies, subsidies and 
implementation of the lowest price rates for agricultural products made the balance 
of price relations on agriculture/industry basis turn in favour of agriculture during the 
period. 
The rise in the inflation rate also eroded the value of salaries from the 
second half of the 1970s onwards. According to Kepenek, inflation was a result of 
the struggle between different groups for a higher share of the income distribution. 
Producers would increase the prices "as much as the market allows" to increase their 
profits. The market structure would also determine the amount by which the 
agricultural, industrial and service sectors could increase their income. In this 
situation the losers of the system would be those that could not increase their income 
according to the market conditions: wage and salary earners. 91 
By the end of 1979, crisis was affecting not only the wage-earning groups 
but the bourgeoisie as well. Unorganised state officials who were dependent on 
steady income of wages were the most affected group. Without the power to bargain 
and strike for increases in income, their position in society was deteriorating rapidly. 
Workers' syndicates were struggling to keep their bargaining power and keep the 
workers' wages as high as possible in this high inflation environment. The capital 
owners were seen as left with no other choice but to break the coalition with the 
workers as production was stagnating but the workers syndicates were pushing for 
higher wages. It was by 1979 that capitalists started calling openly for a change in 
11 
the system, control of the workers' unions and syndicates'and calling the government 
to create the "secure" conditions for capital and investment when the country was in 
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a deep political turmoil and instability,. almost at the edge of a civil war. As the 
"coalition" between the capitalists and the workers collapsed we see the clash of 
interests and the class action developing as a result of the breaking up of this 
cooperation. However, the 1980 military coup would put an end to this class action. 
Keyder calls the period until the late 1970s as the years of "national 
development" and the crisis of ISI by the end of the decade as the "bankruptcy of this 
national development process". 2 Since the formation of the Turkish Republic, the 
political elite - the military-bureaucracy - was trying to develop capitalist and 
bourgeoisie forces in society but rather than applying purely liberal policies, the state 
was always the major actor in determining the economic development. Despite some 
liberal periods, the main strategy was "national development" which was less 
dividing, less polarising and more populist, but at the same time "modernising" and 
"western". The main aim of bourgeois creation would be materialised within this 
process as well but it would be encouraged to act in compliance with the state's 
development policies. The working class would be kept satisfied with redistributive 
policies and a "classless" society was to be formulated within this process. As an 
ideal, national capitalism was to take a classless, corporatist form, under the control 
of the state elite. 93 With the collapse of the ISI policies, and the economic crisis that 
followed, this "national developmentalism" had disintegrated and what was 
witnessed was the "bankruptcy of this era", to use Keyder's terms. 
FROM ISI TO EXPORT ORIENTED GROWTH STRATEGY - THE 24 JANUARY 
DECISIONS 
It was in this environment that on 24 January 1980, the government announced a 
series of economic policies to remedy the economic deterioration of the country - 
known as the 24 January Decisions. Seeing the `bankruptcy' of the ISI policies and 
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the deteriorating economy, a new set of policy measures was introduced that aimed 
to `liberalise' the economy from state dominance, leaving the economic sphere to the 
market forces. The `neo-Liberal market economy' debate was introduced to Turkey 
with these measures. These economic policies aimed at controlling the inflation and 
stabilising the economy by encouraging exports and decreasing the state initiative 
and state estates in heavy industry and primary goods. Instead of the ISI policy, now 
the government was accepting a new strategy - export-oriented growth. The new 
economic programme included some major elements of reform in the economy such 
as replacing the overvalued currency policy with a `real value currency' in order to 
increase the exports, market forces determining interest rates and prices rather than 
the state, ending subsidies on the goods produced by the state sector, which led to an 
increase in the prices of the goods. Further, it foresaw reforming the state economic 
enterprises and abolishing of the policy of unlimited employment in these 
establishments, limitations on state expenditure and a tax reform accompanying it, 
encouragements for foreign investment and the opening up of the state owned 
enterprises for private domestic and foreign investment 94 
The Prime Minister of the period, Demirel, was talking about the necessity 
of these measures saying, "Whichever of the countries in the world faced with 
economic problems like ours, they had to take these measures. That is why we had 
to implement these policies that we know are not very pleasant, but that will take us 
out from darkness to bright horizons. "95 'The 24 January Decisions' were not solely 
the innovation of the government but included measures advocated by the IMF and 
World Bank's structural adjustment policies. The close relations with the 
international organisations, especially the IMF and the World Bank, played a crucial 
r 
role in the implementation of the new polities. Owen and Pamuk note that these 
international bodies saw Turkey 
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as a shining example of the validity of the orthodox stabilisation and structural adjustment 
programs they promoted [... ] Their support translated into better terms for rescheduling 
the external debt and the substantial amounts of new resource inflows. As a result foreign 
exchange constraint disappeared practically overnight and the public sector had less need 
for inflationary finance at home. These were undoubtedly vital ingredients for the 
success of the program . 
96 
During the 1980-84, Turkey received five successive structural adjustment 
loans from the World Bank, which was a record number. By the end of 1984, the 
cooperation with the World Bank continued with the `sectoral adjustment loans'. 
The scale of resources that had been given to Turkey provided a freedom of action on 
the side of the policy-makers and secured the government's autonomy from the 
societal pressures. However, the programme was not immune to criticisms and 
protests. One of the most important problems of the economy was seen as the 
inward looking, small scale manufacturing sector that operated on high profit 
margins and, as a remedy, opening up to the competitive international markets was 
proposed. This policy had already been supported by TÜSIAD since 1971, its 
formation. However, except for the big industrialists of TÜSIAD the commercial 
sectors and large companies that operated safely under state protection during ISI 
had concerns about their future operations and how to adapt to the new system and 
opposed to the opening up of the market forces. 
An important item in these policy measures is the limitations on the wages 
of the officials and the cuts on the agricultural subsidies. It must be kept in mind that 
the government chose to implement policies limiting the income, especially the 
salaries and the wages for decreasing the internal demand rather than "monetary" 
policies. The need to control the wage and salary increases became the call of the 
new programme that led to concern on the side of the wage/salary earners. Faced 
with a high inflation rate, the already deteriorating positions of the wage/salary 
earners would furtheridecline faced with constant income, when everything else's 
price increases. This is why these policies are seen against the labour and salary 
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earners and as the "counter-attack of capital" after long years of populism. Against 
pressing opposition, had the military coup of 12 September 1980 not happened, the 
success of the programme would have been hampered to a great extent. Under the 
military regime, it was possible to pursue the policies and not consider the political 
outcome, as the military did not share the political concerns of losing votes or seats 
in the parliament for the next elections. 
Along with the economic problems and severe economic measures, the 
political scene was not stable either. There was a dramatic increase in the level and 
scope of political violence that spread to most parts of the country and claimed more 
than 4,000 lives between 1976-1980. As Sayari notes "by 1980, the possibility of 
another military takeover had become a matter of public discussion as many Turks, 
including some segments of the civilian political elites, began to express their open 
or tacit support for a military solution to the escalating crisis". 97 
SUMMARY 
To summarise the developments during the period under consideration, emphasis 
could be placed on developing class politics in the country along with the theme of 
duality that underlined the collective action in the society. Against the military- 
bureaucratic elite, there was the development of a `counter-elite' that began to 
challenge the definition of modernity during this period. While the element of 
Turkish nationalism was not challenged, the Westernisation, especially the 
secularisation pillar of the modernisation project, came under increasing attack. 
During this period, the public space was tightly controlled and contained by the 
military and it intervened every time the challenge to the Kemalist modernisation 
project became too strong. So, during the period under consideration, the tensions in 
1 
the society, manifested both in class and duality terms, had been contained by the 
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political system within which they operated, especially by the military-bureaucratic 
elite. 
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CHAPTER 
TURKEY 1980-2001: CHALLENGES TO THE KEMALIST MODERNISATION 
PROJECT AND THE HETEROGENISATION OF IDENTITIES 
The period under consideration starts with the 1980 military coup that not only 
shaped the future of the political but also the socio-economic life in Turkey. The 
military regime that lasted until 1983 initiated some changes to the Kemalist 
modernisation project and instituted a new constitution in 1982 that resulted in the 
"reconstruction of the state". ' Between 1980 and 2001, economic liberalisation 
policies continued with export oriented production policy. Within the sphere of 
collective action, we see the decreasing role of the trade unions and the 
representation of class interest, and the proliferation of different identities through 
which interests were defined, demands for change were declared and political action 
was followed. These identities were shaped around ethnic (Kurdish and ultra- 
nationalist Turkish) and religious (Muslim) bases. The growing influence of the 
nationalist and Islamist parties during this period, and the responses of the military- 
bureaucratic elite to these challenges to the modernisation project, became manifest 
in the 1997 "post-modem coup", or what is commonly called the 28 February 
process. Within the Islamist politics, there was a growing distinction between the 
`old' guard, represented by the Erbakan group and the `new' Islamists that were 
mainly the products of the newly emerging identities in a global society by late 
1990s. This difference within the Islamists led to a division in the party for the first 
P 
time, in 2001. This chapter aims to look at these, developments in a detailed way. - 
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THE 1980 Coup, POST-1983 DEVELOPMENTS AND THE MOTHERLAND PARTY 
Ahmet Evin in an article written some years after the coup asks whether the 1980 
military intervention "would enter the annals of Turkish history as a fundamental 
turning point with regard to the role of the state in that polity or with the passage of 
time it would appear [... ] as one of those periodic interventions [... ] since the 
transition to multi-party system". 2 More than two decades after the coup, it seems 
that the 1980 military intervention constituted one of the turning points in Turkish 
politics. A significant reason for this lies in the changes made during the subsequent 
military rule to the Kemalist modernisation project. A second reason could be noted 
as the changes in the constitution and the political system of the country following 
the military rule. The argument of the following section will focus on these points. 
Islamist extremism was given as one of the main justifications for the 
coup. In May 1980, worshippers in Istanbul's Fatih mosque jeered and booed at the 
mention of Atatürk in a service, which was broadcast. This was an open challenge to 
the secular order of the country. Erbakan, in an attempt to calm down the reactions, 
said that he was sorry for such `un-Muslim behaviour' but made no attempt to defend 
Atatürk's memory. On 6 September in a mass rally in Konya, the NSP supporters 
from all over the country refused to sing the national anthem and called for a "return 
to Shari' a". 3 During the same period, the clashes between the leftist and the rightist 
groups and increasing polarisation of the society along ideological lines were 
intensifying. The growing instability at the time was seen as challenging the 
modernisation project and as emanating both from the Islamist forces4 and from the 
leftist ideological forces. Within the framework of the Cold War, the army was 
already conscious of the threat of a Soviet takeover and the leftist' forces were seen as 
elements that could contribute to such a possible scenario. On 12 September 1980 
F 
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the military, having enough of evidence that the country was sliding into political 
and social instability, decided to intervene to restore law and order and reinstate the 
undermined state authority. 
It can be noted here that the main point of the military interventions, 
repeated in ten year intervals, seem to lie in the threat perception of the military and 
their concept of stability of the country. Political stability was the main prerequisite 
for the advent of the Kemalist modernisation project and the military's secure place 
as the elite of the country throughout this process. Thus, every time the country's 
stability appeared at risk the army intervened to secure the continuation of the 
modernisation project, and its own place as the definite arbiter of this modernisation. 
After the coup, to maintain stability and order in the society, the military 
cadres tried to initiate a new framework that would decrease the power of the leftist 
groups, keep the society together and secure the continuation of the Kemalist project 
in unity. This new framework was designed in line with what some have termed the 
"Turkish-Islamic synthesis" (Turk-Islam Sentezi - TIS) .5 The TIS was implemented 
as a policy to decrease the power of the left and glue the society together and by this 
way carry the modernisation ideal forward, with a slight modification in the 
modernisation formula. Accordingly, this new Turkish-Islamic ideology would 
provide the society with the understanding of a "national culture" and guide it 
according to this, basing its legitimacy on pursuing the "national cultural values and 
principles". Islam would constitute the main place in such an understanding. The 
Turkish-Islamic synthesis was thus an attempt to "bring supposedly shared values to 
the surface, peel away the `false Western veneer' which was seen as responsible for 
the ills of the modern society and recognise a national synthesis of fundamental 
values under the labels of `Turk' and `Islam'. "6 Tapper said that `this synthesis 
aimed at an authoritarian but not an Islamic state where religion was seen as the 
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essence of culture and social control and should thus be fostered in the education 
system but not be politicised.? The TIS was widely advocated after the coup, and the 
vital positions in the government, education and the cultural bodies were all given to 
people sharing this perception of the TIS. 8 
As the idea of the TIS took root, some policies were put into effect to 
- increase its spread in the population. One important development was the 
implementation of compulsory religious courses, to secondary and high schools. 
Another visibility of the TIS wa's in the state discourse. The coup leader, Kenan 
Evren, in his speeches was often making quotations from the Quran and the hadith, 
underlining the concept of ummah and the Muslim unity in the society. 9 
Initiating the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the state ideology was the main 
deviation from conventional Kemalist reforms and principles and the 1980 coup is 
important in placing Islam within the state ideology, from which it had been absent 
for decades. In time, without realizing the incompatibility of the concepts of 
Turkism as a national concept and Islam 10 there was an evolution of the 
understanding from Turkish-Muslim to an Islamist-Turk. The military leaders 
initiated the former as a legitimate part of the new definition of modernisation in an 
attempt to secure its continuation, but in time it developed its own dynamics and 
Islam started to be seen in every aspect of life, beginning to create a real alternative 
to the existing system, and the redefined modernisation, especially from the second 
half of 1980s onwards. The role of the 1980 military coup is important in drawing 
and encouraging this policy. 
To summarize, regarding the definition of the Kemalist modernisation 
project we can talk about the first changes made to the initial definition under the 
r 
military rule during 1980-1983. Capitalist development still constituted the first 
pillar of the project. Following the pace of the 24 January Decisions and the 
183 
economic liberalisation policy, instead of a state-led capitalist industrialisation a 
market based, export oriented capitalist development constituted the economic 
element in the formula. Nationalism and secularism were kept as the official 
ideological components of the regime, but bringing Islam into the official discourse 
added an element of cultural authenticity to the picture. Instead of Westernisation as 
a cultural framework for modernisation, it was basically now limited to Western 
technology, as the cultural framework had now shifted to Islam. Karpat notes that 
what the West meant for the Turkish elites had changed at this time. He notes that 
The cultural and political emulation of the West is no longer the axis of `modernism'. It 
is rather economic development, technological advancement and material progress in all 
its forms [... ] Reshaping of the national identity in the light of the Turk's own cultural 
and religious ethos has broadened the scope of modernisation in such a way as to relegate 
the West, without abandoning it, to a secondary ? osition, while giving priority to a new 
historically rooted socio-cultural Turkish identity. ' 
By redefining the modernisation project, the 1980 coup paved the way for 
other groups in the society to challenge and demand to reformulate the project as 
well. Since the state, the military-bureaucracy that initiated the Kemalist 
modernisation project, could change and reformulate it, other groups would soon line 
up with their challenges to all aspects of the modernisation project. 
If one of the aims of the coup was to restore law and order the other one 
was to build a political infrastructure that would help the political system to become 
immune to turbulence. 12 During the three year period in power, the military leaders 
repeatedly attributed economic and political chaos of the 1970s to the political party 
system and the political leaders of the period in general. 13 As early as 17 September 
1980,5 days after the coup, Kenan Evren, the coup leader was saying that 
All my trust in the politicians had been rubbed away. If they are all asking their leaders 
what to do, it means that in practice they will go on doing the same thing. We need 
people who really believe in us and will stick with us. Let's give up the idea of forming a 
government made up of the JP and RPP moderates. 1d 
p 
On 21 September the cabinet of the military regime was formed under the 
leadership of BUlend Ulusu -a newly retired admiral. The Cabinet was established 
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composed of 27 members, six of which were retired generals and the remainder 
being neutral bureaucrats or academics. Thus, careful attention was paid to choosing 
people with no political background. 
What to do with the old party leaders who had been detained after the coup 
and the fate of the party organisations were discussed under the military regime. 
Trials were held of the NSP's leader Erbakan and the NAP's leader Türke. Both 
leaders were placed on trial for breaking the law and the Constitution. Erbakan was 
charged and arrested for working against the principle of secularism. Türke$ was 
charged, along with 585 members of his party, with instigating civil war and 
murdering nearly 600 people between 1974-1980.15 Both were released in 1985. 
Regarding the JP leader Demirel and the RPP leader Ecevit, no evidence was proved 
for breaking any regulations or laws and they were released from custody on 11 
October. 
Although at the time of the coup all parties were banned from politics, they 
were not dissolved until October 1981. By 1982, the military had started to give 
signals that they would not allow the old politicians to re-enter into politics for some 
time as they were seen to be responsible for all the instability and if they came to 
power again they might lead the country along the same route, hampering the newly 
redefined modernisation efforts. In the new constitution enacted by the military 
regime, the framework necessary to keep the `old' politicians away from post-coup 
politics was drawn up. According to the new constitution of 1982, the Chairman, 
general secretaries and other senior members of the former parties would not be able 
to form, join or hold any relationship with the future parties and would not be able to 
stand for elections as independent deputies for ten years. According to the 
'constitution, General Evren would automatically become the president of the country 
for a period of seven years. As in the 1961 Constitution, the role of the military was 
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again guaranteed, as five chief commanders would serve as the members of the 
National Security Council, which advised the Council of Ministers on issues 
concerning internal and external security. 
The underlying theme of the 1982 constitution was to decrease the 
"politicisation" of the masses and to limit the rights and freedoms that had been 
introduced by the 1961 constitution. State forces were given more power and the 
associational rights and freedom of organisation, strike and protest that were given 
under the 1961 constitution were decreased to the minimum. Socially and 
politically, the state moved back into the centre as the main source of power against 
the decreasing individual and organisational rights. The 1982 constitution was 
accepted with a 92 percent `yes' vote in a referendum. The result of the referendum 
also made Kenan Evren the president of the country. 
Economically, the military regime continued to pursue economic stability 
and austerity measures. The military showed its commitment to carrying the Turkish 
economy from an ISI, inward looking production pattern to export oriented growth 
strategies by appointing Turgut Özal, the architect of the January 1980 economic 
decisions, as deputy prime minister responsible for economic affairs. The major 
immediate aims of Özal in checking the three digit inflation rate, ending the 
shortages of basic consumer goods and improving the foreign trade deficit were 
relatively successful within the first year of the military rule when the annual 
inflation rate dropped from 140 to 35 percent. 16 In addition to the austerity measures, 
the government carried out a policy of devaluating the Turkish Lira by 48 percent 
against the dollar, large price increases for the various products of the public sector, 
reduction in government subsidies and expenditures, and wage restraints for public 
sector employees and workers. Sabri Sayan emphasizes the point that had it not 
been the military regime that was in power but a civilian one, groups whose interests 
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were adversely affected from these policies could have shown their opposition on 
various grounds. However, the military regime, by imposing strict controls over 
potential sources of opposition, ruled out such a possibility. '7 The technocratic 
initiative to reform the economy benefited greatly from the absence of "public 
contestation and democratic liberties" but the redemocratization process that would 
follow led to considerable opposition in the longer term. 
By 1983 and the beginning of renewed civilian political rule, the economic 
policies were already bringing positive results. The balance of payments improved 
as a result of doubled rates of exports in the first two years and the rate of inflation 
decreased from around one hundred percent in 1980 to thirty percent in 1983.18 
THE CIVILIAN POLITICS IN THE POST-COUP ERA 
Although the military decided to delegate power back to the civilian politicians in 
1983, with free democratic elections, it still wanted to act as the main arbiter in 
politics, to secure the continuation of the redefined modernisation project. The 
election date was announced as 6 November 1983. The -military regime imposed 
special rules to govern the elections. All the parties that were established went 
through a careful examination and most of them were vetoed by the military regime. 
The military, aiming to make a fresh start with politicians that adhered to no past 
party, vetoed the Social Democrat Party, established by Erdal Inönü, the son of the 
late Ismet Inönü, that basically represented the continuation of the RPP. The Great 
Turkey Party was also vetoed as it represented the continuation of the JP. Later, the 
True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi - TPP) was formed as a substitute for the Great 
Turkey Party but did not manage to have itself accepted into the elections of the 
1983, either. -. - 
187 
Within this framework, only three parties competed in the elections held 
on 6 November 1983. The candidate parties were the Nationalist Democracy Party 
(Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi - NDP) which the generals themselves had founded, 
the Populist Party (Halkci Parti - PP) that again the generals had encouraged to 
channel the leftist votes, and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi - MP) that was 
given "permission"' to enter the elections. According to Tachau, the plan that was 
envisioned by the military for the 1983 elections resembled a "sporting contest". 
The military's plan envisioned 
an antiseptic type of politics that ideally would resemble a gentlemanly sporting contest 
in which the two teams compete with one another and in which one can win and the other 
loses. Onlookers (in the form of interest groups and associations) may not even cheer 
their favoured team although individuals may cast votes periodically. Any team, fan or 
group of fans that violates the rules may be thrown out of the game. 19 
The MP was spoiling the two-party plan of the military that had hoped for 
a NDP victory in the elections and PP opposition. However, there were no grounds 
to veto the MP's candidacy for the elections. So, a three party competition evolved. 
1983 ELECTION RESULTS 
The plans and hopes of the military were destroyed when the elections resulted in the 
victory of the MP. The military-backed NDP received only 23.3 percent of the votes 
in the elections, decreasing the power of the military to play an active and direct role 
in the Turkish politics in the post-1983 period. 
Table 5.1. Result of the 1983 General Elections 
Total number of votes: 18 238 362 
Participation rate in the elections: 92.3 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of Votes 
Motherland Party 7 833 148 211 45.1 
Populist Party . 
5 285 804 117 30.5 
Nationalist Democracy Party 4 036 970 a 71 23.3 
Independents 195 588 - 1.1 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204 
188 
The MP was nicknamed the "brainchild of ÖzaP'. 20 Özal often referred to 
the party as representing a new beginning in Turkish politics, with no antecedents 
and "definitely no roots that extended into the past struggles". 21 Özal picked every 
candidate before the 1983 elections "deliberately and almost alone, seeking a 
platform that would bring politicians of diverse ideological persuasions under the 
same roof. "22 Claiming to be representing the Orta Direk (the main pillar of the 
society, the middle classes), Özal repeated that his party was incorporating four 
different tendencies under its banner: the liberal right, the traditionalist right 
(mukaddesatcz sag), the nationalist right and the democratic left. The party seemed 
like a coalition of these different tendencies that had met in the MP as they had 
nowhere else to go. Ergüder notes that in the 1980s, after a decade of political chaos 
and terrorism, the population was craving for a centrist position that would 
incorporate all the elements of the right and pull the anti-system tendencies like the 
Islamists and the nationalists into the centre. 23 The MP represented such an 
alternative. Özal in his election campaign was proposing faster integration with the 
international markets and rational policy making in the economic sphere. 
When faced with a moderate option, disassociated from the tarnished politics of the past, 
the Turkish electorate seemed to respond positively. In the campaign of 1983, Turgut 
Özal ran on a platform stressing economic growth and fiscal caution. He advocated de- 
emphasis on state economic enterprises. He has described himself as a devotee of 
`supply-side economics'. His program would have placed him comfortably within the 
range of many Western right-of-centre parties. He also stressed the need to enhance 
Turkey's place within the Middle Eastern economic network. Sometimes described as a 
`Muslim technocrat' he seems to appeal to the traditional values without giving them 
ideological pre-eminence over the need to bring Turkey into the international competitive 
market. 24 
Despite the claims of the MP not to be the continuation of any past parties, 
the above statement supports Göle's point that the MP could be considered as both a 
"continuation of the Democrat Party tradition of the 1950s and also a renewal of the 
conservative liberal legacy, attempting to synthesize market modernism and Muslim 
identity". 25 
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The MP was successful in getting the support of the Islamists and 
incorporating them into the party. The political environment had left this party as the 
only option for channelling Islamist support as neither the NDP nor the PP could be 
the representative of the Islamists. Ozal and his brothers were already figures known 
by the Islamist circles. They were, according to many analysts, members of the 
Iskenderpa§a Congregation of the Nakýibendi religious order. 26 Korkut Özal, the 
brother, had been a leading member of the NSP in the 1970s. Özal had taken the 
ideas of such circles into consideration while building his political cadres and 
gathered the politicians that were accepted by Islamists as leaders under his party 
organisation. With the MP coming to power, "political Islam" had finally "unified 
with the state". 27 All through his post, Özal continued his close relationship with the 
leaders of the religious orders and sheiks with a view to improving his image and 
credentials among the Islamists. 8 
After coming to power, Özal was able to pursue virtually absolute rule in 
the country, without major opposition since most of the political parties were not 
represented in the parliament and the restrictions on the political activities of former 
party leaders still continued. Having charismatic leadership qualities, Ozal managed 
to keep all the different tendencies in the party together and, having been the victor 
of the 1984 municipal elections as well, there was no power to stop his economic and 
political activities. The reign of the MP continued uninterrupted until the 1991 
elections and during this period Islamist circles were given great opportunity to 
increase their power. Taking into consideration the 1982 Constitution's restrictions 
on the leftist organisations, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis continued as the main state 
ideology without any counter-ideology to challenge it and Özal's continuous 
discourse on the importance of religibn in daily life dominated the political scene. 
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The counter-elite that started to play a role in the politics of the country 
during the 1970s had come to power in the 1980s. In general, the MP rule witnessed 
the transformation of society and the ruling elite 
from the modernizing elites of the earlier decades that took as their basic mission the 
secularisation of Turkish politics and the transmission of Western values to that polity 
and society, to the technocratic elites of the 1980s who defined their goals less in terms of 
educating the people than of synthesizing Islamic values and pragmatic rationality. 29 
The state elite of the post-1980s is placed in contrast to the military 
bureaucratic elite of the "post-Atatiirk period as they do not presume that they are an 
inherently superior group in sole possession of the truth ... The Atatiirkian thought is 
not regarded as a source of all public policies. It is rather taken as a technique, not a 
manifesto for all public policies". 30 While talking about the 1980s in general, Göle 
emphasises the point that the MP rule had "begun dismantling the state by its policies 
of decentralisation of government, privatisation of the state economic enterprises and 
the reorientation towards the market economy"31 This in turn encouraged the very 
much used liberal discourse, developing with the advent of the market economy. 
This time, instead of the state or the political elites that were encouraging the pro- 
private sector policies, it was the entrepreneurs themselves that tried to carve out an 
economic space independent of the state. It was mainly this development that led to 
the emergence - on the political and cultural levels - of pragmatic values. 32 
Many of the MP members are termed by Göle the "Islamicist engineers", 
who personally hold traditional Muslim values regarding the individual, family and 
society, but because of their professional backgrounds adopt the norms of Western 
rationality. 33 Thus, 
MP rule shows that the modernising elites (military -bureaucratic elite) began to lose 
their power to transform the society from above and were increasingly replaced by more 
representative elites. Paradoxically the latter were mostly technocrats who belonged to 
the centre-right political parties. Their prevalence resulted basically from their attempts 
to reconcile technological change with traditional values, an attempt that paved the way to 
politics of harmony, an essential ingredient for the consolidation of democracy. "" 
Parenthesis are mine. 
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Already in 1983, Islamist financial companies and banks had been 
incorporated into the economy. This was in line with the Muslim entrepreneur image 
of the MP rule, giving opportunities to this segment to invest the way they choose to 
do so. 
ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER OZAL - GROWTH OF THE MARKET ECONOMY 
During the period of MP rule, the transition from an ISI economy to the liberal, 
export oriented market economy continued and important steps were taken in this 
direction. Both the trade regime and the capital inflows and outflows were 
liberalised. The degree of tariff protection on imports was reduced by a considerable 
margin. A liberal regime was also established with regards to foreign direct 
investment. 5 Foreign investment in the pre-1980 period was very limited due to a 
host of restrictions and bureaucratic constraints. In the course of the 1980s, these 
restrictions were eliminated and a single agency was created in the form of the 
Foreign Investment Department in the State Planning Organisation to deal with the 
issue. Furthermore, the Foreign Investment Code was made consistent with the 
Organisation for Economic and Cultural Development (OECD), providing foreign 
investors with the same incentives and allowances as their domestic counterparts 36 
The issue of privatisation entered the agenda of the government in 1984. However, it 
followed a rather slow progress as the first major case of privatisation, involving the 
sale of the half of the public shares in the telecommunications company TELETAS 
via stock exchange, occurred as late as February 1988. By 1990, only a few 
companies had been privatised. 37 
The response of the private sector to the import liberalisations was mixed. 
P 
While the export oriented groups and sectors supported the move, like the big 
industrialists of Istanbul gathering under TÜSIAD, the ISI industries and the big 
192 
conglomerates had opposed it, still lobbying for protection. But the government 
repeated its determination to open the economy for international competition and 
integration of Turkish markets with the globalizing world economy by not making 
any concessions on the liberal economic policy. 
One important area of success within this new liberalisation context had 
been the growth in the export rates. Exports rose sharply from $2.3 million in 1979 
to $8 billion in 1985 and $13 billion in 1990. During the decade Turkey ranked as 
the first in the rate of the export growth in the world. 38 Manufactured goods 
constituted 80 percent of the increase in this period. Among the manufactured 
products were textiles, clothing, iron and steel products. 39 As can be seen from the 
table below, exports had jumped from 2.9 percent of the GNP in 1978-79 when the 
ISI was the economic policy to 11.7 percent of the GNP in 1984-85. Manufacturing 
exports constituted the bulk of this increase. 
Table 5.2. External Orientation of the Economy 
Year Im rts/GYP Exports/GNP Manufacturing Exports / GNP 
1970-71 5.5 3.3 0.7 
1978-79 6.5 2.9 1.3 
198 i-85 17.6 11.7 7.7 
1989-90 1 14.7 9.7 7.5 
Jource: Turkey. State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Inaicators, IYIj-Y4. 
However, the unemployment and unequal distribution of income had 
become significant characteristics of the period. In the beginning of the 1980s, the 
decreasing power of the workers and the reductions in public sector employment had 
important effects. From 1985 onwards, the unemployment rate rose to become as 
high as 7 percent of the entire workforce, accounting for 1.2 million people; by 1987 
the number of unemployed and underemployed not seeking work stood at double that 
figure. 40 The decline in real wages was very significant during this period as well. 
As a proportion of national income they declined from 33 percent in 1979 to 18 
percent in 1985-86. Gross government salaries and wages dropped from 9 percent of 
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GNP in 1980 to 6 percent in 1985. Official figures show that the share of wages and 
salaries in the value of State Economic Enterprises (SEE) production declined from 
47 percent in 1979, to 19 percent in 1986. However, Waterbury notes that in the 
public sector as a whole it is the civil service (memur) that suffered the greatest 
absolute and relative declines in salaries: 50 percent since 1979.41 There is agreement 
among Turkish economists that the anti-wage policies have not been this severe in 
any other country, the decreases in the purchasing power and real incomes of 
workers and state officials have ' not been as sharp as they were in Turkey during 
1979-1988. '` 
The agricultural sector also suffered from the new policies. In agriculture, 
subsidies were either terminated or decreased, price regulations were abolished and 
farmers and peasants were left unprotected against organised capital. Thus, as can be 
seen from the figure below, their share in income distribution had fallen from 23.8 
percent in 1980 to 14 percent in 1988. 
Table 53. Functional Distribution of Income of Turkey, 1967-1988 (%) 
Year Agricultural Incomes Wages and Salaries 
Incomes from Interest, 
Rent & Profit 
1930 23.87 26.66 49.47 
1981 23.06 24.57 52.36 
1932 21.82 24.62 53.55 
1983 I 20.52 24.78 54.69 
1984 I 20.44 21.57 57.99 
1985 19.08 18.84 62.08 
1986 18.09 17.70 64.21 
1987 17.10 17.00 65.00 
1988 14.00 15.80 70.20 
. )ounce: Jonrt Waterbury, "Export-Led Growth and the tugnt-tugnt t. oatttton in i ur cy , in i cviuc 
Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds. ), Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization, p. 66 
While the income of the agricultural sector employees and wage/siilary 
earners declined dramatically, the income of the capitalist class increased greatly. As 
can be seen from the figures above,, -the capitalists seemed to win the victory over the 
wage-earners, getting back the power that they had lost due to the populist policies of 
the 1970s. 
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In addition to the big capitalists of Istanbul, towards the end of the decade 
there were small-scale family businesses in certain Anatolian cities that were 
developing, concentrating on the export of manufactured goods. They were well 
equipped to adapt to `flexible production patterns' and were actively competing in 
the international markets in line with the changing production patterns that the global 
economy necessitated. They were hailed in the media as success stories and were 
labelled the "Anatolian Tigers", reflecting the "generally shared positive sentiments 
about their economic potential"43. More discussion about this issue will be made 
below. However, it is important to note here that as the country was moving towards 
a market economy, competitive manufacturing industries that implemented small 
scale, flexible production were developing and the monopoly of the bourgeois class 
of Istanbul as the sole industrialists was starting to be challenged by these small 
Anatolian businesses. These businesses managed to adapt to the international market 
and they had advantages compared to the big industrialists as they did not have the 
burden of first having to abandon the old Fordist production patterns as the big 
industrialists had to do. Being dynamic, highly computerised, and newly equipped, 
they benefited most from the integration with the international markets with the 
economic liberalisation policies of the 1980s. 
The economic liberalisation and export oriented growth strategies brought 
the Turkish economy into a new stage and by the end of the decade Turkey had gone 
a long way towards integrating with the world economy through trade and foreign 
investment. These developments had led to the rise of newly enriched strata, 
composed of not only the businessmen of Anatolia but also those "new groups of 
professionals now able to find highly lucrative employment opportunities especially 
in the service sector". 44 
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- In addition to these groups, the illicit wealth of certain groups and charges 
of corruption became widely discussed issues in the media. Links with politicians, 
especially at the municipality level, worked as a way of accumulating wealth for the 
companies that entered into contracting-out work with the state. Conspicuous 
consumption and spending on luxurious imported goods and rather a showing off 
culture seemed to take root among the nouveaux riches of the period, with the Özäl 
family in particular coming to represent the extravagant lifestyles, and excessive 
spending features of the rising groups. 
EMERGING NENV IDENTITIES IN THE TURKISH POLITICAL ARENA 
In line with the theoretical framework drawn in the first chapter, changes in the 
nature of the economic production would be expected to bring changes in the 
political and collective action themes. Within this line of argument, transition from 
state-led capitalist industrialisation to economic liberalisation and market economy 
would bring with it the questioning of the old order and the values associated with it. 
Thus, the unifying ideologies and myths that revolved around national identities will 
be highly challenged during this period. In the Turkish case, against the elitist, 
bureaucratic, classless, secular modernisation pattern of the pre-1980 period, now 
stood upwardly mobile Anatolian rooted entrepreneurs, engineers, and export-import 
company holders with identities rooted in Islam. Before the 1980s `the imposed 
definition of modernisation - the Kenialist modernisation project' - 
had already 
started to lose its unifying mission. This was manifest in the clashes between 
different groups in the late 1970s. The military had tried to revamp Kemalism and 
prevent the total collapse of the modernisation project by incorporating the Turkish- 
F Islamic synthesis to the modernisation project. However, the liberal economy, at 
least the beginnings of the transformation to flexible production and the market 
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economy, was posing a strong challenge to the monolithic `national identity' and the 
continuation of an imposed modernisation. The new period of economic 
development meant that the given national identities were ready to be challenged and 
this new elite - the counter-elite in politics and economy, the new Islamist 
bourgeoisie - was the actor challenging these identities. They represented the rise of 
an -alternative unifying mission that filled the gap created by the demise of 
Kemalism. 
Özal by emphasizing that his party was representing all the tendencies of 
the population tried to keep the fragmentation of identities and different ethnic and 
religious groups that were developing during the period under control. However, as 
the ban on the former party leaders and members was lifted in 1987, this unity could 
no longer be kept under the MP. There were two factions developing within the MP 
itself. While the liberals were advocating a faster integration with the world 
economy and the markets, the conservatives in the party were advocating for a more 
emphasized role of Islamic principles. 
The 1980s witnessed the formation of two significant parties. One of them 
was the illegal Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), founded in 1983, that adopted terrorist 
means, aiming at the formation of a separate Kurdish state in the south-east of 
Turkey. Describing itself as Marxist-Leninist from the beginning, it adopted an anti- 
imperialist rhetoric, "opposing the `Turkish imperialism', which it argued was 
prevalent in `Turkish Kurdistan'. " 45 The second party was the Welfare Party, 
founded in the same year to be the continuation of the NSP. Ozal tried to incorporate 
these two identities, Kurdish and Muslim, in himself and his party. He often made 
remarks saying that his aunt was Kurdish, although refraining from open remarks 
r 
about his Kurdishnessý as that might endanger his `uniting mission' and might raise 
some eyebrows in the military-bureaucratic elite. However, his acknowledgement of 
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the Kurdish reality was a big step in the politics of the country. Özal's close 
relationship with the Islamist circles and some religious orders has already been 
mentioned above. However, both movements - Kurdish and Islamist - were gaining 
their own dynamism and constituencies in a sense that they could no longer be 
confined to the centre-right discourse of the MP by the end of the 1980s. 
As the IMP rule continued in the mid-1980s, there wäs an increasing 
dissatisfaction developing in the society mainly because of the negative impact of the 
economic liberalisation on the majority of income groups. The lavish lifestyles of 
the newly rich strata were in sharp contrast with the decreasing purchasing power of 
the lower income groups who were faced with high inflation rates. Despite being 
officially illegal, the former party members started to make a number of political 
statements and run some parties behind the scenes. Özal, in a courageous move, 
decided to accept the challenge and announced a referendum for an amendment in 
the constitution that would allow the former politicians to take part in party politics. 
The results of the referendum were slightly in favour of seeing the old leaders on the 
political scene once again. 46 After the referendum, Özal announced that the next 
elections would be held in November 1987, which would surely underline once more 
the MP monopoly in the National Assembly. 
Table 5.4. Result of the 1987 General Elections 
Total number of votes used: 24 603 541 
Participation rate in the elections: 93.3 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of votes 
Motherland Party 8 704 335 292 36.4 
True Path Party 4 587 062 59 19.2 
Social Democrat 
Populist Party 5 931 000 99 24.8 
Democratic Left Party 2 044 576 - 8.6 
Welfare Party 1 717 425 - 7.2 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Tz rkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999 
As the restrictions on former politicians were lifted, the True Path Party 
(Dogru Yol Partisi - TPP) entered the elections under the leadership of Süleyman 
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Demirel, winning 19.2 percent of the votes. The Democratic Left Party (Demokratik 
Sol Parti - DLP) entered the elections under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit with a 
new party structure rather than the old structure of the RPP. The Populist Party that 
entered the 1983 elections and the Social Democracy Party under Inönü that was 
vetoed before, decided to unite and form the Social Democrat Populist Party (Sosyal 
Demokrat Halka Parti - SDPP), and Erdal Inönü continued as the leader of the new 
party. The SDPP under lnönü proved to be successful in launching an election 
campaign based on criticism of the economic policies of the regime. The election 
campaign was based on a `squeezed lemon', symbolising how the majority of the 
population was suffering under the economic programme. As the inflation rates 
increased, and the purchasing power of the majority declined to a great extent under 
MP rule, the support for the SPP would increase more in the following years. 
The monopoly of the MP rule terminated after the municipal elections held 
in March 1989. The 1989 election is important as the MP won only 21.9 percent of 
the votes, third in line after the SPP with 28.2 percent of the votes and Demirel's 
TPP with 25.6 percent. It had become more difficult for the MP to claim to be the 
representative of the four tendencies from then on as the parties both on the left and 
the right started to challenge it strongly. 
This all came at a time when the presidency was going to change hands. 
Kenan Evren who had been serving as the president of the country for seven years 
was leaving his post and Özal announced his intention to stand for the elections. 
Seeing the decrease in the votes in the local elections, Özal asserted that he would 
never serve in the Parliament as an opposition party leader, and had himself elected 
the President in 1989, leaving the task of leading his party to Yildinm Akbulut, who 
mainly followed Özal's orders given from behind the scene. Akbulut served for two 
years, after which his authority was challenged by Mesut Yilmaz, representing the 
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liberal, market oriented segment of the party. From 1991 until now, Mesut Yilmaz 
has served as the leader of the MP. 
During his period in office as Prime Minister, Özal advocated political 
liberalism in addition to economic liberalism. Civil society occupied an important 
place in the discourse of his politics and was seen as a dynamic force in maintaining 
sustainable growth and enhancing the democratic stfucture of the country. Forces 
that might act as an impediment for the individual entrepreneur were lifted and what 
was substituted is termed by Gö1e as "anarchical liberalism", "which destroyed the 
traditions, freed individuals, heightened aspirations, opened up new markets and 
dismantled all the obstacles in its way". 47 
This `anarchical liberal' environment, saw the development of 
environmentalist, gay and lesbian and feminist movements around the country, and a 
proliferation of different organisations advocating these values. The proliferation of 
private TV channels, radios, publications, and different organisations that capitalised 
on these newly developing identities provided an environment conducive to free 
discussions and the creation of a public opinion. While the feminist, gay and lesbian 
and environmentalist groups and debate on these topics were rather seen as confined 
to the elitist circles, the Kurdish groups and their counter force, the ultra-nationalists, 
as well as the Islamist circles, incorporated peripheral forces into the debates in this 
liberal framework. 
The increasing visibility of Islamic symbols in the public space continued 
r 
all through the 1980s, accelerating in the 1990s. The Kemalist and the secularist 
elite repeatedly pointed out the danger of the increasing number of mosques, Quran 
courses, Imam-Hatip schools, whose graduates were now allowed to enter to any 
University department, and Islamist bookstores and publications. These'were seen as 
the attempts of the conservative wing of the MP to diminish the secular nature of the 
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state further. Although these developments *ere initially in line with the Turkish- 
Islamic synthesis, as Islamist ideology deepened in society, they went beyond the 
idea of keeping the masses in unity behind the Kemalist modernisation project. 
Rather, especially in the 1990s, the Islamist ideology started to present a new version 
of modernity, representing an alternative to the system, rather than its continuation. 
This would be seen with the rise of the Welfare Party to power with its increasing 
electoral support and the Islamist alternative that it offered, capitalising on the 
Muslim identity of the state consolidated during the MP rule. 
THE WELFARE PARTY IN THE 19805 
As explained in the last section, the 1980 coup had a significant impact on the 
political representation of Islamist ideas and establishing the framework for the 
advent of the counter-elite under the MP rule. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - 
WP), was founded on 19 July 1983, but was not able to enter the 1983 elections. The 
party emphasised moral development and heavy industry, giving the signal that it 
was the continuation of the NOP and the NSP. 
The WP had the opportunity to enter the 1984 municipal elections but it 
received just 4.4 percent of all votes, with the support of 778,662 voters, thus 
decreasing its vote potential to half of what it had during the NSP time. The effort of 
Özal to incorporate the Islamists in his party and his success in doing so is an 
important factor contributing to this result. Nonetheless, the \VP won control of 17 
municipalities, including two provinces: Van and Urfa, in the east and south east of 
the country respectively. In the 1987 general elections, the WP received 7.16 percent 
of all votes but could not enter the parliament, as it couldn't pass the electoral 
I. 
' threshold of 10 percent. But the 1987 elections are important in showing the increase 
in the votes of the WP, which would ultimately lead to its success in the 1989 
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municipal elections. In the 1989 elections, the party won 9.8 percent of all votes, 
gaining municipal rule in Konya, Sivas, Sanhurfa, Van, Kahramanmara, city centres 
and 15 other towns. This success has been interpreted by many as the WP winning 
back the votes that it lent to the MP by that time. 8 It is interesting that the south- 
eastern region where ethnically Kurdish voters were the majority saw the higher 
voting rate for the WP. The reason for this could be explained in the changing 
political context of the country. The WP, being the only party that offered politics 
questioning the Republican ideology, and represented different identities other than 
the monolithic state ideology, got the votes of those with similar concerns. The 
Welfare Party in effect represented the only radical alternative to the system. 9 
THE 1991 ELECTIONS AND CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT 
The year 1991 is important for Turkish politics both because the elections held in the 
year resulted in the termination of the MP rule in the government and because it 
marked the beginning of a new international environment with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the disappearance of the communist threat. 
Table 5.5. Result of the 1991General Elections 
Total number of votes: 25 157 089 
Participation rate in the elections: 83.9 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of Votes 
Motherland Party 5 862 623 115 24.0 
Democratic Left Party 2 624 301 7 10.7 
True Path Party 6 600 726 178 27.0 
Social Democrat 
Populist Party 5 066 571 88 20.8 
Welfare Party 4 121 355 62 16.9 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204 
As expected the decreasing power of the MP was seen in the elections held 
on 20 October 1991.. Demirel's True Path Party (TPP) was the victor of the 
' elections. Since becoming the head of the party in 1987, after former party leaders 
Avon the right to return to politics, Demirel had been working on two strategies to 
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increase the support for the party. While the first strategy was designed to attack the 
MP's "economic policies' social dimensions, focusing on the economic hardships of 
`the other Turkey'50 the other strategy, in an attempt to appeal to `the first nation', 
focused the market liberalism and greater democracy. "51 Demirel had incorporated 
"new, young, dynamic forces into the party, including Tansu tiller, who had ties to 
urban and business elements" 52 before the elections and had been successful in 
having the party strategies heard in the society, as the election results show. The 
Social Democrat Populist Party of Inönü had rather a low rate of support mainly due 
to its election partner the Kurdish People's Labour Party (Hall-in Emek Partisi - 
PLP). As the PLP could not participate in the elections due to a lack of candidates in 
every province, they entered the elections in a coalition with SDPP, alienating the 
Turkish nationalist elements among the SDPP supporters. 
The WP entered the elections in a coalition with the nationalist forces. We 
can say that the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, with the election coalition of the WP and 
the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi -NAP) gained 16.9 percent of 
the votes. The WP entered the elections with a new strategy that emphasized a 
civilised, Western-looking, city-centred and freedom-seeker image in the country. 
On the way to becoming a mass party, it-was trying to change its image of rural 
based, petit-bourgeoisie party organisation. The desire of the WP to change "from 
being the party of the countryside and the `believers"' to being the "party of the 
masses" could be seen during this election campaign and the results. The Vice 
President Bahri Zengin said, "The %VP got locked around the community of the 
mosque, just like the NSP before it. Yet, there are communities other than the 
community of the mosque. It is necessary to open the WP to these communities. For 
this reason change was necessary". 53 
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The party programme was based on the slogan of a `Just Order' that would -; 
come with the rule of the WP. Despite different interpretations of this concept, it 
was not defined by the organizational cadres, making different understandings and 
manipulation of the term easier. The details of the `Just Order' proposed by the WP 
will be analysed in the next chapter. 
During the 1991 election campaign, the WP focused on the "man on the 
street", profiling the problems of the ordinary man and offering solutions for the 
daily life of the "oppressed" economically, politically and socially. 54 It based its 
election campaign on the theme of `the discontent with the system'. All the 
problems that were raised in the campaign emphasized a kind of oppression and 
exclusion. The party offered to bring up a `new order' that would liberate the 
oppressed and include the so called "excluded" with the Just Order discourse. 55 The 
WP tried to show that it understood the problems of the ordinary people and 
committed itself to a solution, without being "elitist". This was one of the important 
points that made the WP gain support of the masses, by showing that its leaders were 
one of them. 
Despite the implementation of the campaign and its success for the WP, 
winning 16.9 percent of the votes and increasing the number of the voters from 
1.717.425 in 1987 to 4.121.355 in 1991, there was a group in the WP which opposed 
change and the opening up of the party to the masses. While the group in favour of 
change was advocating the transformation of the WP into a mass party with 
minimum concessions from its Islamist character, the traditionalist group in the party 
was saying that any step for change and incorporation of `others' within the party 
would mean a deviation from the Party's pure Islamist character and therefore should 
be stopped. 56 This discussion would mark the beginning of the division in- the party 
between the `modernists' and the `traditionalists'. 
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- The government was formed between Demirel's TPP and Inönii's SDPP 
after the elections and the two parties stayed in power during 1991-1995. The 
Parliament structure is interesting to note here as both Muslim and Kurdish identities 
now had political representation in the system through the Welfare and the People's 
Labour parties57 respectively. The government started with a liberal programme 
"promising constitutional change and more academic freedom, freedom of the press, 
democratisation and respect for human rights". 58 However despite the intentions, 
only minor amendments could be made in the constitution due to lack of enough 
voting power of the two coalition parties. At the same period, the country was going 
through a phase in which the clashes between the PKK and the Turkish army had 
severely intensified and there was virtually a civil war in the south-east of the 
country. The sudden death of Özal in 1993 led to a change of leadership in the TPP, 
from Demirel to tiller as the former had replaced Özal in the Presidential office. 
Erdal Inönü at the same point after Özal's death announced that he would be 
resigning from politics, leaving his place to Murat Karayalcin, as the head of the 
SDPP. From 1993 onwards, the coalition continued under the new leadership in both 
parties. 
In July 1993 in Sivas, thirty seven individuals, who came to a festival in 
the city, among them many Alawite poets, intellectuals, and musicians, were burnt to 
death "mainly as a reaction to Aziz Nesin, a leading overtly atheist intellectual, who 
promised to translate Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses into Turkish". 59 As the hotel 
these intellectuals were staying was burning down, a large group was chanting and 
demonstrating outside with slogans for the Shari' a rule in the country. 60 These 
events once again showed that the polarisation in the country was increasing as the 
Islamists were involved in acts against the secularists and the Kurds (PKK) against 
the Turks. More important than the militant manifestation of these two events were 
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the representation of the strife deepening in the society as these identities started to 
pose a serious challenge to what had now become more difficult to maintain - the 
Kemalist modernisation project. 
The challenges to the modernisation project during the 1980s were already 
mentioned above. These challenges intensified during the 1990s. The businessmen 
- of Anatolia founded the Independent Businessmen and Industrialist Association 
(Müstakil Sanayici ve Jcadamlarz Dernegi - MÜSIAD) as against the TÜSIAD of 
Istanbul capitalists to represent their interests in the sector in 1991.61 In addition to 
the Islamist bourgeoisie, during the 1990s, there was an increasing group of Islamist 
intellectuals 62, academics, engineers and bureaucrats that were highly educated and 
were challenging the monopoly of the elite in the centre - the military bureaucracy - 
that still held the definition of the public space, the interpretation of rules and ways 
of conduct. What is more important here is the politicization of the demands of the 
"newcomers" against the unwillingness of the centre to change or to put it differently 
to share their monopoly with the rising groups, the counter-elite. 
As shown above, for decades, since the introduction of the multi-party 
politics, the demands of the periphery had been reflected in the centre right and left 
parties, mainly the DP, the JP and later the Motherland Party. The political parties of 
the centre were often seen as taming institutions for the demands of the periphery, 
working as integration tools and filter mechanisms. Politics carried out with 
"cultural identities" instead of the official identity was seen as unacceptable by the 
central political parties and these demands were excluded and were often seen as 
pathologic, unimportant demands of the periphery, in line with the dominant trend of 
the time. Thus the centrist parties were not able to adapt their policies to the changes 
in the role of the periphery - its coming to the centre and trying to take part in the 
centre and even to be the centre sometimes - and their legitimate increasing demand 
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for a redefinition of their role in the society. During the 1990s, by creating a 
powerful financial base, the "newcomers" were able to develop their own 
institutions, from media to business organisations, from bookshops and coffee 
houses, from their intellectuals to the political party. They even built up special 
living quarters for their members, where an Islamic life-style and ways of conduct 
were strictly followed. 63 Bugra names these new developments as a developing 
societal culture "providing its members with meaningful ways of life across the full 
range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and 
economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. " 
The Islamists were successful in gathering support through their 
organisations and in time developed strongholds in the society that helped to locate 
themselves firmly against the political centre, rejecting it with their own alternative 
organisations. The rise of the Welfare Party coincides with the period that the state 
ideology came under serious attack and the demands of the periphery were at their 
peak. The inability of the system to incorporate these new demands and the inability 
of the centre parties to overcome their closed rentier and clientalistic structures 
contributed greatly to the increasing votes of the WP. 
Especially from the early 1990s onwards, the WP started to use a discourse 
and organisation that aimed to create an alternative system to the existing one, 
bringing together a divergent group of interests and working through the parameters 
of change in the society. It had been successful in becoming the representative of all 
those groups that were rejected by the official ideology and those that could not be 
incorporated into the prevailing social and economic structure. The WP started to 
represent the `political identity' of all those groups that challenged the system by 
r 
virtue of their cultural identities, and presented their economic and social dethands 
through these identities. Despite its Islamist characteristics and discourse, the WP 
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did not homogenise different identities and demands in itself. Rather there was a 
conjectural unity of different cultures and identities, uniting under the banner of 
change and demand for inclusion in the beginning of the 1990s. Under the WP's 
umbrella different identities like Muslim, Kurdish, Anatolian, shantytown poor, 
shantytown moderates that demand incorporation, Anatolian merchants and 
businessmen that were excluded by the monopolist economic system and central 
lower middle classes came together. 65 In short, identities challenging the 
homogenous national culture and the official identity were represented under the 
WP, giving the party enough power to play an active political role in the country. 
1994 MUNICIPAL. ELECTIONS AND THE VICTORY OF WELFARE PARTY 
The 27 March 1994 municipal elections opened another new era in Turkish politics. 
They opened up the control of most governorates to the WP, putting the stamp of the 
party on national politics. It also initiated a period in which Islamic symbols were 
still more openly visible in the public sphere, starting the years of confrontation and 
tension between the secular and Islamist circles in the society. 
The TPP won the majority of the votes in the elections, with 21.4 percent 
of all the votes, followed by the MP of Mesut Yilmaz with 21 percent. The WP won 
19.1 percent of all votes, ranking third. The SDPP was the fourth party, with only 
13.6 percent of the votes. 66 During the TPP-SDPP coalition, the Republican People's 
Party was reopened, this time under the leadership of Deniz Baykal. Seeing that a 
merger between the SDPP and the RPP could potentially %vin more votes and could 
have increased their success in the municipal elections, these two parties decided to 
unite after the municipal elections. Under which party this merger should take place 
r 
was discussed for long time and constituted the main debate in the leftist spectrum of 
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the political scene. It ultimately happened under the RPP and Baykal became the 
leader of the new RPP on 9 September 1995. 
The main victor of the elections was the WP as it managed to hold the 
municipalities of 28 city centres, the most important of all being Istanbul and 
Ankara, as well as a total of 338 city and town local municipalities. The victory of 
the WP was a significant aspect of these elections. After this victory, there was a 
vast amount of literature trying to understand the reasons for their victory. Rather 
than seeing the changing structure in the society and the calls for change from 
different groups for a redefinition of the modernisation project and the centre as the 
cause, studies followed the classical fashion, mainly focusing on socio-economic 
factors, the lack of other alternatives and the falling power of the left - factors 
independent of the WP's discourse. 
Bringing most of the municipalities under their control, the WP was now 
able to make use of the opportunity to create jobs and take new actions to gain 
continuous support of their members. The municipal leaders were successful in 
bringing services to the population and removing most of the corruption in the 
system. Erbakan was saying that they were "writing a legend" in the municipalities 
by removing bribery, corruption and unnecessary spending, opening Imam-Hatip 
schools and despite all the debt they had inherited from the former rulers the 
municipal leaders had worked "with the love of God to raise a huge budget and 
invest with the money they raised". 67 $evki Yilmaz, the outspoken member of the 
WP was praising the victory in the municipalities saying that the first step on the way 
to power was taken. 68 The results of the 1995 general elections proved Yilmaz right 
as the party won enough votes to come to power in a coalition government. 
I 
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THE 1995 ELECTIONS - THE ROAD TO ERBAKAN'S PREMIERSHIP 
The result of the 24 December 1995 Parliamentary elections once again underlined 
the increasing popularity of the WP in Turkey. The party won 21.4 percent of the 
votes, getting 6,012,450 votes in number, increasing its number of seats in 
parliament from 62 in 1991 to 158 in 1995. 
Table 5.6. Result of the 1995 General Elections 
Total number of votes: 29 101 469 
Participation rate in the elections: 85.2 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of Votes 
Motherland Party 5 527 288 132 19.6 
Democratic Left P 4 118 025 76 14.6 
True Path Party 5 396 009 135 19.2 
Republican People's Party 3 011 076 49 10.7 
Welfare Party 6 012 450 158 21.4 
source: Jtattstical rearbooK of i urKey, . tote Institute of JYatisttcs, ! 9519, p. ZU4 
The result brought an enthusiastic reaction from the Islamist circles, 
although with some disappointment that they could not be the majority in the 
Parliament, chanting the victory as "Good News! Welfare is Coming" (Iffijdeler 
Olsun, Refah Geliyor! ). After the elections, government was formed between the 
Motherland Party of Mesut Yilmaz and the True Path Party of Tansu tiller. This 
government was short-lived mainly due to disagreement over the covering up of 
tiller's corruption allegations. The end of this government opened the way for a 
coalition government of tiller's True Path Party (TPP) with the WP and the long- 
waited premiership of Erbakan. 
THE WELFARE - TRUE PATH COALITION GOVERNMENT 
Despite leading campaign before the 24 December elections based on an anti-WP 
discourse, and claiming itself to be the guarantor of the Republic against rising 
political Islam (the WP), the Tute Path Party under tiller formed a coalition 
government with the WP within six months of the elections. The main motive that 
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brought the two parties together in a coalition could be seen in the desire of the TPP 
leader Tansu tiller to cast off the allegations against her and the interpellation by 
getting the support of WP and on the side of the WP the desire to come to power and 
rule the country - or at least start "the winds of change". 
To stay in power, there seemed to be no other way for the TPP leader to 
- start negotiations with the WP leader Erbakan. The two leaders were both sensitive 
to the issues of interpellations against them and seemed to find it relatively easy to 
stand together against the different corruption allegations in the Parliament. This 
factor led to the conclusion by some that the WP-TPP coalition "neither represented 
a democratic ideology nor a political tradition, but was rather an ordinary interest 
pursuit of the two party leaders. "69 The WP-TPP (referred here as the Welfare-Path) 
coalition was formed on 3 January 1996. The TPP leader made speeches 
emphasizing the harmony and common understanding in the government. tiller was 
saying, "it is told that working of two parties having different bases of support would 
be difficult. Parties with the same constituency would lead to harmful competition. I 
think we will be able to complement each other, find the right way and use the 
competition for service to our country". 70 
As soon as the government was formed, populist policies started to be 
implemented. One of the first policies was to increase the wages of state officials by 
50 percent. The increase reached 70 percent for the ranks of the military personnel, 
leading to some speculation that this was a policy of the government to silence the 
military opposition to the Islamist elements of the government. 
A more conservative discourse had taken over the political scene, affecting 
the TPP public speeches. The change in the discourse of the TPP leader tiller, who 
r 
used to represent the image of the `Republican Woman', was reflected in her 
speeches like: "Our aim is not only nationalism. It is to believe and to say one word. 
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We are coming from roots that take the flag and the prayer (ezan) as holy. This is 
our essence: we are believers and we are nationalists". 7' 
One of the main developments during the WP-TPP coalition was the 
attempt by the WP to increase its members in state positions by appointing its 
members as judges and state attorneys. The presence of Islamic dresses and the 
increase of the Islamic symbols in the public space led to some worries on the side of 
the military-bureaucratic elite. The WP opened debates that questioned the concepts 
of secularism and democracy in the public arena. Its attempts to increase the WP 
members in state positions, as mentioned above, the invitation of some religious 
order sheiks to the Prime Minister's residence for the evening meal during 
Ramadan, 72 its attempt to open the way for female state officials to wear headscarves 
at work, the often repeated project of building a mosque in the Taksim Square in 
Istanbul as a manifestation to complete the conquest of Istanbul, could all be seen as 
factors leading to criticisms against this party by the military-bureaucratic elite of the 
country. These issues were brought onto the agenda of the National Security Council 
by the military members of the Council and five points were cited as leading to 
particular concern among the military: the mosque in Taksim, the headscarf issue, 
special Ramadan working hours, the new regulations for collection of the sacrificed 
sheep leather73 and travelling to Hajj through land transfer. 
On the foreign policy scene, there were some important developments, as 
r 
well. As the Welfare-Path came to power, one of the first developments was on the 
partnership with Israel. In February 1996, the Turkish military had agreed on the 
basic terms of the agreement with their Israeli counterparts and the final agreement 
was signed in August 1996. Prior to coming to power, one of the milestones of the 
WP discourse rested on the termination of all relations with Israel and the description 
of this country as the mother of all the ills in the region and in Turkey. The old order 
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in Turkey was defined as a "Jewish order" and many of the leaders were shown as 
getting their orders from the `evil Israeli state' which `should be destroyed'. Now in 
power, military relations with Israel were becoming stronger and the largest 
agreement with this country in this field had been approved with the signature of 
Erbakan. Despite criticism from its constituency and harsh reactions from the Arab 
countries, Erbakan had approved the agreement. 
As a message to his constituency and to make up for the loss he suffered 
because of the agreement with Israel, Erbakan paid his first visit to Iran, followed 
some months later by visits to Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. These visits were referred 
to as a catastrophe for Turkish foreign policy and the Libya visit especially brought 
new worries to many. In Libya, Qaddafi said how disappointed he was with the 
Turkish state as it was now under the invasion of the US military bases; it had signed 
an agreement with the Israeli state and was not giving the Kurds their 
independence. 74 More interestingly, Qaddafi said that he was very glad that the WP 
had come to power; however, it would be wrong to expect the WP to fulfil what was 
in its programme immediately. In order to make the WP to come to power and 
accomplish its programme, every Turk must vote for the WP. Qaddafi also said that 
Erbakan was a member of an organisation called the International Muslim People's 
Command, of which Qaddafi was the commander. In spite of all these statements, 
which were considered as intervening into the domestic affairs of the country, 
Erbakan remained silent, leading to an uproar in the media, and to an interpellation 
against Erbakan in the Parliament. 
As in the Israeli agreement case, Erbakan continued to implement policies 
that were against his party discourse during his premiership. One of the important 
, examples of this was his signing of documents that would lead to the sacking of 
military personnel from theirs office due to their relations with the Islamist 
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organisations. The WP and the other National Opinion parties that preceded it had 
been calling for action against the military organization and schools and were 
showing their dissatisfaction with the prohibition of Imam-Hatip graduates from 
entering into these schools. They were also harshly criticising the sacking of 
personnel due to disciplinary reasons from its ranks, especially due to links to 
Islamist organisations. Sometimes the accusations implied the unbelief of military 
members and their intolerance for Muslims in their ranks. Despite such a discourse, 
Erbakan signed the documents that would lead to the expulsion from the army of the 
personnel against whom such allegations were made, with no opposition. Such 
actions led many to question what the WP could accomplish in line with its discourse 
while in power. 
However, the WP leader Erbakan was emphasizing how proud he was of 
their achievements in power. In a speech he made on the 13th anniversary of the 
formation of WP, Erbakan stated that: 
The National Opinion movement that we have initiated in 1969 has been successful after 
27 years of struggle. This struggle that started in Konya with the understanding of "When 
Right comes, all the evil is destroyed" has been successful with the help of Allah. On 26`4 
December 1996, our nation has made WP the biggest party. As soon as the WP came to 
power, it made all the members of the nation pleased by giving them 50 percent wage 
increase... From now on we will continue giving good news to our population everyday. 
We will stop unemployment and migration. Not a single hungry person will be left in 
Turkey. Thanks to Allah, our land is full of resources; we will make use of them in the 
most effective way. We are not the government of the rentier class; we are the 
government of the oppressed [... ]. We will be mobilised for service to our population and 
we will get their good prayers! 7 
Despite praising the accomplishments of his party, Erbakan was aware that 
there was growing discontent within the party regarding the actions of the 
government. In addition to the ideological controversy over differences between 
action and discourse, the party was becoming less able to keep together the 
economically disadvantaged segments seeking the change in the economic system 
immediately that would lead to some wealth distribution and the Anatolian 
businessmen that were increasing their wealth. In addition to that they were not able 
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to provide their supporters with a new platform to voice their demands for change 
and a redefinition of the Kemalist modernisation project. The WP promised for long 
years before coming to power that it would bring a new version of modernity, not 
only involving economic progress but also moral development. Now in power, it 
was not able to deliver on the promises. The party was not able to implement 
cultural or moral development, let alone a "just economic order" that it had been 
advocating. Despite the increase made in the salaries of the civil servants and 
officers, a radical change in the economic system for a distribution of income had not 
been carried out. This is understandable to some extent; firstly because the WP was 
a coalition partner, not in power alone to carry out any policies it wanted. However, 
even if the WP had the power to change the laws a radical change in the economy 
would have been difficult due to its own constituency. The country had to remain 
capitalist as it had already been incorporated into the world economy and a large 
group of supporters of the party, the Anatolian businesses, were an integral part of 
this integration. Although some points were criticised as to the controversy between 
action and theory in private meetings, open criticism of Erbakan's decisions and 
actions was impossible within the party mechanism. 
The difference between the discourse of the WP and its actions in power 
brought with it the question as to whether Erbakan and his party leaders were mainly 
power seekers and used the Just Order discourse to reach out to the segments of the 
society that were marginalized by the new capitalist development, without really 
believing in the discourse. The Just Order discourse worked in gaining the necessary 
support to come to power. But now, the party was faced with the reality of its 
supporters' needs and demands to redefine modernisation and change the system by 
r 
altering the place of the periphery in the definition of the economic system and the 
public space. The WP leadership tried to control these circles and compensate for 
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what it could not deliver by radicalising the discourse and openly attacking the 
Republican principles in the speeches and party meetings. While complying with the 
military's recommendations in the National Security Council, the party discourse 
was shifting towards a more radical tone, placing it as a counter-force to the 
Republican principles. As the debate about what modernisation meant for the WP 
was going on, Turkey was on the brink of drastic changes in its politics. Erbakan's 
pursuit of policies at odds with the Islamist discourse of his own party illustrates both 
the instrumentalism of political parties as well as the limitations to the public space 
within which they operated. The military still had the power to determine what 
parties elected to government could and could not do. 
THE 28TH FEBRUARY PROCESS 
The month of February of 1997 witnessed some important developments that would 
leave their stamp on the future of the country. The Jerusalem Night (Kudüs Gecesi) 
that was organised by the Sincan municipality of Ankara, under the posters of the 
leaders of Hizbullah and HAMAS, to which the Iranian Ambassador to Turkey had 
also been invited, served as a catalyst in the process already initiated. While the 
Iranian Ambassador Muhammed Riza Bagheri was calling for Shari'a rule in Turkey 
and saying that "we should not be afraid to be called as fundamentalists. The 
fundamentalists are the most intelligent, most civilised and most believing people", 
the governor from the WP was saying that they would "inject Shari'a on the 
secularists by force". 76 The governor, Bekir Yildiz, went on to say that the 
headscarves were their flag of honour. "We would fight for our beliefs, our flag that 
we are proud of. We have great patience. The entire world should know that our 
patience should not spill over. "77 
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Against such an-open challenge to the Republic, the reaction of the 
military was harsh as expected. As it had shown before, the military would not allow 
any forces in the country to threaten its own modernisation programme. Faced with 
the latest developments, the military saw that Islam was not playing the role that was 
assigned to it under the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Some military officials were 
reported in the newspapers as reflecting the general concern in the different ranks of 
the Armed Forces. "Turkey is being pushed towards disaster. But because of the 
political interests and calculations, nobody tries to stop this situation". 78 Military 
tanks were seen on the streets of Sincan on the morning of the 4th of February 1997, 
"on their way to the Operation arena". However, the statement of "we fixed the 
unbalanced democracy", suggested that this was not a coincidence. 79 
It was not only the military that was concerned about the developments, 
mainly caused by the WP part of the coalition government. Before the events of 
Sincan, and out of concern with the practices of the WP, a civil initiative, composed 
of the major syndicates, professional boards and artisans unions was formed mainly 
for the promotion of an "alternative in the Parliament against the developments 
targeting the major characteristics of the Republic". 80 This initiative also had the 
support of the President of Turkey and the President of the Parliament. The WP 
leadership reacted in a rather dismissive way towards the worries of these circles. 
Erbakan said that "the issue is not secularism; this is the worries of the people who 
want to use secularism as religion-hostility. These people are only a handful. And 
they have become fossils". 81 
The statements of Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the MP, in this context were 
striking. He said that the country was facing three main dangers: Firstly, political 
r 
corruption in the country had reached its peak; secondly, the principle of rule of law 
was being defied by the government, and thirdly the WP was posing a threat to the 
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establishment by its policy of filling state cadres with their members and by the 
radicalisation and militarization of the WP base. 82 The military leaders were also 
concerned as well due to the organisation of the WP base under the title of "private 
guard". Almost 50 thousand people were told to gather under this group and 
concerns grew over its resemblance to the pre-Revolution Iranian organisation. This 
group was organised by a group called "Sakarya Group", and was also responsible 
for the private guarding of Erbakan. 83 
The 28th February* 1997 National Security Council meeting, which was 
later named and known as the "post-modern coup" and its aftermath as the 28`h 
February Process (28 $ubat Süreci), met in the light of these developments. During 
the meeting, the military side demanded that some policies be immediately 
implemented against the increasing power of the WP and the spreading of 
"fundamentalist Islam". The policies included the increasing of compulsory 
education from 5 to 8 years, which would lead to the closure of the secondary school 
parts of the Imam-Hatip schools, and opening of the new ones under the control of 
the Ministry of Education, the closing down of the private Quran courses, the 
implementation of the dress code (prohibiting the wearing of headscarves for women 
and long beards and religious caps for men) with no exceptions. The government 
was `advised' as to necessary regulations to prevent the extremist religious groups 
from trying to divide the country along different religious sectarian lines. 84 The 
proposals led to harsh responses from the cadres of the WP. The WP 
Parliamentarian from $anliurfa, Ibrahim celik, stated; 
If you try to close down the Imam-Hatip schools under the WP rule, blood will be shed. I 
want blood to be shed too. Democracy will come by this way and everything in the 
country will be wonderful. The military has not managed to cope with 3500 PKK 
members, how will they manage the 6 million Islamists? If they pee against the wind, it 
will come to their face. I would l1it who hits me. I am an Islamist to the very . end, 
I want 
Shari'a law to come. 85 
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But such criticisms against the military "advice" did not change the result. 
Erbakan signed the proposals despite some postponement. By signing, he was acting 
against all the principles of his party and openly accepting the military's position on 
the issues. 
Since the WP had come to power in a coalition with the TPP, and Erbakan 
became the Prime Minister of the country, the military had been playing a more 
active role in the politics and using harsh words and criticisms against the elected 
government. By April, the Chief of Staff was announcing a change in the National 
Military and Strategic Concept. The threat perception of the military had been 
altered; now internal threat (Islamists) was the priority over the external threat. In 
the briefing held in the military headquarters, it was stated, "the divisive (PKK) and 
religious groups (WP), in unity, are trying to divide the Turkish Republic with their 
operations. This means the dissolving of the state. Under these circumstances 
internal threat precedes the external one and becomes a top priority". 86 This could be 
seen as the military trying to secure the continuation of the Kemalist modernisation 
project from a growing challenge to its continuation. 
There were some reactions to the National Security Council decisions and 
the increasing role of the military in the politics. On 11 May 1997, there was a big 
meeting in Istanbul that was organised by the Islamist circles, to protest against the 
decisions, especially those about the eight-year compulsory education and 
consequent closure of Imam-Hatip's Secondary schools and the wearing of the 
headscarf. "Long live Shari'a" and "Arms stretched out to the Quran will be broken" 
were the main slogans of the meeting. The presence of the WP Parliamentarians 
showed the party's support for the meeting. "Muslims are here, Where are the 
r 
Seculars? " was another chant. Secularists we're organising anti-Islamist meetings in 
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the meanwhile and after this meeting. 87 The tension in the political arena was 
strained more and more each day. 
The idea presented here is that the 28`h February event should be taken as 
the open manifestation of the conflict in politics. The clash of the Republican- 
secular ideology, now disguised under the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, and the Islamist 
ideology of the WP had taken place in the open, in the public space and the fight was 
over the occupation of the public space. The presence of people with Islamic dress 
and mode of conduct had been increasing significantly with the Welfare-Path in 
Universities, businesses, media and occupation associations. Now, however, the 
universities and public offices were declared as places where Islamic dress could not 
be worn. This should be seen from the perspective of the struggle over who defines 
public space and who defines identity. The clash of cultures and identities between 
the military-bureaucratic elite versus the Islamists is the significant feature of these 
developments. Thus it can also be defined as the attempt of the military to throw the 
alternative life-styles out of the system and to restore the state's monopoly of 
national culture with the support of the Kemalist civilians. In this sense it could be 
seen as the clash of cultures resulting from the clash between Kemalist and Islamist 
understandings of identity. 
APPEAL TO CONSTITUTIONAL COURT FOR THE CLOSURE OF THE WELFARE PARTY 
By May 1997, the state attorney opened a case for the closure of the WP based on the 
allegation that it had become the headquarters of action against secularism. The 
allegations were not only based on the practice of the party in power, but also on the 
past speeches that had been made by the members of the party in different occasions. 
There were cassettes circulating on TV channels containing . speeches of different 
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members of the party openly criticising the system and Kemalist principles and often 
calling for the implementation of the Shari'a. 88 
As the tension in society was growing, the dissatisfaction with the TPP 
leader tiller was increasing as well. The leadership of the TPP was already under 
attack from the liberal part of the party and the key names of the party were resigning 
one by one in protest against the policies and statements of the WP part of the 
coalition. tiller was saying that it was becoming more difficult for her to control the 
cadres of her party and was asking Erbakan to leave the Prime Ministry to her. She 
was asking for what Erbakan termed a "transfer in the air". According to this plan, 
by changing the roles of the two parties, making tiller the Prime Minister and 
Erbakan her Vice-minister, the relations with the military would be soothed and the 
tension in society normalised. It was difficult for Erbakan to accept that a change 
was necessary, as he was naturally unwilling to give up the position he had been 
waiting for so long. But tiller had started threatening to leave the coalition and there 
was no other chance but to accept her offer if he wished to continue the coalition 
government. The two parties agreed that Erbakan would resign from the Prime 
Ministership and they would go to the President with a petition showing that a 
coalition under tiller would be able to get enough support for a new government. 
They would ask President Demirel to transfer the Prime Ministership to the TPP. 
There was no doubt on the side of both parties that Demirel would give the 
Premiership and the duty of forming a government to the TPP. But the plans did not 
work. Considering the tension in the society, after Erbakan had resigned from the 
Prime Ministry and returned the duty of government forming to Demirel, he gave 
this duty to Mesut Yilmaz of the Motherland Party. All. the WP-TPP plans were 
- -spoiled and the dream of both ledders to stay in power until the year 2000 was 
terminated with the decision of the President. In less than a year the \VP government 
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was out of power, leaving behind signatures committing the government to eight- 
year compulsory education, expulsion of members of Islamist movements from the 
military, improved relations with Israel in addition to a radicalising discourse with 
statements full of attack on the Kemalist order and the Republic. 
Mesut Yilmaz formed a government with the DLP of Ecevit and the new 
Party called as Democratic Turkey Party (Demokratik Türki'ye Partisi - DTP) 
composed of a group of former TPP members who resigned in reaction to the 
coalition with Erbakan. The new government aimed to fulfil the recommendations of 
the National Security Council, but this proved difficult as the WP and the TPP 
continued to sabotage the government's policies. Early elections were announced for 
April 1999 and this remained a rather short-lived coalition, mainly founded against 
the Welfare-Path experience in power. 
The Constitutional Court closed the WP on 16 January 1998 and Erbakan 
was banned from politics for a period of 5 years. Even as the closure case was being 
opened against the party by the state attorney, another party called Virtue Party 
(Fazilet Partisi - VP) was being formed by the lawyer of Erbakan. In case the WP 
would be closed, the members would transfer to this party and thus the continuation 
of Islamist politics in the Parliament could be guaranteed. This was exactly what 
happened. 
THE VIRTUE PARTY YEARS 
After the WP closed down, all its members transferred to the Virtue Party (Fa filet 
Partisi - VP). Attempts were made to make the VP independent of the WP legacy, 
in order to keep it away from allegations for closure. However, the leadership of the 
newly founded'VP was given to Recai'Kutän, who was a close comrade of Erbakan 
and it was obvious and badly concealed that it was Erbakan who governed the party 
1. ), 
and took the decisions behind the scene. 89 The Virtue Party seemed to underline the 
issue of the headscarf as the main policy tool around which the discourse of the party 
would revolve. 
The VP tried to change its image and to present itself as the `bastion of 
democracy' in Turkey, in contrast to the Just Order discourse of the former WP. It 
designed a policy that included closer relations with the West and an implementation 
of a Western type democracy. It criticised the military-bureaucratic elite for not 
being `modern enough' and presented this lack of `modernness' on the side of the 
elite as the main threat to the system. The `intolerance' of the `ruling powers' 
towards individual liberties and any deviation from beyond Kemalist principles were 
criticised and were shown as the real threat to the country as opposed to the 
`imagined internal threat' - the new threat definition of the military strategic concept. 
Within this perspective, the VP built its policy on the expression of different 
identities and presented these within the discourse of Western democracy, individual 
liberties and basic rights. For this purpose, the headscarf issue was a great symbolic 
tool in the hands of the Party. Recai Kutan, the leader of the party, said in his party 
speech in Kayseri that: 
Some people, including some professors and rectors among them are saying that `We do 
not want the girls with headscarf to enter the university because we want to protect the 
Republic'. Everybody, even the birds, laugh at these statements. What kind of a 
Republic understanding is this that opposes in a person's belief, the society's culture, 
traditions? To this understanding of Republic, they call a Banana Republic. 90 
In the same meeting Vice President Abdullah Gill was saying: 
Those that are stealing from the state, that are corrupt, that are hand in hand with the 
mafia and gangs are today hiding under the secularism guise. Would they be able to sit in 
the most prestigious positions if justice and freedoms were complied with in this country, 
if the society was not deprived of its values and treated as second class in his own 
country? 91 
While the establishment was banning the use of headscarves in public 
offices and universities based on the argument that it was not used as a religious 
requirement but rather as a political tool and the symbols of the National Opinion, 
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the VP was presenting this merely as a religious issue and blaming the state for 
disrespect to religious obligations. Cemil Cicek described society as being stuck 
between the requirements of religion and the oppression of the state. "What will this 
society do now? Will he face the state for his religion or will he face the religion for 
his state? "92 A founding member of the VP, Nazli Ilicak, said: 
When VP comes to power, this oppression will be solved. This headscarf repression will 
be solved, how? Because the VP will bring by votes women wearing headscarves to the 
parliament. Because there will be MPs with headscarves. Let's see what they will say to 
this. Because there will be a minister with a headscarf. Wherever there is oppression, 
93 there is a political demand of this oppressed. 
Before the 18 April 1999 parliamentary elections, Merve Kavakci, who 
openly said that she would under no condition take her headscarf off, was put on the 
election list in a position from which she could be chosen to be a parliamentarian. 
The leaders of the VP repeatedly said that, if elected, Kavakci would come to the 
Parliament with her headscarf and would take the Parliamentary oath with her 
headscarf. This would lead to another conflict in the parliament between the centre 
powers and the Islamists. 
THE 1999 ELECTIONS AND BEYOND 
In the 1999 elections, the VP won less votes than it expected. The controversial 
policies in power, as well as the inability of the party to deliver economically and 
culturally, coupled with its reactionary radical discourse seemed to decrease the 
support for the VP. 
Table 5.7. Result of the 1999 General Elections 
Total number of votes used: 32 495 217 
Participation rate in the elections: 87.1 percent 
Number of Votes Number of Seats Percentage of Votes 
Motherland Party 4 122 929 96 12.69 
Democratic Left Party 6 919 670 136 21.29 
True Path Party 3 745 417 85 11.53- 
Republican Peo le's Party 2 716 094 - 8.36 
Virtue Party 4 805 381 ill 14.79 
Nationalist Action Party 5 606 583 129 17.25 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, State institute of Statistics, 1999, p. 204 
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The elections could be considered as a victory for the DLP, which had 
become the biggest party in power. The RPP was rather a disappointment as the 
party could not pass the electoral threshold and was left out of the Parliament. This 
came as a big surprise as the party had never been out of parliament in any elections 
that it participated in since its formation in 1923. Another surprise was the 
significant increase in the votes for the Nationalist Action Party, carrying the ultra- 
nationalist Grey Wolf legacy to power. The government was formed as a coalition 
between the DLP of Ecevit, the MP of Yilmaz and the NAP of Devlet Bahceli, who 
was elected the head of the party after the death of the founding leader of the 
nationalist movement Alparslan Türke§. Bülent Ecevit became the Prime Minister 
and this government is still in power as these lines were being written. 
Kavakri was elected to the Parliament and as expected her arrival to the 
Parliament with her headscarf on 1 May 1999 opened a new debate and a new open 
clash between the military-bureaucracy and the National Opinion group. The 
military-bureaucracy perceived the act as an attempt to "abolish the Republici94 and 
thought it to be the most dangerous Islamist manifestation in the history of the 
Republic, since this was carried on by a political party in the Parliament targeting 
"the brain of the state". 95 Kavakci's status as a parliamentarian was cancelled and 
her Turkish citizenship was terminated on the grounds that she was an American 
citizen, a fact she had kept secret from the state authorities. 
As the manifestations of the Islamist character of the Party was continuing 
with the headscarf issue, the party structure began to be criticized by its own 
members - the reformist group - for not being able to find a new image for itself in 
the political arena and for being very much under the influence of the Welfare Party 
experience. Some compared its condition to that of the later period of the Ottoman 
Empire, being subject to both internal and external attacks. 96 For many critics, the 
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party seemed to be two-headed, with the official leadership not being in full control 
of the party. It gave the image that it was Erbakan who ruled behind the curtains, an 
image reflected especially with the differences of opinion between Erbakan and the 
official administration. There was a widespread idea that the main priority of the 
party was to bring Erbakan back into politics via any means possible. Thus, this led 
to the questioning of the `Virtue' of the Party. 97 
The younger, reformist group in the party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
the former mayor of Istanbul, and Abdullah Gill started to challenge the old guard in 
an attempt to make the party more appealing for the masses and they even 
pronounced the need for a pro-system party. In the first congress of the Party, in 
May 2000, GUI challenged Kutan for the leadership of the party, representing the 
reformists against the traditionalists. However, Kutan by winning the support of 
Erbakan, managed to outbid the reformers and tried to consolidate his rule in the 
party. 
On May 1999, the State Prosecutor Vural Sava opened a case for the 
closure of the VP based on the grounds that it had become a centre of anti-secularist 
activities and that it was the continuation of the closed WP. As the internal 
opposition in the party was escalating with different statements from different 
groups, the constitutional court had found Sava correct in his first point but rejected 
the second one, and the party was closed on June 22,2001. After this date, the 
National Opinion was divided into two: while the reformists founded the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) under the leadership of Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, the traditionalists formed the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi) under 
Recai Kutan. 
p 
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SUMMARY 
During the period under consideration, economic liberalisation policies were 
implemented as a remedy for the failure of the developmentalist project of the state. 
These new policies broke down the structure built on the old state-led capitalist 
industrialisation and also the old capitalist elite. The changes in the economy, with 
the impact of globalisation as well, helped to intensify the challenges to the Kenialist 
modernisation project. The emergence of ethnic and religious identities, which had 
until now been subordinated to an imposed and supposedly monolithic national 
culture, made the continuation of the elite-defined version of modernisation more 
difficult. The state had to make concessions to the forces being unleashed at this 
stage in order to secure a continuation of that modernisation process. In an attempt 
to incorporate the new emerging groups, the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was 
introduced into the modernisation project. So, the Kemalist modernisation project 
had been reformulated by the military-bureaucracy, as composed of capitalist 
development (a free market economy), Turkish nationalism and secularism put into 
an Islamic cultural context. By showing that the modernisation project could be 
reformulated, the elite had opened the doors for demands that wanted further 
reformulations and changes to the modernisation project from Kurdish nationalists to 
feminists, from workers' rights groups to environmentalists. While the feminists and 
environmentalists remained rather weak voices in the collective action, the Kurdish 
groups and the Islamists played the major role in the process. 
The Turkish-Islamic synthesis was ultimately unable to integrate. the 
Islamists into the system as ordained by the military-bureaucratic elites. Especially 
from the 1990s onwards, new demands were raised challenging not only the formula 
of modernisation but the entire modernisation 
project. This was seen with the 
demands for a Just Order that undermined the progress of capitalist development and 
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the calls for reviving the religious community. By challenging the modernisation 
project, the Islamists showed that the society was not an harmonious, homogenous 
whole but a fragmented and contradictory set of interest groups and contradictory 
needs that could not be resolved in a corporatist or even a limited democratic 
framework. The military-bureaucratic elites could not "incorporate" the Islamists by 
reformulating the modernisation project, so they were left with the options of fully 
democratising the country and risking the overthrow of their version of modernity or 
suppressing the Islamist movement. The party closures signify that the military- 
bureaucratic elite had chosen to "suppress" Islamists for the sake of continuation of 
the modernisation project. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCOURSE OF THE NATIONAL OPINION PARTIES 
The aim of this chapter is to look at the discourse of the National Opinion Parties: the 
National Order Party, the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party and the Virtue 
Party (all of which were founded by Erbakan with the exception of the Virtue Party) 
and all of which claim to represent the continuation of the same ideology - the 
National Opinion (Milli Görüc). If we want to see, in line with the New Social 
Movements debate, whether the Islamist movements are responding to modernity, 
and if so, how they challenge the modernisation process, it is necessary to look at the 
discourse of the parties representing the Islamist movement. It is important to 
understand exactly how the Islamists see themselves as responding to modernity. 
The evidence so far presented has suggested that, at times, political parties 
have utilised Islamist discourse in an opportunistic manner, abandoning it when 
convenient or when the limitations on the public space have forced them to do so. 
However, the Islamist political parties have developed an identifiable discourse of 
their own which indicates their location and evolution within the wider grouping of 
Islamist movements. The nature of this discourse, and its challenges to Kemalist 
notions of modernisation, has been of fundamental importance, both in itself and as 
an ideological tool for opposition to the imposition of those ideas upon Turkish 
political society. By examining this discourse, this chapter serves a number of 
purposes. Firstly, it demonstrates the "Islamist" nature of these. political parties. 
P 
Secondly, it exposes the counter-elites' ciallenge to the Kemalist modernisation 
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project. Finally, it lays out the ideological premises which have been picked up by 
the opposition for use against the military-bureaucratic elites. 
THE NATIONAL ORDER PARTY 
As stated in the previous chapters, the formation of the NOP coincides with the 
growth- of class politics in the country and the party was seen as closely related with 
the interest representation of the petit-bourgeoisie, who were stuck between the 
competition of the big businesses and the workers' unions pressing for wage 
increases. When Erbakan was elected as the president of the Turkish Union of 
Boards, representing the small businesses in 1969, he was met with a reaction from 
the Boards of Istanbul and Izmir, where the big businesses had the upper hand. 
Against this reaction, Erbakan was removed from the position that he was elected to 
by the Justice Party regime at the time and his candidacy for entering the Parliament 
from this party's list had been vetoed instantly. As a result of these developments, 
Erbakan entered the 1969 elections as an independent from Konya and he was 
elected to the Parliament with an independent status. These developments further 
strengthened his position among the small businesses and helped him to gather their 
support under the new party that he would soon form: The National Order Party. 
The National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi - NOP), founded on 26 
January 1970, defined itself in the party programme, as a forward-looking 
ideological party. The NOP progranune starts by stating that the aim of the party 
was "to bring the strong morality and virtue that is in the nature of our great nation 
into practice and to bring order, peace, justice, happiness and salvation to the 
population". ' Developing "a real science that is purified from foreign imitation, that 
is creative and constructive, in addition to the moral development that we adhere to"2 
became one of the main objectives of the founding members. The NOP proposed in 
p 
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its programme to build up "a civilization that will be a model for the world and will 
bring welfare and happiness and shed a light to humanity within a democratic order, 
without harming the national and moral values" thus, everybody was invited "to 
work for this great aim". 3 The aim of creating an Islamic state is not openly written 
in the programme as this would be against the constitution and the Law of Political 
Parties and would have led to the immediate closure of the party. Instead of an 
Islamic state, the NOP called people to gather around the `holy aim of forming a 
great civilisation', with this civilisation being formulated according to Islamic 
premises. 
In order to form this "great civilisation", education was given a major 
importance and national struggle in the cultural field was proposed, "until the 
country is no longer underdeveloped and the society is an example to all humanity in 
every aspect". 4 
According to the NOP programme, Turkey's domestic problems could be 
divided into two. The first problem was in the economy: the dependence of the 
Turkish economy on foreign markets and capital and the low income per person with 
an unjust distribution of wealth. The second problem was what the NOP had been 
distinctively emphasising in its programme: the moral sphere. In an attempt to 
develop the moral sphere, the main group targeted by the NOP was the youth and 
"the necessity of the youth to be educated according to the national values"5 was put 
forward as a priority. According to the party programme, the Turkish educational 
system could not train the Turkish youth in line with the national targets but was 
rather based on a rejection of `great Turkish history' that left the `hearts of the youth' 
without any belief. The NOP leaders thought that such an environment increased the 
activities of the cultural imperialists for moral invasion. Marxism, cosmopolitanism 
and all foreign ideologies were seen as expanding their influence in Turkey due to 
236 
these wrong policies implemented for decades 6. - Thus, it was noted that the NOP 
considered it a duty, as much as national independence, to fight the moral invasion. 
HAK VERSUS BATIL 
Within the National Order Party programme, as well as in the following `national 
opinion' parties, the world that we live in was portrayed as a constant fight of the 
Hak (the absolute right, right under all conditions) and Batil (absolute wrong, wrong 
under all conditions). While batil represented the rights based on concepts of power, 
majority, privilege and interest, hak represented all the rights that were given by the 
God to all humans equally. National Opinion Parties claimed that they represent the 
absolute truth (hak) in the society, while all other parties and groups represent the 
absolute wrong (batz ). All other parties and the people who supported `others' 
represented `the wrong', as well as having an `imitating mentality'. Therefore, all 
other parties had to be closed down for the implementation of the National Opinion, 
`the absolute right', initially in Turkey and later in the world. 
In January 1971, Erbakan referring to the fight between hak and batil in 
the country located this struggle in the moral sphere. He said that `the batil front' 
composed of 72 parties and `the hak front' was only defended by the National Order 
Party. Fighting against the National Order Party in this morality struggle was thus 
named as becoming "a Jewish soldier". 7 Thus, every believer was invited to side with 
the NOP against such evil - the `others'. 
The appeal of the NOP to the petty-bourgeoisie could be seen in the party 
programme. Within the economic principles of the party, its opposition against the 
concentration of capital in the hands of the few was underlined, while more state 
support and help for the "industrialists" of provincial towns and the periphery (tacra) 
was regarded as a priority. The party's opposition against the "socialist and 
communist philosophy" and the materialist-capitalist ideas is underlined. The party 
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saw the nation as composed of spiritual and national values, encouraging honest 
work and earning and respecting ownership rights. The economic understanding of 
the party is noted to go beyond the socialist model of the Eastern Bloc and the `free- 
ride capitalism' of the West, resting on both the material and the spiritual 
development of the individual. Thus, it was the only way that could take the 
humanity forward. The spiritual order was seen as the guarantor of a mixed 
economy and all mixed economy policies that did not rest on a spiritual basis and 
support were rejected! The NOP demanded a scattered and decentralised private 
sector in different cities of Anatolia, the channelling of investments to 
underdeveloped regions, abolition of exploitative interest system, changing of the tax 
system that "exploited the poor and favoured the rich". Erbakan held speeches that 
stressed the importance of the interests of the petit bourgeoisie: 
"Economic mechanisms work for the interests of the big city merchants 
and the merchants of Anatolia know themselves as a step-son. The bulk of the 
import quotas are shared by the merchants of the three - four cities and these people 
also control the Union of Boards". "All the money in the Banks are invested by 
people of Anatolia but this money is given as credits to the merchants of the big 
cities". "It has been understood in short time that Union of Boards is working as a 
tool of the truly comprador mason minority. " " This minority does not want the 
Anatolian merchants to improve their positions and develop. They would always 
want to control. "9 These are some of the statements of Erbakan regarding this issue. 
From these statements it is apparent that the NOP appealed to the small 
businesses of Anatolia; however, it would not be enough to explain the formation of 
NOP only with economic reasons. If it got the support of the whole petit- 
r 
bourgeoisie, it would have been more influential in terms of the political 
representation. It must also be kept in mind that it is the continuation of the anti- 
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Western, anti-secular reaction to the modernisation period in the Republic, with 
reference to the "good old days" - the glorification of the past. 
One of the manifestations of these glorifications of the good old days can 
be seen during the speeches of some prominent members of the Party during its 
formation stage. The first congress of the Party opened with slogans of "God is 
Great" (Allahüekber) and in an attempt to show the links of the party with the past, 
the leader Erbakan said, "Why would I hide the truth? The real builders of the party 
are Sultan Fatih, Sultan Yildinm, Sultan Murat, Ulubatli Hasan, Sultan Yavuz, 
Orhan Gazi, Kilic Arslan and Sultan Hamit". 10 All these figures represent important 
heroic figures in Turkish and Ottoman history. In a speech in Ankara city congress 
the vice chair of the party Hasan Aksay said that the main difference of the National 
Order from the other parties was that they were not searching for a salvation in 
Moscow, China or Paris but in the 1000 years of road of belief (hak yolu). 11 
In another speech, Erbakan was told that National Order was the name of 
the movement that would mobilise the believers in the country to get rid of the 
`sicknesses of communism and masonry' in the country. The party was named as 
belonging to those that smelled of roses and heaven. 12 
The reaction against the Republican reforms and the Kemalist 
modernisation project, especially against secularism and policies liberating women, 
was reflected in the speeches as the reforms were seen as infringing the morality of 
the population. Aksay said, "since the Turkish women started going out naked into 
the streets, this soil that is watered with the blood of the martyrs is cracking with 
shame. " 13 
Not only the Kemalist reforms but also the cadres that carried on the 
r 
Tanzimat reforms and the War of Independence were attacked as being Masons and ' 
Jews working against the real interests of the country. Erbakan had openly attacked 
239 
the first traits of the national resistance movement resembling it first to the despotic 
rule of Abdulhamit and later the foreign invasion. He said in Diyarbakir in June 
1978 that 
Masons had built up their headquarters in Thessalonica (where the CUP had been 
founded) and had converted some of the Ottoman officers to their cause, making them 
Masons. They had overthrown Sultan Abdulhamit from the throne; leading to the 
collapse of the Muslim Empire and by this way had transferred the rule of the world from 
the Muslims to the Jews. The National Order is the road to a thousand years of belief and 
the road to the right, after fifty years of darkness... We are going to make everybody 
know about the National Order in the country and we will not do this for our interests but 
for the consent of Allah and worship. The people who pray are the oppressed and the 
exploited in this country. '4 Parenthesis are mine. 
The NOP played an important role in the life of Islamist opposition in 
Turkey. Before the formation of the party, the Islamist opposition was represented in 
the opposition parties of the centre and with the anti-westernisation discourse that it 
propagated; it remained a marginal force that was countered by the class based 
arguments of the peripheral opposition. 's The NOP was to some extent successful in 
building up a political party that brought together the political preferences and 
religio-cultural identity of Muslims. In the beginning of the 1970s, the NOP 
managed to separate "Islamist politics" from those of the Centre-Right parties and 
gave it a real place in the political spectrum of the country. 
The military intervention of March 1971, carried out with a memorandum 
sent to the government had been followed by the closure of the NOP by the order of 
the Constitutional Court on 20 May 1971. The court decided that the NOP was 
against the basic principles of the Republic, especially those based on secularism. 
The NOP had called into question the Kemalist modernisation project and advocated 
the creation. of a new system based on Islamist principles that was against, the 
constitution. In addition to the above-mentioned speeches of different members of 
the party, the publications by the party organs at the time were also shown as a proof 
by the court that the party was against secularist principles. Erbakan's ideas written 
in these publications suggested sentiments like "there could be a lot of benefits from 
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implementing the caliphate back into the system, including political benefits. I am 
not insisting that it should come, however, if the population want, everything is 
possible [... ]. "16 In another publication called Islam ve Him, Erbakan writes, "There 
could be no source of truth except that of Islam. " 17 Against secularism, the leader of 
the NOP noted that "the statement of religion and state are the same things and they 
could not be united is wrong and misleading. This is not right. Religion and state 
work together and go hand in hand. It is not possible to separate them. "18 
The party was closed in May 1971. During this period when the NOP was 
founded and operated in politics, the modernisation project in Turkey consisted of 
state-led capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and secularism in a Westernisation 
framework. Regarding state-led capitalist industrialisation, the NOP, in a drive to 
place itself in the increasing class politics of the time, proposed a mixed economy 
that would protect the interests of the petit-bourgeoisie. It underlined the necessity 
for reform in the economic system that would provide favourable conditions for 
Anatolian businesses. However, it did not challenge the capitalist industrialisation 
per se. The main challenge of the NOP to the modernisation project was formed 
against the secularism and Westernisation pillars. `A civilisation based on Islam' 
was proposed as the main alternative to replace the `alien and imported project of 
modernisation'. 
THE NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY 
As the NOP was closed down, another party, the National Salvation Party (Milli 
Selamet Partisi - NSP) that became a continuation of the NOP ideology was formed 
on 11 October 1972. Despite being the continuation of the NOP, the leaders had 
been more careful about their discourse and speeches especially in the beginning. In 
order to avoid another closure, Erbakan did not become a founding member of the 
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party. Erbakan's close friend Süleyman Arif Emre became the leader of the party. 
The party entered the 1973 elections under his leadership. Erbakan took over after 
the elections of 1973. 
Emre in the First Party Congress underlined that the political parties in 
Turkey brought ideological conflicts into the core of the political debate and within 
this context he emphasized the ideological nature of the party. According to Emre, 
there were three main opinions in the Turkish political life: the Republican People's 
Party represented the "leftist opinion", the Justice Party represented the "liberal 
opinion", and the NSP represented the "national opinion" (milli göri4). 19 According 
to this view, ideas other than the national opinion were materialist: for RPP, 
everything was material, for the Justice party, everything was money, while for NSP 
everything was morality. The RPP and the JP represented the two infidel ideologies, 
so "they will collapse one day and the Islamist `national opinion' of the NSP will be 
dominant"? ° 
To the question of what the essence of the `national opinion' was, Emre 
stated that 
Our Constitution provides every individual the right to develop himself both materially 
and spiritually. Our party accepts the pursuit of both material and spiritual development 
in a balanced manner. We think that the leftist and the liberal ideas only seek material 
development and neglect spiritual development and morality in the society. This is a 
wrong approach because the basis of material development lies in the spiritual 
development [... ]. We believe that the legal order have to be complemented and 
supported by a moral order. A moral order is the basis and guarantor of a democratic 
regime. [... ] A regime can survive only with support of its believers. Thus, this support 
could be secured by spiritual and mental education of the individuals". Z' 
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The main aim of `national opinion' was announced as building up material 
and spiritual development and the main way to attain such a development required 
educating the individuals in this direction. In the party programme and publications 
five main targets were put forward by the `national opinion'. These were: `Internal 
Peace', `State-Nation Unification', `Great Turkey Once Again Ideal', `Spiritual 
Development' and `Material Development'. 22 
In an environment where the ideological clashes that were continuing in 
the country sometimes turned into terrorist acts, the principle of maintaining `internal 
peace' was proposed and the need for tolerance towards other ideas was emphasised. 
The main route for increased tolerance and harmony in society was, again, to go 
through education in the moral sphere. The state-society unification constituted 
another aspect of national opinion. The elitist approach of the military-bureaucratic 
elite was criticised and the necessity of the state officials to respect the nation and its 
values was noted. According to the `national opinion', the Turkish nation had been 
the `most honourable nation' (en yerefli millet) during the course of history and at the 
present situation; it still carried the spiritual and material potential to form a 
civilization that would be an example for the whole of humanity. The Turkish nation 
was noted as having been the basis of civilisation in the past, contributing to the 
development of Western technology and development. The NSP adhered to building 
up such a civilisation, reviving what it had achieved before. The NSP's leaders 
thought that Turks lost their civilization-building mission with the defeats that they 
faced in the military wars. As they lost territories, the trauma increased, the central 
forces had been pushed aside and with every reform and new policies their freedoms 
had been restrained. "Therefore, the fight of those who take the holy scripts as their 
reference point is a fight for freedom, after this freedom is achieved a civilisational 
drive will come". 23 `Great Turkey' will be formed once again with such a 
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civilisational drive. The importance of the spiritual development is already 
mentioned above; it was seen as constituting the core of all other developments in the 
society. Building up material development was also thought to depend on spiritual 
development. 
The NSP was formed and operated at a time when the modernisation 
project continued to comprise of state-led capitalist industrialisation, nation-state and 
secularism in a Westernisation framework. The NSP as distinct from the NOP 
formulated a more sophisticated approach in analysing the problems of the country - 
that of modernisation - and offering solutions in line with the party ideology. 
The first point to be emphasized here is related to the state-led capitalist 
industrialisation pillar of the modernisation project. In a parallel fashion to the 
state's industrialisation drive carried under the ISI policies, the NSP programme 
focused on industrialisation as well, but more on heavy industry. Within the party 
discourse, immediate industrialisation of the country was seen as a matter of life or 
death. The main target was identified as being to make Turkey the strongest 
industrial country in the world, heavy industrialisation being the slogan of the party. 
The NSP's economic ideology, just like that of the NOP, was dependent on the idea 
that the backwardness of the Turkish economy was because of its dependence on 
Western economies and capitalism. Turkey should use its own resources to develop 
its economy, rather than being dependent on Western capitalism. The party members 
announced that developing the economy to the level of the industrialised countries 
was the main aim and the national sources would be used to facilitate such 
industrialisation. This approach was welcomed and supported especially by the 
small tradesmen and producers that were on the stage of becoming capitalists. It 
could be noted that just like the 19th century ideologies of development, the NSP saw 
244 
industrialisation as the main target, yet, refused the cultural forms that have 
accompanied such economic development. 24 
Within the economic order proposed by the NSP, national, strong, fast and 
decentralised industrialisation was seen as necessary to go beyond the developed 
countries' economic achievements. Within this perspective, the driving force behind 
the development of Anatolia would not be the `happy minority' (mutlu a inlik) of the 
country - the Istanbul bourgeoisie - as the liberals would propose, nor the state as 
the leftists would propose but "regional development companies" of the national 
opinion. 25 According to the party programme, regionally organised industrial zones 
were to be built by the state all over the country as a necessity for the economic 
development. The party proposed to isolate foreign economic relations that were 
seen as harmful and exploitative. Relations with the European Economic 
Community, the so-called Common Market agreement, was seen as harmful and a 
continuation of Western imperialism since the Ottoman Empire was maintained by 
"some Zionist powers in the country to increase their wealth by keeping Turkey 
dependent and exploited by the foreign powers". 26 Turkey's real interests were seen 
as resting in cooperation with the Muslim countries and the Common Market was 
seen as a necessity that should be founded with the Muslim countries, to which 
Turkey had historical and cultural connections. 
In line with the NOP discourse, a second point to be emphasized in the 
NSP discourse is the moral development and the opposition to secularism and 
Westernisation in the country. The NSP increasingly demanded an Islamist order. 
As a continuation of the NOP, the party put itself within an antagonistic position 
against the Republican reforms and secular principles. $evket Kazan, the vice 
president of the Party, openly said that the maih aim of NSP was to "install the rule 
of Allah" in the country. 
2J5 
There are laws that are implemented in every aspect of life. Unfortunately, today, in 
family, trading life, criminal issues, in national and state jurisdiction, there is no room for 
the Quran. What is implemented in these areas is Turkish Civil Law. Where does it 
come from? From Switzerland. Trading Law? From Germany. Criminal Law? From 
Italy. The Constitution comes from French and German constitutions. We have many 
problems in our country and these (imported laws) are the reason for this. To say that 
religion cannot interfere in politics is to say that the rule of Allah cannot govern and His 
words would not be followed. The group called the National Salvation exists in this 
country to terminate the Jewish and Christian hegemony under which our motherland is 
suffering for 55 years and to make the law of Allah rule in these territories. "'' 
Paranthesis are mine 
In a similar fashion, on 12 June 1979 Erbakan told in Izmir, 
NSP is proposing that the weekend holiday should be on Fridays. The RPP and the JP are 
saying `no' to this proposal. They have left the holy Fridays behind and made the 
Sundays of the infidels a" holiday. We are proposing that the marriages should be 
conducted by the muftis. We are saying `Let's put Quran courses to schools'. Why do 
the books of the schools of this country not start with the name of Allah? 's 
The members of the NSP also used the opportunity of Hajj to propagate 
their ideas. For example Erbakan in a speech held during his hajj service in Mecca in 
November 1979 commented on how the Turkish state should be governed and gave 
the formulate to achieve this - through jihad. 
Allah has sent his prophet with Quran to all the bats! (the absolute wrong) religions to 
dominate over all humanity, to terminate them and to make the word of Quran govern... 
There are many rules in the Quran that belong to the life of the individual, family life, 
morality, work life, state order. If these rules are followed, we say that the Quran 
governs. If these rules are not followed for the sake of some individuals, then we cannot 
say that the Quran governs. Do the people that govern us rule according to the Quran? 
We have to test this... What we see is that people who govern us rule according to laws 
that are taken from France, Germany, and Switzerland [... ]. We have deserted the Quran 
some fifty years ago [... ]. The Jews and Christians have worked to separate us from the 
Islamic life ... To make the word of 
Quran rule again is the duty for all of us. Every 
Muslim must work to make this possible. How will we make Quran rule? By Jihad! As 
Quran tells Jihad is a prayer. Jihad is the struggle to make Islam govern [... ] and it is the 
duty of every Muslim. To make Islam govern is our duty and we will make it by law. 
This is possible by entering the Parliament. Because of that, the National Salvation group 
operates under party organization. 29 
As seen from the quotation from above, Erbakan believed that changing 
the Constitution was the way for establishing the `rule of Allah' in the country. In 
order to change the Constitution, a majority in the Parliament was seen necessary. 
That was shown as the reason why they were working under a party mechanism. 
According to Erbakan, the NSP had to become the governing Party in the Parliament 
in order to reinstall the Islamist rule, from which the Republican rule was deviating 
rapidly. "Two years later there will be a new election and after that the Salvation 
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Party will form a new government. With the formation of that new government, 
Turkey will embrace Islamic life". 30 
However, these elections were not held as the military intervened into 
politics on 12 September 1980. The NSP was closed after the coup. During its 
period in politics, the party challenged the modernisation project, especially its 
secularism and Westernisation aspects. It proposed to bring an alternative order to 
the existing one based on Islamist rule, therefore standing in sharp contrast with the 
modernisation project. 
THE WELFARE PARTY 
The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi - WP), was founded in 19 July 1983, but could not 
enter the 1983 elections. The Welfare Party represented the continuation of the NOP 
and the NSP ideology. The principles of the `national opinion' were reflected in the 
party programme. This time, different from the former parties, the WP started to 
advocate the formation of a new order, the `Just Order' (Adil Diizen). Details of the 
`Just Order' will be presented below. Firstly, the continuing elements of the 
`national opinion' will be mentioned. 
Through its discourse, the Welfare Party openly challenged the Republican 
system and the existing order in the country by naming it the "order of oppression" 
(zulüm düzeni) because the ruling elite had been plunged into the Westernisation 
process. For that reason they were seen as having an "imitating mentality" (taklitci 
zihniyet) which prevented the development of creativity and the motivation needed 
for the reconstruction of "Great Turkey Once again"(Yeniden Büyük Tiürkiye). 31 
Within this argument, all political actors, except. for the \'VP, were regarded 
as "a handful of a happy minority" (bir avuc mutlu azinlik) who were corrupt, 
unaccountable, unresponsive, incompetent and selfish. The WP proposed that, in 
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reality there were only two alternatives for the population: the WP (or in general the 
National Opinion) or the "imitating others". Erbakan said that "in the political scene 
now, all the other parties are the same. The Motherland Party, the Republican 
People's Party and the True Path Party are all equal to each other. They are all 
imitators; they are all imitators of Western interest-based order. They are like one 
- single party". 32 The only other alternative to these `imitators' was shown to be WP. 
Those who did not want the WP to come to power were labelled as either the rentier 
class or the ones who oppressed the population in the name of a secular Republic - 
the two components of this imitating mind. 33 
The WP continued to regard the Quran as an order of life. The WP 
Parliamentarian from Bitlis, Zeki Ergezen, said that "the Quran came to the world to 
be implemented into all spheres of life. Will I believe in my Allah that has created 
me or in Demirel or Erdal Inönü? They are all infidels. Of course I will believe in 
Allah. Whatever he says is true". 34 Thus, the only possible way for the 
implementation of the rule of God and the development of the country through a 
possible `state-society unification' was seen to be under the rule of the WP. The real 
challenge for such a unification and the rule of Allah was seen as the presence of a 
culturally alienated bureaucratic-military elite and the solution was the replacement 
of this elite with the cadres of the WP, which would be in harmony with the culture 
and religion of the society. "Cultural unification of the state and society" was the 
main policy for the realisation of the Just Order. 
The members of the WP presented themselves as seeking power not for 
their own interests but for morally superior purposes: the mission of rescuing Turkey. 
The members of the WP often stated that the Party "goes beyond the right and the 
r 
left, representing the centre, the true history, cultiue, spiritual and moral values of the 
society"35 that once "brought salvation and felicity to the people". 36 The cadres of 
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the party are pious and since only those that surrender to Allah could be a just ruler, 
they qualify for running the state in a just manner. Because they fear the judgement 
of Allah, what they offer to the public would be solely an `honest' government, when 
they would come to power. 37 
Internal Peace, which had been an important component of the National 
Opinion, was also reflected in the speeches of the members of the party. As different 
from the ideological clashes and emphasis on tolerance for different ideas in the 
society, the WP focused on the Kurdish issue as a part of the internal peace 
discourse. The WP offered a solution to the escalating Kurdish terror in the south 
east of the country and the clashes between the Turkish military and the PKK 
members by taking Islam as the common point of both groups. Against the 
nationalist discourses Islam was brought as a uniting principle and the main 
component of the society. Istanbul Municipal leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a 
speech that "if you say, `How happy is a person who says he is a Turk' (a famous 
statement of Mustafa Kemal), the other person will come and say how happy is a 
person who is a Kurd [... ] In front of God, we will be questioned as what is your 
religion, what is your book and who is your leader. Not as to what is your ethnic 
group". 38 Other members of the party repeated in their speeches that they were 
ashamed of being named as Turk or Kurd. Sevki Yilmaz, a prominent and outspoken 
member of the party, said that "Allah does not need Turkishness; happy to be a Turk 
is a wrong sentence". 39 
The WP tried to show that the "new order" that it proposed to create was 
an alternative to the modernization process that the Turkish state had been pursuing 
since its inception. By the 1990s, it started to widely advocate its new formula to 
r 
replace the modernisation process: the Just Order. 
I 
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THE JUST ORDER 
The term `Just Order' or `Just Economic Order' started to be used by the Welfare 
Party after its formation. Seeing the decreasing economic power of the masses, on 
its way to becoming a mass party, the WP announced its remedy package for the ills 
of the society. As noted above, as early as 1969, the idea that moral and cultural 
development of the individual constituted the basis of economic development was 
laid down. "In societies where the individual element is strong, because these people 
will comply with justice and truth, they will work for the benefit of the society at 
large. By complying with the wishes of Allah by themselves, these people will 
create a model moral order that will form the basis of the economic order that will 
shed light on the world. i4o By the beginning of the 1990s, the name of that 
economic order was given: `Just Order'. The new economic order had significant 
differences when compared with the heavy industrialisation drive proposed by the 
previous parties of national opinion. It can be said that in response to the export 
oriented development strategy and the flexible production patterns, announced after 
1980, the party needed a new economic strategy to address the population. The 
appeal of the heavy industry drive lost its importance, in such an environment and it 
was now the Just Economic Order that the party proposed to implement. 
Considering the income disparities in the society at the time, especially reflected in 
the lavish life-styles of the jet-society composed mainly of the newly rich, and the 
eroding income of the salary/wage earners and the agricultural sectors, the term `Just 
order', implying a just distribution of income and wealth appealed to many segments 
in society. 
According to the leaders of the WP, the Turkish economy had been 
suffering from many illnesses: poverty, famine, unemployment, bribery, inequality of 
opportunity, the exploitation, subordination, injustices, inflation and depravity. " 
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- "We have to analyse the reasons for the illness to find the cure"42. The illnesses were 
noted to be caused by five microbes: 1) interest, 2) an unfair taxation system, 3) 
printing money by the state leading to the increase in prices and decrease in money 
value, 4)foreign exchange, 5) credit. 
These are microbes that we cannot see with our eyes that are eating the country from 
inside. The corrupt rulers of the country are using unseeable ways to exploit the society. 
The system is corrupt. It does not matter if an individual is putting his money in the bank 
on interest. It is bad too, but the main microbe is the interest that the country has to pay 
for money it had borrowed from the Zionist banks of the United States of America [... J 
You see the name of IMF in the newspapers. IMF is a reference institution. It doesn't 
have money. There is Zionism in the world and there are Jews. These Jews live in the 
US and control the money of the world. They are lending their money to the world under 
the state guarantee of the US and living on the interest of the money they lend. They are 
giving money to the whole world and controlling whom to give, under what conditions, 
when to get it back. They have formed an institution to make these decisions. What they 
call IMF is this Zionist, interest-based institution. It is owned by Zionist Bankers. " 
According to the WP discourse, the existing system in Turkey which, in 
the words of Erbakan, depended on the Zionist system, was currently run by making 
60 million people work as slaves and taking back from them whatever they earned to 
be distributed to the Israelis, collaborator companies, tourist hotels and swimming 
pools which were crucial for the material and spiritual destruction of the national 
pride and morals. 44 Thus, this existing system was termed a `Slavery Order' (köle 
düzeni). The cure for this `slavery order' was the implementation of the Just Order. 
The Just Order was represented as a `perfect order' where there would be equal 
opportunity for everybody, profit would be encouraged for the running of the 
economy but special interests would not serve as a tool for exploitation. The Just 
Economic Order allowed a market economy but it did not allow the creation of any 
monopolies. That was why it was `the perfect order', based on the principle of 
absolute right (hak). 
The necessity of implementing the Just Order not only stemmed from the 
need to make the country free of `Zionist exploitation' but also rested on the 
approach of the WP to human beings and assumptions about the nature of humans. 
According to Erbakan, human beings by nature only want to consume but not to 
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produce. "This stems from their creation. Human beings are created to live in 
heaven, where they will only consume and not produce. Human beings are sent to 
earth for a temporary period to be tested and because of their nature stated above; 
they contradict this world's conditions. For human beings of this nature, we have to 
build up the Just Order" as 
As the human beings do not want to produce by instinct, a mechanism had 
to be built to secure the production of goods. Everybody would produce in this 
system and there would not be any exploitation. In the Just Economic Order, there 
would be a balance between production and consumption. This balance would be 
maintained by restricting the right to consume according to one's contribution to 
economic production. Individuals would be able to consume as much as they 
produce, and not more. Therefore the gap between "the productive capacity of man 
and his unlimited wishes to consume" would be solved. 46 Erbaltan defined `money' 
as a document that showed how much an individual had produced and how much he 
could consume. Because this was a contract, in the `Just Order', money equalled 
goods. The amount of goods for sale equalled the amount of money in the pocket of 
the person. By this way, interest would be stopped. As there would only be goods 
that were produced in the society, and the right to consume it would be given to those 
who produced it, there would not be any surplus to be distributed to those who did 
not produce it. Therefore, there would not be any interest gains. In such a system, 
there would also be no money printing, based on political motives, without 
production. The amount of goods would equate to the amount of money. So. there 
was to be no printing of money for political motives which was seen as the main 
cause of inflation in the society by the WP members. This would lift another burden 
r 
from the shoulders of the masses. Credits would be provided for people who would' 
like to start a business within this proposed system. However, it would be interest 
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free, based on the principle of selem credit. According to this principle, the person 
will be given the necessary amount of money against the promise of a future delivery 
of goods when they are produced. The creditor will thus keep the difference of the 
value of the goods at the time of their delivery and the initial amount of money 
provided. Founding a state bank was proposed for this purpose of giving credits. 
Such a bank based on selem credit would pave the way for interest-free banking as 
all other banks seeing the activities of the proposed state bank would have to provide 
credits without interest. 
In the Just Economic Order, there would not be any taxation either. 
Although Erbakan said that those who owned eighty cows would give two of them, 
those who owned 160 sheep had to give four of them and others who owned different 
things had to give two and a half percent of their possessions to the state, this was not 
identified as taxing. As can be understood from the calculation of one fortieth of the 
wealth to be given away, this is the calculation for the amount of zakat that is given 
according to Islamist principles. This is defined as the right of the state for the 
service it would provide, rather than a tax. 
In the Just Economic Order, a minimum role is given to the state in 
economy. The state would not make macro plans or factories but it would encourage 
the private initiative to make factories. Decreasing the number of state officials was 
noted as a priority in the party programme; there would be a small number of state 
officials, who would encourage private initiatives in some projects. Only two main 
roles were designed for the state. One would be an organising duty, whereby the 
state would act to provide non-profit organisations for the people, in services like the 
storage of produced wheat. The second duty of the state would be the provision of 
basic, services like hospitals, roads, schools, electricity and d6pendable warehouse 
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officials, accountants and transporters: The state would provide twenty-four services 
of this kind for the society. 
It can be seen from the explanation above that the Just Order is mainly 
designed for an economy that produces for the internal market and the production is 
mainly agricultural goods and small crafts. The state is prepared to provide 
warehouses to store goods, especially those of agricultural goods. The service sector 
is not taken into account within this system, and foreign investments and foreign 
capital are disregarded. The'integration with the global markets and the free flow of 
capital seem to be highly neglected within this understanding. As money would only 
be the form on which the total amount of production of the individual for the market 
is written, how this would be dealt with in the international financial markets, and 
how the problem of convertibility would be solved are unclear in the programme. 
Because the system that is proposed would be highly self-sufficient, it seems that the 
WP leaders have neglected foreign economic relations as well. 
It is interesting to see that Erbakan's Just Order remained rather 
unchallenged in the party at this period despite the contradictions that it posed for the 
interests of the rising Anatolian businesses that were integrated into the global 
economy and at the same time were one of the main constituencies of the party. 
How Erbakan continued his power in the party despite such a significant controversy 
is interesting to see. In addition to the absolute power of Erbakan in the party and his 
charismatic leadership in managing to keep different elements in unity, the external 
threat, that of the military-bureaucracy, had been important. Feeling threatened by 
the military-bureaucracy and the Kemalist establishment that could close the party 
that was openly basing itself on Islamist principles, the necessity of unity was 
emphasized and the Just Order had remained unchallenged. Only soma weak voices 
were heard from the Islamist writers criticising the programme from opposite angles. 
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While one group told that the programme was not Islamist enough, but was rather 
based on modern economic ideology, others have emphasized that the Just Order in 
general was based on "mere fantasies", impossible to implement in the current 
Turkish economy. 47 This second group proposed that instead of Just Order, what had 
to be brought about was the implementation of a protestant ethic to Üzal's policies 
that encouraged consumerism. 48 Both lines of criticism remained rather marginal 
and Erbakan with his new project of the Just Economic Order continued 
unchallenged in the party. 
The aim of the WP's leaders was not only to bring the Just Economic 
Order, but to build up a Just Political Order as well. Regarding the Just Political 
Order, there was no analysis put in formulas as in the economic part, but some issues 
were emphasized in the speeches of the leaders from time to another. The widely 
discussed issue of the Just Political Order is the "right to choose laws". It takes this 
idea from the Medina Contract that was implemented under the time of the Prophet. 
Erbakan said regarding this: 
We want the understanding of `you have to live according to what I believe' abolished. 
There must be a multiple law system and the citizen should choose under which law 
system they would like to live. This is what happened in our history. There have been 
different belief systems in our history. Everybody had lived according to their belief and 
everybody was peaceful. Why should I be obliged to do what someone else believes? 
The right to choose law is an indispensable part of the right to belief. 49 
One of the prominent names of the party, Oguzhan Asiltilrk, argued that 
the proposed system of `multiple law systems' was much more developed and better 
than secularism. 
We will tell people, "do you believe in this particular rule, do you agree in its 
implementation, all of you agree and this is what you believe? Then you can practice this 
among yourselves. " The order that we are proposing is better than democracy - in 
democracies it is the majority that decides the rules. If you are not a part of the majority 
then your preferences are not taken into account. While in our order, everybody will 
practice what he or she believes and what he or she wants. 
5° 
According to the WP members, this model of multiple law systems 
represented the utmost level of freedom, human rights and democracy. A multiple 
law system was proposed to work in society, where people would be able to live 
255 
according to their belief and be bound by the laws of this belief. Under such a 
system since everybody would be subject to some religious law, which were again 
predestined, there would be no need for any legislation except for some limited 
communal issues. What would be the communal issues and which issues would be 
regarded as out of the religious sphere were all subject to different interpretations. 
While the WP is presenting this idea as the project of utmost freedom, it is 
important to see that this project is taking away all the features of the unitary state, 
dividing the society according to the belief systems, challenging the national 
development project of the Republic in its essence. Bringing the concept of 
secularism under attack, the WP proposes the anti-thesis of secularism. The 
existence of religion in every aspect of state and society and division of the nation 
according to belief systems constitute the core of this approach. The economic 
development was challenged by an alternative economic order - the Just Order. 
Now the Republican principle and secularism were challenged with the Just Political 
Order. 
Looking at the Just Order project in general, the issue of democracy seem 
to be highly questionable in the minds of the leaders of the party. Both claims about 
the nature of human beings and the idea about existence of the absolute truth, bring 
to mind the questions about the understanding of democracy in the National Opinion 
cadres. The approaches to humans as predestined beings, whose future is already 
determined and who are in this world only to be tested for a period of time, contrasts 
sharply with the underlying philosophy of democracy that foresees the individuals' 
rights and capabilities to determine their future. As put forward by the concepts of 
Hak and Batil, the existence of an absolute truth that is given by God, also 
contradicts democracy. If there are true laws that exist in society, there will be no 
need for decision making by the people in the system. What is needed will be a 
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group of people who have the command of the absolute truth and the masses that will 
be governed according to these set rules. 
Democracy seems to have been a tool for the WP and its predecessors, to 
come to power. This was openly admitted by Erbakan in his statements. "We should 
never forget that democracy is a tool. It is not an aim. Our aim is the formation of 
the `Order of Happiness' (Saadet Nizami). Otherwise, you under democracy would 
choose this and the other would choose that and the order that is formed after the 
elections will be the `Order of Oppression'; then there is no meaning in voters and 
elections". 51 The WP's Parliamentarian from Kayseri, $ükrü Karatepe said that 
"There is a huge difference between the order that we will bring and that of 
secularism and democracy. While our order is located at the peaks of mountains, 
secularism and democracy are down in the bottom of deep valleys". 52 
Having formulated the Just Order project, the demand of the WP to 
become a mass party became manifest. This could be seen in the party propaganda 
campaigns for 1991 elections. The WP having been successful in introducing the 
project, got most of its support from the big cities especially after the 1991 elections. 
Within the party, change was taking place "from being the party of the countryside 
and the `believers"' to being the "party of the masses". 
During the 1991 election campaign, the WP had used a strategy of not 
focusing on the leadership as the other parties had done but rather focused on the 
"man on the street", profiling his problems and offering solutions for the daily life of 
the "oppressed", economically, politically and socially. 53 The WP tried to show that 
it understood the problems of the ordinary people and committed itself for a solution, 
without being "elitist". The success of the party in the 1991 elections is an indication 
that the message the party gave was re6eived positively by the voters and the Just 
Order discourse was thus approved. 
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The challenge of the WP to the modernisation project's economic pillar 
came from the Just Economic Order; the challenge to the political system came from 
the Just Political Order. The challenge to the cultural sphere was also strong. 
Statements like "Republic is not a virtue, it is made of mud ... 29 October (the date 
of the formation of the republic) is not a festival to be celebrated, it is the day of 
oppression for the Muslims", "Do not follow the road of the Satans of Thessalonica" 
(the birth place of Mustafa Kemal) were often repeated by the members of the party. 
54 
Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, another outspoken member of the party, was 
warning his audience in a speech not to forget the date of 3 March 1924 in the 
Parliament in Ulus, Ankara. It was the date of the abolition of the Caliphate when 
"all the population was devastated. Ezan was destroyed; we were destroyed. I am 
trying to grow up and live with the spirit of 3 March 1924. My Allah, you are 
capable of taking revenges. Make me your official to take your revenge. We were 
devastated by the Parliament and we will revive from the Parliament. We will start 
with conquering Istanbul". 55 
In addition to these developments, what the MVP wanted to achieve was to 
gain the monopoly on the definition of what Islamic morality and Islamic principles 
meant. In this respect Erbakan's assertion that "those who do not give their 
allegiance to me must look for another religion" could be read as an attempt to 
homogenize and take full control of the constituency as well as the broad 
movement. 56 It is interesting to see that most of the time the definition of what Islam 
meant was coupled by the calls for money and help for the WP. Turkey was seen in 
a state of cultural war and the WP was presented as the army against the alien, 
r 
Western cultural traits. Erbakan said that 
If you do not serve the WP, none of your worship will be accepted. There is no other way 
of being Muslim then serving the WP. There is no other salvation. Welfare is the army. 
You have to work with all means to help this army to grow. If you do not, then you 
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belong to a potato religion, not to Islam. This party is an Islamist jihad army. You 
cannot by yourself make jihad. You have to belong to some headquarters [... ] Are you 
Muslim, then you have to belong to this army. You cannot be a Muslim without giving 
money to this jihad. The level of Muslimness of a person is weighed according to the 
money he gives to jihad. A Muslim would not give his zekat to a poor. He will give it to 
the headquarters of jihad. We are Muslim. We will go to those who want to make Quran 
sovereign. We are all obliged to be apart of the Welfare, because we make jihad. Those 
that work dearly for the Welfare go to paradise. Why? Because the Welfare means to 
work for sovereignty of the order of Qum. 07 
$evki Yilmaz, one of the prominent and outspoken members of the WP, 
made similar comments before he was elected as the municipal leader of Rize: 
You have built up a Quran course, you made dormitories, you are educating pupils, 
helping with their finances. These are not jihad. These are good acts. Jihad is the 
struggle for power to make the rule of Allah the law in the country... Jihad is made with 
an army. The leader is determined [... ] Today, if a Muslim has 100 liras, he will spare 30 
lira for building up of Quranic courses and spare 60 lira to the political institutions that 
will come to power... The question that Allah will ask you will be `why didn't you work 
for the establishment of an Islamist rule, in an order of unbelief. '[... ] In this country, even 
the Jewish Abraham has understood that the symbol of religion is the Welfare. [... ] Our 
duty is not to talk but to operate the plan as a soldier in this condition of war. 58 
To the question of `is Turkey dar-ul harb or dar- ul Islam? ', the members 
of the WP answer that Turkey is dar-ul irtidat. It was dar ul Islam but it rejected that 
in time with Kemalist reforms and turned away from it. The population was Muslim 
but the administration was not. So, it was dar-ul irtidat. "You will follow Islam for 
centuries and then you will reject it and prefer West and Rome to Allah. There is no 
sin that is worse then this. In this country making jihad until the country turns to 
dar-ul Islam is compulsory. Everybody should work with utmost effort to get rid of 
this sin of the sins". 59 
With its discourse and its cadres, the WP presented an alternative to the 
system as a whole. It challenged the Kemalist modernisation project in its entirety, 
in the capitalist development, nationalism, secularism and Westernisation pillars 
together. This was also stated in the speeches of the members of the Party. The 
WP's minister of Justice was openly saying, "The WP is a party that changes the 
order. WP is not an alternative to the Motherland, the TPP or the RPP. The WP is " 
an alternative to the whole order. Because of that, WP is on the one side and all the 
other parties are on the other". 60 
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Ironically, the project of the WP, as a whole, is not very different from that 
of the Republican elite in the 1920s, what the WP rejects completely. Replacement 
of the current cadres of the centre - the military-bureaucratic elite - with the cadres 
of the `national opinion' and the installation of new ideas to the population from 
above to pursue, in line with the Islamic premises, seem to be the underlining 
principles of the WP. It resembles the social engineering of the Republican regime, 
in a different parameter. In that sense some analysts have written that the VIP project 
carried a "Republican character and is no different from the mentality it criticises". 61 
Despite all the efforts to show an anti-elitist approach, the party discourse rests on 
the assumption that the people don't know what is good for them and they have to be 
guided. The cadres of the VIP see themselves as the true representatives of society. 
The replacement of the present political class with the members of the WP will solve 
all the ills of the Republic. 62 Thus, the solution is mainly a cultural - moral one that 
offers the rule by the best or the virtuous men. This virtue in turn is defined by 
religiosity - Islam. 
63 
The Islamist discourse of the National Opinion seemed to have evolved in 
response to the military-bureaucracy's efforts to redefine modernisation after the 
1980 coup. The military-bureaucracy had brought the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in 
an attempt to revamp the modernisation project, in an Islamist framework. However, 
this was not enough for the WP. It tried to bring a wholly reconceived 
modernisation. No capitalist development, no nationalism, no secularism but Islam 
and the Just Economic Order, the community of believers, and a society divided 
according to the belief systems were proposed to replace the current system. 
Erbakan had been presenting an economic system that rejected the capitalist 
development, while most of the new supporters had already been working within the 
global market economy. Thus, what modernisation would mean and how the party 
a 
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would adjust itself to the global developments became an important debate within the 
party. Since the implementation of the Just Order as a new strategy, the division had 
started within the party between those who wanted to become a part of the globalised 
economy and keep the Islamist values as a part of the system and those that rejected 
the modernisation in its entirety and wanted Islam as the new parameter of the 
system. Although the debate about modernisation continued, intensifying the 
division in the party, it remained of secondary importance to the goal of coming to 
power in unity. The WP has been successful in presenting an alternative system that 
gathered the newly emerging identities under a cultural framework - Islam. 
However, it implemented a totalitarian strategy of the replacement of the current 
cadres with that of the National Opinion as the basic policy. 
However, after coming to power, the WP was unsuccessful in pursuing the 
policies that it advocated. The details of this were presented in the previous chapter. 
As the WP increasingly pressed its challenges against the system, the system itself 
became more polarised. The military-bureaucracy and the Islamist counter-e1ite 
competed to define and control the public space. 
After the WP was closed, the members of the party transferred to the 
Virtue Party, which emphasized more of democracy, human rights and a pro-Western 
approach. 
THE VIRTUE PARTY 
With the formation of the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi - VP), the discourse of the 
national opinion parties changed to a significant extent. The critique of the militarv- 
bureaucracy intensified as they were seen to have been behind the closure of the WP. 
11 
Instead of an anti-Western discourse, the party stood as the bastion of democracy, 
blaming the established institutions and military-bureaucracy for not being 
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`democratic' and `modern' enough. Analysing the situation in the country, the VP 
members focused on this point. 
There is no reaction to the empowerment of the Virtue Party from the population at large. 
The population is supporting us and showing their support in the elections. But there are 
groups in Turkey that could not accept the democracy in the country and that is the 
civilian and military elites. That is the main strain in society now. They are is also the 
reason for inflation and even for terror. If you put restraints over the population's 
opinions, views, belief and values to be represented and create a system along the 
opinions of a small bureaucratic minority, then there will be problems there. [... ] This is 
what is happening in Turkey today. 64 
Recai Kutan, the leader of the party, criticised the current system and the 
principle of secularism as understood by the military-bureaucracy. 
Turkey is not a secular country. There are practices that are carried out under the name of 
secularism but it is all fake. Our understanding of secularism is that everybody will be 
free in their own belief. Nobody will pressurize anyone else about his belief. Those who 
want will believe and those that don't will not. This is what we understand from 
secularism. Secularism in Turkey is not in line with the universal understanding of 
secularism. Bring us the understanding of secularism in the Anglo-Saxon world and we 
will accept it with full support. We want two things to be materialised in the Parliament 
today: All different opinions in Turkey must be represented in the Parliament and political 
6s stability must be attained 
The criticisms of the `Islamist intellectuals' increased towards the political 
system within these lines as well. The criticism was generally concentrated on the 
`undemocratic' nature of the system in Turkey. All Bulac, one of the prominent 
names of the `Islamist intellectuals', has been writing that one of the major problems 
in Turkey was `limitations' over the right to belief and the right to practise belief. 
"It is the small minority with `imitating mentality' that hold power centres 
r 
in their hands and they try to impose their will and interests onto the whole of 
society. This is costing both a material and moral loss for the rest". 66 Bulac says that 
"Turkey is in a vicious circle of oppression and undemocratic practices that is linked 
to the threat perceptions of this small minority... Because this `minority' perceive 
the peripheral forces as a threat to the internal security of the country, anti- 
democratic practices made for the sake of preserving the democracy are mostly seen 
as a legitimate tool". 67 He wrote a commonly referred to statement: "'we are a 
democratic country that preserves its democracy with anti-democratic rules". 68 
According to Bulac, the conservative and the religious urban merchants and 
262 
businessmen as well as millions of poor and unemployed people that live in the 
shantytowns were not represented in the political system and were more and more 
excluded from the system. As they were not represented and pushed aside as internal 
threats by the centre, political, economic and social crisis was escalating. 69 
In line with this argument, another Islamist writer, Omit Karda., wrote that 
the political system and the way things were formulated in Turkey were problematic 
and coupled with vicious circles. 
There seems to be a dominance of bureaucracy, which has an ideological mission 
(Kemalism), and has an elitist attitude, with the belief that the population is not mature or 
educated enough to decide for him or herself. This is the main problem as it is blocking 
the way for the party leaders to bring the demands of the population forward in their 
policies. 70 
Bureaucracy was seen as blocking the democratic participation of the 
peripheral forces and politics was seen as a rent distribution mechanism for the 
supporters of various parties. Thus, making `real politics' and proposing solutions to 
the problems was seen as becoming secondary to rent making. "This vicious circle is 
surrounding all the mechanisms of state and a solution to this problem should be the 
core of politics in the country today". 71 
Erbakan made speeches about the undemocratic nature of the state as well. 
In an interview that he gave to journalists, he named the current state of affairs in 
Turkey as being based on a "horror tale". He emphasized that a `horror story' was 
built up regarding what would happen if the Islamists (the National Opinion) came to 
power. According to Erbakan, some small but powerful group in Turkey based their 
policies on this `horror' and tried to manipulate the system for their interest by using 
this argument. Erbakan linked the closure of his party and his political ban to this 
`horror tale'. 72 He emphasized that there was no need to be afraid of the members of 
his parties if they came to power. Erbakan argued that this"was firstly because they 
had been on the political scene of Turkey for more than 30 years and had been tried 
well in politics in the past. They were basing their policies on the rights of 
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democracy and human rights and they wanted a close relationship with the Vest. 
They demand a democracy in the Western style. Being `afraid of them' was against 
science and rationality according to Erbakan. There must be a clear and present 
danger to be afraid of something. They had not interfered in anybody's life-style or 
dress until that date, so it was against rationality to be afraid of the Welfare. `A Just 
Peace' has been proposed by Erbakan which will offer a peaceful environment to 
everybody. This order of Peace would provide the same opportunities to those who 
wear the headscarf as well as those who do not. In this order, the parents would be 
free to give their children the kind of education that they would want. Erbakan was 
proposing an `order of peace' that is based on equity and justice. 73 Thus, in the post- 
28 February political environment, Erbakan was proposing a `Just Peace' to be added 
to the packages of "Just Orders" offered before by the MVP. 
In addition to emphasis on democracy and secularism despite having 
previously always been against introducing Western values and norms, Erbaltan now 
appeared to be advocating pro-Western policies. He argued that his party's ideology 
still focused on national values but within the context of universal standards on 
democracy and human rights. He wanted to see the introduction of these 
predominantly Western values into Turkey. " Democracy in Western standards first 
of all meant a decreased role for the military in the country. Erbakan saw the 28`h 
February and the role of the military as the main reason for the limitations on the 
National Opinion in Turkey; therefore, the decreased role of the military was a 
necessity for their survival. He argued that the military was being misinformed 
about the National Opinion members and that was why they were against them. '] 
In line with this new argument, Erbakan altered his policies from support 
for thb `Great Turkey Again' to advocating a 'Turkey to live in' or 'liveable: Turkey' 
(yacanacak Ttlrki), e). He was saying that it was impossible to build up the Great 
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Turkey once again, before making the country liveable with human rights and basic 
freedoms guaranteed. Before securing freedoms and providing an environment of 
free speech and right to live `according to belief, it was impossible to create a `great 
country'. To the question of `despite being in politics for three decades Erbakan did 
not focus on these points as a priority before and what has changed now', he gave the 
answer that it was only in the last three years that intervention to basic freedoms and 
rights and unlawfulness in the working of the system had been resorted to. 76 He said 
that Turkey came to such a point that even if a party had received 80 percent of the 
votes, if the `small minority that holds the power centres in Turkey' did not approve 
the results, it would mean nothing. 77 That was why at this moment the necessity of a 
`livable Turkey' became more important. 
Within the party, there was growing tension between the reformers and the 
traditionalists. Despite the changes in the party discourse emphasizing freedom of 
speech and democracy, these principles were not implemented in the party. The 
continuing rule of Erbakan, on the party, even though behind the curtains, seemed to 
prevent a new vision and new policy in the party. Attempts of the Party 
administration to avoid any kind of conflict, for the sake of overcoming the double- 
headedness and maintaining the unity of the party, to the point that there would be 
almost no discussion and debate, seemed to decrease the hope invested in this new 
party mechanism. Thus, the criticisms led to the resignation of some key names 
from the administrative council of the Party, such as Abdullah Gill. Gill said that, "It 
cannot go like this. It is not possible for the party to be governed like this. We need 
to be stronger, accurate and hope giving. The problems of the country force us to do 
this. "78 Cemil cicek also focused on the same problems: "This party looks like it 
el 
had caught an AIDS- virus. It cannot provide an alternative project at the moment. 
We have to overcome this, we have to make this party a party. "'9 
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As the debate was continuing, the Constitutional Court decided to close 
down the VP on the 22 "d of June 2001 on the grounds that the VP was the 
continuation of the WP. After that date, the members of the former VP split into 
two. While Recai Kutan and the group known as the `traditionalists' founded the 
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi - HP), the reformist group gathered under Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul, and founded the Party of Justice and 
Development (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi - PJD). This division stemmed from the 
internal debate over what modernisation meant for the party, which had been going 
on for the last several years between these two sides. While the Kutan group 
continued to represent the National Opinion ideology and declared themselves as the 
heir of the Virtue Party, the PJD decided to follow a different path. Rather than a 
confrontational discourse and politics against the system and against the military- 
bureaucracy, Erdogan announced that they would neither be taking Islam into the 
party politics, nor basing their politics on Islam. Implementation of the Shari `a and 
building up of an Islamist state were defined as `impossible' considering the new 
dynamics of the society that had been integrated with the world. 80 Defining himself 
as a `globalist conservative' 8' Erdogan underlined the necessity of integrating with 
the global markets and the international system, saying that his party would refrain 
from a confrontational politics against the established institutions and the military- 
bureaucratic elite. The PJD declared that they would work within the system for the 
benefit of the whole population. The secular, democratic, unitary nature of the 
Turkish state is emphasized and `not ideological platforms but the platform of 
modem democratic values' are shown as the ground on which the party would carry 
out its political activities. 82 
1 
Economic issues are given an important place in the party programme and 
the market economy and privatisation are shown as the main components of the 
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economic understanding of the party. The structural changes brought by 
globalisation are underlined and the necessity to increase competitiveness in the 
economy is shown as the basic road to cope with new changes in the global 
economic system. Foreign investment and foreign capital are seen as significant 
components that would contribute to the economic development especially with the 
information technologies and the experience the foreign investment would bring into 
the country. 83 
Despite being formed recently and the charges of corruption targeted at its 
leader, Erdogan, the PJD became popular in a short time. The appeal of the party for 
the traditional segments and the liberal economic approach bring to mind the politics 
of the Motherland Party under Özal and its reflections in the present date within the 
PJD. The coupling of export oriented growth and a conservative-moral approach - 
an authentic version of modernity - seem to be the direction that the PJD is leading 
to. 
By rejecting the `Just Order' both in its economic system and the multiple 
law systems, on which the Felicity Party is still advocating, Erdogan aims to appeal 
to a larger constituency and become a centre party advocating liberal economy and 
conservative values and morality at the same time. Getting the support of the 
Islamist intellectuals and the Islamist bourgeoisie, the PJD will play an important 
role in the future of the country. 
The `new image' that the PJD members are presenting is seen by many as 
a disguise to get votes and come to power. Despite refraining from confrontation, 
the PJD challenges the value system and the elite of the country. In June 2002, in a 
TV discussion program in CNN Türk, the leaders of the PJD gathered in answering 
the questions of some journalists in a long discussion programme. One of the most 
striking statements of the party members was regarding the issue of the headscarf. 
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They were insisting that the military-bureaucracy "did not have the right to tell 
people what to do, what to wear, how to behave" and the question they asked was, 
"who are these people that try to dictate us what we should wear? Where do they get 
their power, as it is not from the population that wants freedoms and liberal 
environment? " This approach shows that confrontational politics between the 
Islamist circles - both the moderates and the traditionalists - and the military- 
bureaucratic elite will continue to be a feature of Turkish politics in the coming 
decades. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, I have tried to examine the reasons for the growth of Islamist 
movements, and to develop an approach through which Islamic revivalism could be 
understood. I proposed that Islamist movements could best be understood as 
responses to imposed versions of modernisation in the Middle East. 
I found that none of the three conventionally alternative approaches - 
socio-economic, political and cultural - was alone adequate to explain the growth of 
Islamist movements. By analysing Islamic revivalism as a response to modernity 
implemented by secular, modernising elites, all these three approaches are brought 
together in an anti-reductionist fashion. 
The case study of this thesis was Turkey. The Islamist political parties in 
Turkey have been analysed as the most visible and (as argued throughout the thesis) 
most important manifestation of the Islamist movements' response to the 
modernisation project implemented by the military-bureaucracy in that country. 
Mustafa Kemal and his fellow reformers embarked upon a modernisation project that 
represented a continuation of the Tanaimat reforms implemented in the Ottoman 
Empire from the mid-10' century. A state-led capitalist industrialisation plan was 
put into effect to facilitate development, and private businesses were also encouraged 
to provide capital accumulation that could be used in the development of the country. 
The sultanate and the caliphate were abolished and replaced with a secular 
republican structure. Secularism constituted one of the main aspectp of the 
1' 
modernisation project that defined the national culture of the country. The role of 
Islam was defined as being confined to the private sphere. Islamist movements 
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emerged as a response to this modernisation project, challenging its components. The 
Islamist political parties have played an important role in Turkish politics since the 
1970s, and especially after the 1980s and the introduction of the Turkish-Islamic 
synthesis into the elites' modernisation project. In the 1990s their popularity carried 
them to power. They regard themselves as the true representatives of the people and 
promise to `replace' the current order with an Islamic one similar to that which held 
the society together prior to the introduction of the Kemalist modernisation project. 
Despite the Islamist political parties' claim of representing the periphery and their 
use of Islamic symbols and discourse, their policies have reflected an instrumentalist 
use of religion, constrained by the function of power-seeking. 
The validity of this analysis is not limited to the case study as no points in 
this analysis prevent it from having validity beyond Turkey. It aspires to contribute 
to the general understanding of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East. 
The main characteristic of the modernisation process in the Middle East is 
its elite-imposed and alien nature. The modernising elite of the post-independence 
Middle East embarked on ambitious projects to develop their countries to the levels 
of Western countries. However, the modernisation process remained rather shallow 
in the region, lacking naturally derived roots. The modernising elite often remained 
unable to create necessary links to build a hegemonic ideology, leading to continuous 
questioning of their legitimacy. Most regimes rested on the economic aspects of the 
modernisation projects to derive legitimacy. Under the state-led industrialisation 
projects and expanding bureaucracies states managed to provide guaranteed 
employment for the educated youth, welfare services and subsidies for their citizens. 
As the economic expansion became unsustainable, the state's ability to deliver 
r 
benefits for its citizens declined. This resulted in stronger calls for change' in the 
system. The Islamist movements represent a response to the imposed modernisation 
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process and its failure to deliver its promises. The reason why collective action is 
pronounced in Islamist terms also becomes clear in such a perspective, as Islamist 
movements are a response to imposed and alien versions of modernity; they gather 
around authentic values in their response. At the same time the Islamist movements 
are a product of modernisation and incorporate the counter-elite in itself, which are 
now proposing an alternative to modernity. 
By bringing in the New Social Movements approach as a framework for 
the analysis I have subordinated particularistic approaches to Islamic revivalism and 
analysed this phenomenon in the wider perspective of collective action. By this way, 
essentialist and Orientalist approaches are avoided. By comparing the Western and 
Middle Eastern themes, I have underlined that Islamist movements are not unique or 
confined in their causes, actions and rhetoric to the Middle East and are certainly not 
a result of the characteristics of Islam; rather in a similar way to the NSMs, they are 
best understood as responses to modernity. 
Comparing the New Social Movements and the Islamist movements 
helped to show that collective action in the world in general has become a post-class 
phenomenon, focusing on identity politics and a critique of modernity. Islamic 
revivalism, like the New Social Movements, is both a response and challenge to 
dominant versions of modernity and of the elite. This approach could be useful in 
understanding the religious movements as well as other movements that rest on 
authentic themes in other settings where the modernisation project was imposed as 
an alien project. 
A comparison with the New Social Movements also highlighted the 
differences between the industrialised Western world and the late developing 
countries, particularly with those like the majority of the Middle Eastern countries 
that embarked upon nation-building processes after colonial experiences. While the 
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collective action in the Western world - New Social Movements - work within post- 
modem environments, collective action in the Middle East takes place within an 
environment in which modernisation has not yet been fully achieved. We can say 
that New Social Movements are responses to modernity in the post-modern era, 
while authenticated responses to modernity, like the Islamist movements, operate in 
limited or incomplete modernisations. The differences in the nature of the public 
space in these environments also contribute to differences in political forms within 
which collective action takes place. 
After September I Ith, arguments of `clash of civilisations' and essentialist 
and Orientalist understandings of the Islamist movements seem to be having a 
revival. As argued in this thesis, Islamist movements are best understood as 
responses to modernity, and as such are comparable to other movements that criticise 
and respond to imposed modernisation. Thus, I hope that this thesis has served as an 
antidote to the clash of civilisations approach. 
i A 
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